

The “War on Terror” and the Military– Archaeology Complex: Iraq, Ethics, and Neo-Colonialism

Yannis Hamilakis, University of Southampton,
Southampton, UK
E-mail: Y.Hamilakis@soton.ac.uk

ABSTRACT

The archaeological response to the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq is often portrayed as a crusade to rescue antiquities, destroyed either directly by the military action itself or indirectly by the looting of archaeological sites and museums. I argue in this paper that this narrative is awfully inadequate, and masks the ethical and political dimensions at the core of this historical episode. I contend that, in their often well-intended attempts to rescue antiquities, most archaeologists involved have projected a professionalized, apolitical and abstract response, devoid of the social and political context, and based on the fetishisation of a narrowly and problematically defined archaeological record. I argue further that the increasing collaboration of many archaeologists with the invading militaries and occupation authorities since 2003, assisted by the “cultural turn” especially within the US military, have laid the foundations for an emerging military-archaeology complex. I trace the contours of this phenomenon by examining various archaeological and museum discourses and practices. This new development (with historical resonances that go as far back as the 18th century, if not earlier) is linked directly with the ontology and epistemology of archaeology, and deserves further close scrutiny and analysis. The thesis advanced here does not advocate inaction and withdrawal in situations of warfare, but a critical engagement that safeguards the autonomy of the scholar; critiques the political agendas and power structures of contemporary warfare; deconstructs its discursive basis and its ideological overtones; and shows its catastrophic consequences for people and things alike, past and present.

Résumé: La réponse archéologique à l'invasion de 2003 et à l'occupation de l'Irak est souvent dépeinte comme une croisade pour sauver les antiquités détruites soit directement par l'action militaire, soit indirectement par le pillage des sites archéologiques et des musées. Je démontre dans cet article que cette présentation des faits est totalement erronée et masque les

dimensions éthiques et politiques au cœur de cet épisode historique. Je soutiens que dans leurs tentatives souvent bien intentionnées destinées à sauver des antiquités, la plupart des archéologues impliqués ont projeté une réponse professionnalisée, apolitique et abstraite, ignorante du contexte social et politique et basée sur la fétichisation d'un compte-rendu archéologique défini de façon étroit et problématique. Je démontre également que la collaboration qui s'est étendue à de nombreux archéologues en relation avec les forces militaires d'invasion depuis 2003, assisté par la mise en place d'un «tournant culturel» tout particulièrement dans l'armée américaine, a jeté les bases d'un complexe d'archéologie militaire émergent. Je définis les contours de ce phénomène en examinant différents discours et pratiques à la fois archéologiques et relatifs aux musées. Ce nouveau développement (avec des résonances historiques qui ont pris racine dès le 18^e siècle, sinon plus tôt) est lié directement à l'ontologie et l'épistémologie archéologique et mérite une analyse et un examen plus minutieux. La thèse avancée ici ne préconise pas l'inaction et la rétractation dans les situations de guerre mais un engagement critique qui sauvegarde l'autonomie du spécialiste; des critiques sur les ordres du jour politiques et les structures du pouvoir de toute guerre contemporaine; la déconstruction de sa base discursive et de ses connotations idéologiques; et montre en dernier ressort ses conséquences catastrophiques, passées et présentes, à fois pour les habitants et les objets.

Resumen: La respuesta arqueológica a la invasión y ocupación de Irak se representa muchas veces como una cruzada para rescatar las antigüedades, que resultaron destruidas bien por la propia acción militar o indirectamente por el saqueo de los yacimientos arqueológicos o museos. En este trabajo argumento que esta argumentación es terriblemente inadecuada y oculta las dimensiones éticas y políticas subyacentes en este acontecimiento histórico. Afirmo que, en sus intentos bienintencionados de rescatar las antigüedades, la mayoría de los arqueólogos participantes han proyectado una respuesta abstracta, apolítica y profesionalizada, exenta del contexto social y político, y basada en convertir en fetiche un registro arqueológico estrecha y problemáticamente definido. También sostengo que la creciente colaboración de muchos arqueólogos con los militares invasores y las autoridades de ocupación desde el 2003, ayudados por el «giro cultural» experimentado principalmente en el seno del ejército estadounidense, han sentado las bases para la aparición de un complejo militar y arqueológico. Sigo el perfil de este fenómeno analizando varios discursos y prácticas arqueológicas y de los museos. Este nuevo desarrollo (con resonancias históricas que se remontan hasta el siglo 18, si no antes) está directamente relacionado con la ontología y epistemología de la arqueología y merece más escrutinio y análisis. La tesis

avanzada aquí no aboga por la inacción o la retirada en situaciones de guerra, sino que se trata de un compromiso crítico que salvaguarda la autonomía del académico, critica los programas políticos y las estructuras de poder de la guerra moderna; desmantela su base argumental y sus tonos ideológicos y muestra sus catastróficas consecuencias, tanto para personas como para las cosas, del pasado y del presente.

KEYWORDS

Ethics, Politics, War, Iraq, Neo-colonialism

Introduction

During the fierce fighting of the past few weeks, we were relieved to see that our military leaders and coalition partners took extreme precautions to avoid targeting cultural sites along with other non-military places. It was also comforting to receive reports that our armed forces have conducted inspections at some of the important archaeological sites....The return to freedom of the Iraqi people must include the freedom to enjoy the great heritage resources inherited from their ancestors....

In contrast to the inhuman Iraqi regime that has just ended, the United States is a benevolent nation committed to the realization of the full human potential through freedom, democracy, fair play and the rule of law (From a letter sent on the 16th of April 2003 to President Bush by 21 US professional organisations to do with heritage, from the American Anthropological Association, to the Society of American Archaeology, and many more).¹

The Department of State should undertake increased responsibility for protection of cultural heritage worldwide...To protect tangible heritage, the United States needs to better understand the intangible cultural values *of the nation to be occupied* (Wilkie 2008; Nancy Wilkie, ex-president of the Archaeological Institute of America, and member of the Cultural Property Advisory Committee which advises the President of the USA on national policy regarding import of archaeological artefacts; emphasis added).

These two passages set the chronological limits of my enquiry here. More importantly, however, they are paradigmatic of a phenomenon that deserves close scrutiny; they embody the monumental failure of most archaeologists and other heritage professionals and organisations to articulate a political and ethical response to the phenomenon known as the "war on terror", a response that could go beyond a narrowly defined and misguided sense of

“professional duty”.² The first intervention, in the midst of the US-led Iraq invasion, in its eagerness to highlight the need for the protection of cultural heritage as defined by these organisations, adopted uncritically the rhetoric of the invading and subsequently occupying power. It abrogated thus the duty of the scholar and intellectual to subject to critique and scrutiny social reality and power structures, especially since the Iraq invasion was opposed to by the majority of people worldwide, and its imperial and neo-colonial logic had been, even at that early stage, exposed widely. The second passage demonstrates vividly the logical extension of such uncritical attitude. The heritage professional here takes for granted that the course of invading and occupying independent countries by the USA administration is already set; she/he thus offers cultural advice on how such operation can be carried out. Furthermore, the passage, unintentionally perhaps, suggests that cultural heritage worldwide and its protection should become part of the remit of the USA Department of State, as if global imperial domination is a done deal. Finally, it points to the need to understand the cultural values of the nations “to be occupied”, echoing a phenomenon that has been termed by scholars and critics as “the cultural turn” of the “war on terror”: the recent tendency of the USA military authorities (and their allies) to invest heavily on and incorporate insights from the academy and especially from the Humanities, which could help them understand local cultural attitudes and values, in order to succeed in their invading and colonising projects, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq (cf. González 2007, 2008; Gregory 2008; Mirzoeff 2008).³

The history of archaeology is replete with examples of scholars operating as part of military structures; archaeologists who followed the flag and marched along with the invaders and colonisers, carrying out their scholarly work, no doubt for the good of scholarship, in the name of saving antiquities in the “cradles of mankind” and within the broader “civilising” mission. In the past, military leaders doubled as archaeologists and excavators, and recent commentators have drawn attention to the resemblances between certain field archaeological practices and military operations (e.g. Joyce 2002). But today we do not live in the era of Napoleonic Wars, not even the era of post-Ottoman colonial Middle-East, where archaeologists and colonial administrators worked hand-in-hand, often embodying both roles in the same person. Or do we? Edward Said, in the preface to the 2003 edition of *Orientalism* noted: “Orientalism once again raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended, or whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon’s entry into Egypt two centuries ago” (2003:xxi–xxii; cf. also El-Haj 2005; Gregory 2004). History has the annoying habit of repeating itself, only that, the second time, as someone famously noted, it plays itself as farce, but with tragic consequences nevertheless. The recent, “pre-emptive wars” since 2001 show that Said’s concern was valid. One would have expected, however, that the scholarly

fields in the Humanities would have learned from the recent endless debates on colonialism and post-colonialism, on the links between knowledge and power, and on the necessity for reflexivity. Evidence shows otherwise. In this article, I return to the issues I discussed first in a 2003 piece (Hamilakis 2003). I examine the archaeological responses to the “war on terror” and more specifically to the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the USA and its allies, and trace recent developments since 2003. I argue that what in 2003 I tentatively identified as the “embedded archaeologist”, the figure of the professional who works in close collaboration with the invading and occupying armies in the service of rescuing antiquities, is now a common occurrence. Moreover, that the links between the military of these invading and occupying powers and the archaeologists and heritage professionals, mostly *from these same countries*, are now both more widespread and much closer than they were in 2003, producing *de facto a military-archaeology complex*. I contend that the phenomenon poses serious ethical and political challenges, and demands close scrutiny and scholarly interrogation.

The Iraq Invasion and the “Embedded Archaeologist”

With regard to Iraq, the basic facts are by now more or less known.⁴ In the run-up to the 2003 US-led illegal invasion and occupation of the country, archaeologists from the invading countries got mobilised, fearful that the incoming war will destroy the antiquities of Iraq. Lists of sites and their co-ordinates were sent to the Pentagon, and to the UK Ministry of Defence, questions were asked in the UK House of Lords (Stone 2005), letters were written to politicians, articles were published in newspapers, some by archaeologists, and some by journalists based on archaeological sources. So far so good, you would say. After all, these archaeologists were doing a commendable job, raising their voices in favour of the protection of antiquities. In other words, they were advocates of the archaeological past, especially since powerful collectors’ lobbies, especially in the USA, saw an opportunity and lobbied the US administration for a “liberal” policy regarding the antiquities of Iraq (e.g. MacLeod 2003; Global Policy Forum 2007).

The argument of many of these archaeologists was that, if they did not interfere, ignorant military personnel and their political masters would have destroyed valuable antiquities, of importance not only to the Iraqis, but to the whole world, or they could have succumbed to the pressure of collectors’ lobbies. Needless to say that we are not dealing here with a unified and homogeneous response. In this mobilisation, one could detect various and at times conflicting tendencies, from genuine concern, to national

rivalry and the anxiety felt by various organisations, institutions and individuals that their nation should be represented in the effort of rescuing antiquities and in the subsequent situation on the ground, and often a mixture of both. Institutions from the invading countries that portray themselves as “universal museums” (such as the British Museum) rushed to head these initiatives, leading others to question their motives (cf. Stone 2005:7). Not all these specialists were against the invasion (Bahrani 2008a), but those who were, may have been mobilised not only by their genuine sense of professional duty and care for antiquities, but also by the belief that in emphasising the potential danger to antiquities, they were expressing a veiled anti-war feeling, founded on their professional expertise. In most cases, however, these responses were articulated and were perceived as action by a professional group being mobilised through whatever means possible, in order to save antiquities. Only that the issue was and still is much more complicated than that, and it is this complexity and the associated ethical conundrums that I want to bring into focus here.

For a start, most of these interventions were happening within a specific historical and political context: a war that was widely perceived as being illegal, a pre-emptive strike, based on the sidelining of the only legitimate global body, the UN, and on evidence that most people and organisations even then considered, as it turned out, rightly, fabricated. The ideological justification of such venture was the well-known neo-conservative, neo-imperial project, which championed USA unilateral military interventions anywhere in the world. The pretext was to protect the USA from the “unknown unknowns” and the metaphysically perceived sense of “terror”. But the subtext was to appropriate world resources, and remake regions such as the Middle East along the lines of neo-liberal economy, as it became increasingly clear. Indeed, this was commented upon widely in the media by critics and intellectuals, and was also opposed by the majority of people on earth, who in 2003 were in the streets, demonstrating by the millions.

Archaeology is all about context, we say to our first year students. Yet, our colleagues, with some exceptions, seemed to have (or have chosen to) ignored this context. There was perhaps a desire to demonstrate complete neutrality; perhaps many believed that heritage specialists can be, as professionals, completely apolitical, or they thought that in this way their intervention can be more effective. Also, many archaeologists and other heritage professionals may have thought that they can decouple the policies of their governments from their own attempts to rescue antiquities, or even that they may be able to atone for some of these policies by attempting to preserve some of the antiquities of the invading country. Yet, all social action is situated within specific regimes of power. To ignore the context of such interventions and treat the efforts to rescue antiquities as an abstract act,

antiquities that appeared as endangered by an equally abstract threat of "war" (as if it was a "natural" disaster), leads at best to the de-politicisation of warfare and its agents, and at worse, as in the passages above, to the adoption of the rhetoric of the invader and coloniser.

Second, on what basis can someone decide which sites are archaeologically significant, to be listed for preservation? What are the criteria? Significant for whom? For some specific Anglo-American or western archaeologists, for some Iraqi archaeologists, the people of Iraq? And which social groups within it? The "globe" as a whole? Was this process of valuation based on any historical, ethnographic or other research? Archaeology no longer makes the distinction between past and present material culture, or even between artefacts and other material traces, be it landscapes, city-scapes, or seascapes. All material culture is the concern of archaeology. All types of human-scapes and landscapes are socially important for the present as well as the future, and different groups are attached to different kinds of material culture. Certain western, often orientalist discourses have declared aspects of Middle Eastern prehistory as "evolutionary firsts" and the region as a whole the "cradle of the western civilisation", which has been symbolically appropriated as "global past" (cf. several papers in Pollock and Bernbeck 2005). Some non-"Mesopotamian" sites were included in the lists supplied to the military by archaeologists,⁵ but what about the innumerable, non "important" material traces of human life in Iraq, past and present? The absurdity in this operation is the *process of selective listing itself*, carried out by archaeologists for the military of *their own countries*, about to start bombing. Let's hear the Iraqi-born, archaeologist and art historian, Zainab Bahrani on this: "The entirety of Iraq is a world cultural heritage site, and there is no way that a strategic bombing can avoid something archaeological".⁶

Third, and following on from the above, how can these specialists have claimed that they were rescuing antiquities by supplying these lists, when it was announced before hand that this will be a war of "shock and awe"? Here are some facts testifying to the ferocity of the invasion:

During the 1991 Gulf War, roughly three hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired over the course of five weeks. In 2003, more than three hundred and eighty were launched *in a single day*. Between March 20 and May 2, the weeks of "major combat", the US military dropped more than thirty thousand bombs on Iraq, as well as twenty thousand precision-cruised missiles—67 percent of the total number ever made (Klein 2007:331–332; emphasis added).

Even if certain "archaeological sites" were to be spared in this relentless bombing, how about all the other material traces of human life, past and present, how about the human lives themselves?

But these interventions by archaeologists prior to and in the midst of the invasion is not the whole story. A number of specialists went much further: they accepted *advisory roles* within the Pentagon, the British Ministry of Defence, or the occupation authorities, advising on archaeological and heritage matters, and stressing the importance of material heritage. In 2 February 2003, well before the start of the invasion, Peter Stone, then chief executive officer of the World Archaeological Congress, was approached by the UK Ministry of Defence and was asked to act as advisor. He accepted, and started providing expertise on material heritage, liaising with Mesopotamian specialists, participating in various meetings, and even writing an article on the importance of antiquities which was published in Arabic in the newspaper put out by the British in the occupied sector under their responsibility. Although he was not asked to sign a bidding confidentially agreement, he had to work, at least in the early stages, *in secrecy* (Stone 2005:3). Here is the farcical element in the whole affair: these specialists were offering advice on cultural heritage to the military of their own countries, while at the same time they were embedded within structures which were destroying that material heritage daily, with a force rarely seen in previous military conflicts. A revealing indication of how these heritage specialists were able to construe their role in strict, “professional” terms, making themselves immune to the dealings in the “office next door” to them, is the following passage:

I decided that if the MoD—*understandably as they were in the midst of running a war*—did not have the time to brief archaeologists about pre- (or post-) war planning, I would take the initiative and contact a number of people from whom I wanted advice in anticipation of this meeting (Stone 2005:4; emphasis added).

We are all aware of the destruction that followed: the looting of the Iraq Museum in Baghdad and of the National library, the looting and destruction of hundreds of declared archaeological sites all over the country, the use of the site of Babylon as well as other sites (e.g. Kish, Ur, Samarra) as military bases, resulting in significant damage (Al-Hussainy and Matthews 2008; Bahrani 2006; Curtis 2008). And of course, all this in the context of a far wider humanitarian, cultural and environmental catastrophe, in the context of immense brutality, terror and torture, in the context of Abu Ghraib and the other torture facilities all over Iraq. Does the estimated 1.2 million civilian deaths since March 2003,⁷ more than those who died in the Rwanda genocide, and the four million displaced,⁸ not constitute a huge destruction of Iraqi heritage?

Many archaeologists and others expressed outraged at the images of the looted Museum, much fewer expressed similar outrage at the broader war

crimes committed. Many specialists expressed despair, and accepted failure, that even with all the warnings and the pleading to the invading and occupying armies, all the collaboration and offers of advice, such “archaeological disaster” could have happened. The Iraq Museum was second in the list of eighty buildings to be secured by the US army. It made no difference. But what was perhaps not evident to many of us then, but it is now, is that the indifference shown by the invaders to looting and to destruction was not unrelated to the broader USA administration’s plan to undo a whole country so that it can build it a-new as a corporate utopia, as a fully privatised paradise for Halliburton. After all, this neo-imperial project did not believe in anything public, be it museums, archaeological sites, or the oil industry (Klein 2007). That is why it did not matter that much to them if the antiquities of Iraq were to end up in private collections in the USA, UK, or Japan. It is this mentality and climate that the US collectors’ lobbies had sensed and they had tried to capitalise on by advocating the “legitimate dispersal of cultural material through the market” which, they claimed, is the best way to guarantee its preservation (Global Policy Forum 2007:2).

In the most recent, published assessment of the state of antiquities in Iraq, authored by Abbas Al-Hussainy, ex-director of the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (2006–2007), and the Mesopotamian specialist Roger Matthews, the conclusions are grim, but the responsibility clear:

In conclusion, we can state that the archaeological and cultural heritage(s) of Iraq are in the most severe state of crisis that they have ever experienced. Until the mid-nineteenth century AD the physical remains of Iraq’s uniquely significant past lay more or less safe and untouched in the earth, where they were rudely disturbed by western explorers from the 1840s onwards. Events in the five years since spring 2003 have been even more disastrous for the integrity, or even survival, of large portions of the archaeological and historical heritage of Iraq and, sadly, much of the blame for that disaster has to be laid at the door of the governments of the invading states who failed to take seriously enough the threat to Iraq’s heritage that would inevitably accompany a collapse of central government in Iraq (Al-Hussainy and Matthews 2008:98–99).

In the same article, Al-Hussainy also recounts a strange event, which evokes very vividly the life and work of a “native” archaeologist in a country under military occupation by the US and its allies:

On the 24th of May 2007 an American military convoy arrived at my office at the Iraq Museum and demanded to enter the compound. When I refused they broke down the gates, and when I again refused to allow them into the building itself they gave me a strange letter in Arabic, addressed to ‘Dear Colleague’ and lacking a signature, which stated that their group belonged to

the US Embassy in Baghdad, and that they were authorised to enter the museum. When I responded that this letter was insufficient they replied that they would enter the building whether or not I agreed. At this point I threatened to call UNESCO to say that this group wanted to destroy the Iraq Museum again, at which point they disappeared. I never received any explanation of their behaviour, let alone an apology (Al-Hussainy and Matthews 2008:96).

Finally, the same authors refute arguments that the looting of antiquities was due to poverty, claiming that:

...rural communities living in proximity to archaeological sites regarded, still regard, those sites not as potential sources of financial wealth, but rather as sacred, spiritual places, connected either with evil jinn (genies), or with cemeteries for the burial of their own dead (Al-Hussainy and Matthews 2008:98).

It seems that the widespread looting of archaeological sites and artefacts, was due not only to the destruction of cultural infrastructure of Iraq as a result of the invasion (and the sanctions before it) but also of the incorporation of the country in the networks of global neo-liberal economy and its art market, and the creation of channels through which such a flow could be facilitated. As Robert Fisk has stated,

The instruments on how to cherry pick Mesopotamia's most precious heritage did not come from a 13th-century warrior or from hordes riding from the east. They came from billionaires, by email and coded fax, from around the globe. Greed has been—to use a word I don't like—globalised. Pillage has been industrialised (Fisk 2008:xiii).

The Military-Archaeology Complex

If the close collaboration of archaeologists with the military of their own country engaged in the invasion and occupation of Iraq had little impact in terms of saving even the few selected archaeological sites listed, and the buildings that had to be secured, what did it achieve? In the months and years that followed, the links between the military and archaeological and heritage organisations and professionals intensified. US-based archaeologists surveyed the damage to antiquities under heavy US army protection,⁹ and a recent survey to assess the damage in the south, carried out by archaeologists from the British Museum in collaboration with Iraqi archaeologists was “facilitated by the British Army” (Curtis 2008:220). Archaeologists and other heritage professionals from the invading nations worked in

the cultural sections of the “Coalition Provisional Authority” set up by the military occupiers (cf. Curtis 2003), and the Archaeological Institute of America has sent archaeologists to US military bases and camps to “teach the basics of Middle Eastern archaeology and the importance of protecting the evidence of past cultures” (Waldbaum 2005; cf. also Geracimos 2008).

US military officers now write for or have been interviewed by scholarly archaeological journals and volumes (e.g. Bogdanos 2005; Rose 2003), and they function as discussants and presenters in archaeological conferences. In one case, a then US Army officer used the academic platform of a prominent archaeological journal to attack archaeologists who had expressed opposition to the war in Iraq (Bogdanos 2005); this article went unchallenged, with no commentary nor response by the editors, nor anyone else. In another case, a UK-based team of forensic archaeologists and anthropologists moved from an archaeology department to a department linked directly with the “defence” sector, a place where “experts from Academia—Cranfield University—and Officers of the British Armed Forces meet to teach Defence Science, Technology and Management”¹⁰ and which organises conferences such as “small arms and cannons”; “electronic warfare”; “military anthropology”; but also “understanding Islam”.¹¹

In 2004, the Smithsonian Institution organised an exhibition of American wars, starting with the early years of American independence, and concluding with the invasion of Iraq. Its title, “The Price of Freedom”. Some museum professionals thus have already inscribed the Iraq invasion, into a narrative of wars of independence. The otherwise innovative exhibition on Babylon which opened at the British Museum in November 2008, concluded with a video outlining the recent legacy of the site, including the damage done by Saddam Hussein and by the USA army (cf. Curtis 2008); the final section of the video, however (“The Future”) ends with the reassurance that archaeologists from the British Museum now work closely with Iraqi archaeologists, UNESCO, and the military, to plan the protection of the site.

In the run up to WAC6 (Dublin, 29 June–4 July 2008), I was asked, as a co-ordinator of the task force on archaeologists and war, to organise the theme on this issue for the conference. With fellow members of the task force, Reinhard Bernbeck and Susan Pollock, we put together the theme “Archaeologists, War and Conflict: Politics, Ethics, Responsibility”. When we started receiving proposals for themes and papers from serving army officers (from the USA and UK armies), we had to reflect long and hard on whether to accept them or not. After long deliberations, we decided not to accept offers by serving military of any country, stating that this is an opportunity for archaeologists to debate their ethical and political stance in situations of warfare, not a general conference theme on war. Furthermore, that the presence of serving military personnel from armies that are currently engaging in imperial pre-emptive wars was not only against the spirit of the

theme, but it could also cause offence and intimidation to several colleagues, especially from the countries currently being invaded. As a result of this decision, we came under extensive pressure by WAC and the organisers to change our mind. At the end, serving army officers participated in sessions outside the “Archaeologists and War” theme. One such session had to take place under police guard (for reasons still unclear), causing further intimidation to several delegates who refused to attend the session in protest. In early 2008, I was invited to attend an academic conference at Cambridge, UK, on war and cultural heritage, to be held at the end of that year. I accepted, but when later in that year I received the final list of speakers, the name of a UK army general, at the time in charge of the UK army forces in Iraq, had been added. After long and hard thinking I withdraw from the conference, and so did two other colleagues for the same reasons.

It seems that it is now becoming acceptable for serving military personnel to be invited to academic conferences, as if the military is another “stakeholder”, which shares the ethics and values of scholarly work, as well as the concern of academics and heritage professionals for the care and protection of cultural heritage; as if it was, in other words, a *natural partner* in our efforts to rescue antiquities. Even if the military in which these officers are prominent members of is at the same time implicated in illegal wars and occupations, they implement a neo-imperial project, and have been found guilty of torture and other crimes. Within any military, of course, there are different views and perceptions on culture and cultural heritage (cf. Brown 2008), but the traditions, principles and structures of such organisation are antithetical to the spirit of critique, debate, and challenge of authority which should characterise intellectual work. More importantly, contemporary warfare cannot be dissociated from the political projects which is called to serve.

In the flurry of academic publications that followed the Iraq disaster, the looting and destruction of cultural heritage is seen mostly as a problem of bad communication, of mismanagement, of lack of information among the military. As can be seen from the second passage at the top of this article, archaeologists are now willing to offer professional, technical cultural advice and expertise on the next “nation to be occupied”, accepting uncritically and as a-matter-of-fact that this will be the course of events from now on, as the naturalised state of world affairs. Hence all the initiatives to inform and train the military, and to collaborate even closer with it.

The archaeological outrage following the 2003 looting and destruction can be seen, to some extent, not only as a professional reaction in favour of antiquities, but also as another expression of the anti-war sentiment, especially in the rare occasions when it was articulated as part of a holistic, ethical, political as well as professional response. As such, it was extremely valuable (cf. Mirzoeff 2008:119). But for the most part, this outrage was

abstract and depoliticised, it was an outrage that focused mostly on ancient objects, one that construed a terrain full of world masterpieces and invaluable sites, but deplete of contemporary people, a *terra nullius*, well known from the colonial discourse. It also failed to see the broader political context and the attempt to undo a country. This depoliticised reaction, and the collaboration of archaeologists with the military (assisted by the “cultural turn” in the military itself),¹² may not have succeeded to safeguard Iraq’s cultural heritage, but they did achieve something important, with potentially serious consequences. They set the foundations, un-intentionally perhaps, for a new militarised archaeology, a military-archaeology complex.¹³ I argue that this military-archaeology complex, some expressions of which I have outlined above, deserves serious study, and its ethical and political dimensions should be examined in much detail. It constitutes a new area for the politics of archaeology, but one that chances are, will be increasingly important in the future.

The phenomenon is not simply a sideline in the broader archaeological discussion. It is rather linked directly to the definition and ontology of archaeology, its ethics (what is our primary ethical responsibility?), and its politics (what are the political effects of our action?) As noted earlier, recent and very promising discussions on the ontology of the discipline, define archaeology broadly as the study of *all* material culture, be it prehistoric or contemporary, a monumental building or a humble house, and their broader landscape. Such definition seems to be at odds with the interventions by archaeologists who rushed to provide expertise to the military, compile lists of “important” sites and so on. Moreover, the collaboration of archaeologists with the military rests on the assumption that the most important ethical principle for the archaeologist, her primary duty and responsibility, is the stewardship for and protection of the “archaeological record”, however defined. The hugely problematic nature of such assumption and its ethical traps have been widely debated (cf. Groarke and Warrick 2006; Hamilakis 1999; 2007; Tarlow 2006; Wylie 2005, and other papers in the same volume). Increasingly, it is becoming accepted that archaeologists do not deal with the material traces of dead people, but rather with living people and “living” things, engaged in the endless process of mutual constitution. To selectively valorise certain things which have been constituted by archaeologists as “archaeological record” (Mesopotamian palaces or cities, for example) and to declare ourselves as the stewards of such a record, is not only ontologically unsustainable but also ethically suspect and self-serving. Our ethical responsibility should not be towards an abstract sense of the past nor towards one materialised by archaeologists themselves, a past which we are supposed to safeguard for an equally abstract future, evading thus the present. It should rather be towards the social present, a present which incorporates the animate and

inanimate beings of multiple, and often co-existing times, and towards an ethically conceived and socially just future.

It is partly this sense of misplaced professionalised responsibility to a very selective and archaeologically produced “record” that justifies alliances such as with the military, even if that military is engaged in destroying at the same time the very material heritage that archaeologists claim to protect. But this sense of responsibility is not only misplaced and arbitrary, it is also metaphysically abstract and completely depoliticised: it does not recognise the broader political frameworks within which it becomes implicated, nor the political effects of actions such as the collaboration with a military engaged in neo-colonial invasions and occupations. A militarised archaeology, especially when its agents become fully embedded within military structures (as employees or advisors of the military, for example), does not lose simply its autonomy and independence, and thus its ability to critique military and political authority; it also provides scholarly and academic legitimacy to military campaigns and the political projects they serve. The military thus becomes sanitized and depoliticized, an innocent bystander, absolved of the responsibility borne by its political masters, a “service industry”, “armed social work” (cf. Gregory 2008:13), with a “job to do” (a “war to run”—Stone 2005:4). The willingness of some parts of the military to make “rescuing antiquities” part of their business, to set up an archaeology branch in their midst, invests their operations with respectability and cultural sensitivity, a respectability and legitimacy that in the case of Iraq, were and are badly needed. It also acts therapeutically for domestic audiences in the invading countries (Gregory 2008), offering a positive picture amidst the string of bad news. Finally, in the case of Iraq, it offers an assurance that the USA and UK administrations and their military will avoid a PR disaster, such as the public outrage after the looting of the Iraq Museum in Baghdad, “next time”.

There are additional ethical concerns and conundrums that a militarised archaeology is bound to face. For example, how legitimate is it for archaeologists from the invading nations to be collaborating with the military of *their own countries*, especially since some of these countries (as in the case of the UK), have a long history of colonial rule and domination, and of colonial archaeology, in the countries that they illegally invaded? Why was there almost no discussion on the potential links between these old colonial ties and the current campaigns, and on the nationalist anxieties to stake claims in the post-invasion Iraq? And what kind of image of archaeology do these specialists project on the people of the invaded country, when they tour the country carrying out their archaeological work under the heavy armed protection of the occupying army, an army and an occupation hugely unpopular in that country, as in the case of Iraq?

Doing Nothing?

A counter-argument to the objections raised above is that this position implies inactivity, passivity, withdrawal, which, some claim, is worse and more unethical. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, most specialists who have pointed out the ethical pitfalls of a militarised archaeology have been very active over Iraq, and more generally. They have often combined their archaeological persona with that of the activist, being very vocal and explicit in their opposition to the invasion and its ideological and political basis, pointing at the same time to the disastrous effects of such action for archaeological heritage (e.g. Bernbeck 2008b). My position here does not advocate inactivity and non-engagement; in fact, it advocates the opposite. In cases like Iraq, archaeologists who, of course, possess other identities too, such as that of the concerned citizen, the national subject of an invading country, or the public intellectual, could have expressed their public opposition to the invasion on various grounds (and some have done so): political, ethical, as well as specifically professional. In addition, they could have used their specialist knowledge and skills to expose the colonial underpinnings of such campaign, deconstruct the "civilising" discourse of the invader, and show the historical links with earlier forms of imperial domination. The raw material for this deconstructionist project is plentiful: from the invocation of the figure of T.E. Lawrence and the constant citation of his work in the various "cultural" initiatives of the USA military (Gregory 2008:17–18; González 2007), to the construction and dissemination of allochronic stereotypes, such as the discursive and visual theme, popular at the start of the invasion of Afghanistan, which portrayed its people as living in the "Bronze Age". They could have also projected a broad and inclusive definition of the archaeological and material heritage, pointing to the futility of any exercise in selective prioritisation and listing in the midst of a military attack of overwhelming force, and of the dangers of separating people and things.

Other expressions of more practical intervention could include the solidarity and direct collaboration (outside of the military structures) with archaeologists working in the occupied countries, the invitation to them to talk about the archaeology of their country as they define it or about archaeology in general, or even ask them to train students in western countries. Archaeologists could also campaign for the return to Iraq of the masses of documents of historical value which were illegally seized by the USA military and by intelligence forces and are currently kept in USA institutions.¹⁴ And finally, they could campaign for *cultural reparations* towards the invaded countries (which will also imply acceptance of responsibility), rather than "aid" by the invaders, linked to specific political agendas, such as the creation of a, friendly towards the donor, cultural elite, as it happens at the moment.¹⁵

In some cases, archaeologists and others may of course have no option but to liaise with military authorities, and nobody has suggested that this should be avoided at all costs. But such engagement should always happen openly and publicly rather than in secrecy, and should not sacrifice the independence and autonomy of the scholar, and her ability to resist the physical and structural violence of the military (Bernbeck 2008a). It should include the open critique of illegal military action, whether it is to do with humanitarian crimes, or with iconoclastic campaigns (Bernbeck 2008b), and the symbolic and material use of ancient sites as their bases (cf. Bahrani 2006). Moreover, any engagement should be constantly aware of its legitimating effects, and its deployment within broader regimes of truth and rule (Foucault 1980), whether it is the use of mass exhumations to justify the violent removal of a regime, or the deployment by a military of the discourse of care and protection of ancient sites (“military stewardship”) to demonstrate cultural sensitivity.

One of outcomes of the Iraq affair is the current attempts to create a new umbrella organisation that will co-ordinate the response of heritage professionals in situations of natural and human-made disasters, such as wars. The International Committee of the Blue Shield, the symbol for marking cultural sites specified by the Hague convention, is seen as one such organisation by many. One of the key stated aims of this international committee is its independence and neutrality, hence the statement that it is equivalent to the International Committee of the Red Cross.¹⁶ Many heritage professionals who champion the Blue Shield, however, have already compromised the independence of their organisations and their own, by collaborating with the invading armies of their own countries, engaging in an illegal war. Besides, in the website of the USA branch of this committee, the word independence is nowhere to be seen, whereas its first goal is to: “coordinate with the US military, US government, and other cultural property organizations to protect cultural property worldwide during armed conflict”.¹⁷ Note the phrasing here: both the US government and the US military become partners in the protection of “cultural property”, and if one wanted to read this passage literally, they even become “cultural property organisations” themselves. Setting up such an organisation is not an easy task, nor am I the best person to prescribe a plan for it, but for any such organisation to succeed, autonomy, independence, freedom from censorship and self-censorship, and ability to publicly critique power structures are paramount. This is what embedded archaeologists and heritage professionals, often working in secret, have lost; they have surrendered their autonomy as scholars, as intellectuals, as citizens who can use their specialist knowledge, not only to care for the material heritage, but also to articulate a powerful, public, critical response. They have become professionalized technicians who do not question the broader regime of truth and power within which their knowledge is being deployed.

One of most encouraging signs, however, is the overt or covert expressions of resistance or concern. Several colleagues who were approached by the army in 2003 in the USA and the UK, declined to collaborate; and several Mesopotamian specialists expressed their public opposition to the invasion primarily on humanitarian and ethical, as well as scholarly grounds. But even people who have accepted that role, have started having serious doubts on the wisdom of their decision. Here are just two examples. Rene Teijgeler, held the position of senior advisor for the Ministry of Culture at the so-called Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, at the US Embassy. But in a recent article (Teijgeler 2008) he openly compared the roles of embedded archaeologist to that of the embedded journalist, producing biased news, and worse, becoming part of the war machine. He concludes by saying that we need to examine that role much more carefully. Zainab Bahrani, despite her doubts, due to her strong opposition to the war, travelled to Iraq in 2004 and acted as an advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Culture. "At that time, [she will write] the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had handed 'full authority' of the ministry back to Iraq and to the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH), but the truth was that this was merely a charade" (Bahrani 2008b:165). After many frustrating months trying to convince the USA army and its allies (including the embedded archaeologists working on site) to stop occupying Babylon, with the army claiming that in that way they were protecting it from looters, she gave up, and she concludes her recent article by saying:

For me, the battle for Babylon, is a metaphor for the occupation of Iraq. The idea that the USA took Babylon for its own protection is perhaps similar to the idea that the USA invaded Iraq to bring it freedom. If you believe in the second statement, you are likely to believe the first (Bahrani 2008b:170).

Bahrani has made it clear (pers. comm.) that based on the experience on Iraq she would refuse any request for collaboration by any military or governmental organisation in the future.

Conclusion

More often than not, the archaeological involvement with the military as part of the recent, US-led invasions has been framed as a simple narrative of a moral crusade to rescue antiquities, amidst the ferocious and catastrophic warfare. I have tried to show here that this narrative is far too simplistic and misleading. I have instead tried to tease out some of the complexities of the situation, to show links and associations, and more importantly to situate this archaeological involvement within its disciplinary, social and political context. History, as well as politics has been absent

from this discussion. While a full historical analysis of the phenomenon was beyond the scope of this paper, I intimated that the invocation of 18th and 19th century colonial archaeology which was an integral part of military campaigns, especially in the Middle East, maybe a useful thought experiment while we contemplate the current phenomenon. The similarities do not stop in geography either, nor in the colonial overtones of the recent invasions. For example, while the involvement of archaeologists and anthropologists with the military and with intelligence services in the Second World War and during the Cold War was mostly covert (Price 2008), and often resulted in widespread condemnation within the scholarly community, the earlier involvement, like the contemporary one, was more explicit and overt, and it had become a naturalised state of affairs, much like the current phenomenon I have traced here.

I do not, of course, underestimate the significant historical and social differences, nor do I wish to push the historical analogy too far. That is why in my analysis I have placed more emphasis on the current historical and political context rather than on the 18th and 19th century one. In 2003, I claimed that the archaeological involvement during and after the Iraq invasion throws archaeology into a serious ethical crisis, exposing the dangers of a de-politicised, professionalized archaeology and of the fetishisation of a narrowly defined archaeological record.¹⁸ Five years later, and with the benefit of a significant body of new data, the widespread exposure of the political agenda of the invasion, and some succinct and sharp analysis, in several disciplines, of the cultural dimensions of that invasion, we can trace more clearly the features of this crisis, and start analysing its emerging characteristics.

I have claimed here that the close collaboration of archaeologists and other heritage professional with the USA and UK invading military since 2003, and the “cultural turn” within the military itself, have resulted in an emerging military-archaeology complex which deserves further scrutiny. Within this phenomenon, the archaeologist or heritage specialist emerges as a de-politicised, seemingly “neutral” professional who offers advice and expertise to the military of their own country engaging in often illegal invasions, and being, more often than not, oblivious to the overtly or covertly political deployments of that knowledge and expertise. The main ethical responsibility of that professional seem to be towards the archaeological material past, defined very narrowly to include only the conventional archaeological sites and objects (with Mesopotamian antiquities occupying a prominent position), and not the objects and things of all periods, including the contemporary era, in other words the entirety of the material culture, with which people construct associations and which was destroyed on a mass scale by the invading armies. While several western archaeologists have embarked on admirable attempts to establish links and collaborations with some archaeologists from the occupied countries, in their

chosen sense of professional responsibility contemporary people from these countries are largely absent, and the link between people and things severed. Moreover, this military-archaeology complex contributes to the depoliticisation of warfare, its naturalisation, even its re-branding as an agent of cultural preservation, a role that the military is keen to promote further.

I have also claimed that the need to maintain our position of autonomy and independence from the military does not imply inactivity, and “doing nothing”. I have instead shown that in fact scholars who oppose the current invasions and the close involvement of archaeology with the invading armies can (and often do) engage in meaningful and effective action, from articulating a powerful professional-cum-political response, to deconstructing the discourse and the historical roots of the current invasions, to collaborating with archaeologists from the occupied countries outside the military structures, and to fighting for cultural reparations.

I do not claim to have solved all ethical conundrums and dilemmas, nor do I want to foreclose further debate on this difficult and important issue. I claim neither the high moral ground nor the monopoly of truth on this matter, and as it should have become clear to the reader, especially the one who is familiar with my earlier writings on the issue, my positions here incorporate insights from colleagues and opponents in endless debates, and are the outcome of much rethinking and hard and agonising reflection. And while there may be serious disagreements on the various ethical dilemmas at play, at the end of the day there is perhaps a position that many of us would agree with, although we may continue to disagree on how to achieve it: that we should be true advocates for heritage by caring for and defending strongly and passionately human lives and cultural objects alike, past and present, being at the same time independent, and strong opponents of those who try to obliterate them. And that we should avoid becoming the cultural branch of war machines, the narrowly defined heritage professionals of the next, bloody neo-colonial project.

Postscript

After, extensive debate, the delegates of 6th World Archaeological Congress adopted the following resolution, which had been signed by more than 100 delegates:

The 6th World Archaeological Congress expresses its strong opposition to any unilateral and unprovoked, covert or overt military action (including air strikes) against Iran by the US government, or by any other government. Such action will have catastrophic consequences for millions of people and will seriously endanger the cultural heritage of Iran and of the Middle East

in general. Any differences with Iran (as with any other country) should be resolved through peaceful and diplomatic means.

The Congress also urges its members, all archaeologists and heritage professionals to resist any attempts by the military and governments to be co-opted in any planned military operation, for example by providing advice and expertise to the military on archaeological and cultural heritage matters. Such advice would provide cultural credibility and respectability to the military action. Archaeologists should continue emphasising instead the detrimental consequences of such actions for the people and the heritage of the area, for the past and the present alike. A universal refusal by archaeologists and others would send the message that such a plan is hugely unpopular amongst cultural professionals as well as the wider public.

The Executive of the World Archaeological Congress considered this resolution and issued the following media release (www.worldarchaeologicalcongress.org; accessed 12 November 2008).

Cultural Heritage in Iran under Threat

The World Archaeological Congress expresses its strong opposition to aggressive military action (including air strikes) against Iran by the US government, or by any other government.

“Such action could have catastrophic consequences for millions of people and will seriously endanger the cultural heritage of Iran and of the Middle East in general,” said Professor Claire Smith, President of the World Archaeological Congress.

“The Iraq war was a disaster for cultural heritage in this region. The world can not afford to replicate mistakes such as this.”

“The World Archaeological Congress strongly opposed the war in Iraq, and we strongly oppose any war in Iran,” said Professor Smith.

“War destroys both lives and cultural heritage. Any differences with Iran (as with any other country) should be resolved through peaceful and diplomatic means.”

“There was a lot of debate around the issue of whether archaeologists should provide advice and expertise to the military on archaeological and cultural heritage matters,” said Professor Smith.

“There is a strong view by some members that a refusal by archaeologists and others to work with the military would send a message that war with Iran is hugely unpopular amongst cultural heritage professionals,” said Professor Smith. “The view here is that providing advice and expertise to the military during the war planning against Iran would offer cultural credibility and respectability to the military action.”

“Other members take the opposite stance, that it is their responsibility as cultural heritage specialists to attempt to mitigate the damage done to cultural heritage wherever there is conflict as this cultural heritage could be an essential building block in the peace process,” said Professor Smith.

A resolution suggesting that no archaeologists or cultural heritage specialists assist the military in planning to protect the cultural heritage was passed by the Plenary session of the WAC-6 Congress for consideration by the World Archaeological Congress Assembly, Council and Executive but was not approved as a formal statement of the position of the organisation as a whole.

“This debate highlights how strongly people feel about any impeding military engagement with Iran,” said Professor Smith.

Since 2003 the World Archaeological Congress has had a Task Force on Archaeologists and War with an explicit remit to investigate the ethics implications of working with the military.

In order to address these issues from a global perspective the World Archaeological Congress will be holding an Inter-Congress with the theme “Archaeologists, Ethics and Armed Conflict.” This is likely to be held in the Hague in 2010”.

The text of the original resolution, despite the calls, had not, at the time of writing, appeared on the website of the organisation.

Acknowledgements

This article is a revised version of the keynote talk I delivered at the plenary session of 6th World Archaeological Congress on “Archaeologists and War” (Dublin 1st of July 2008). I am grateful to the organisers for the invitation, to my co-speakers and to the audience for the debate and the comments, to Anne Pyburn for the invitation to publish the text in “Archaeologies”, and to Zainab Bahrani, Reinhard Bernbeck, and Susan Pollock for comments and suggestions; Reinhard Bernbeck, Keith Brown and Zainab Bahrani also allowed me to see unpublished work for which I am grateful. None are to be held responsible for the views and ideas expressed here, and for any remaining mistakes.

Notes

1. For the full text of the letter and its context, see Hamilakis 2003.
2. There were some exceptions, of course: for example, the petition signed by 78 Mesopotamian specialists opposing the Iraq invasion on ethical *and* humanitarian grounds (see *The Archaeological Record* 3 (1), January 2003); the small group that was formed in the

- UK under the title “Archaeologists against the war” which also participated in the big anti-war rallies in London UK, in early 2003; and some recent archaeological writings which deconstruct the rhetoric of the US military in Iraq, especially its rendering of Iraq as “Indian country” (Silliman 2008), or problematise the ethics of archaeological work in warfare more generally (cf. the special issue of this journal—vol. 4 (3), 2008—edited by Reinhard Bernbeck, Susan Pollock and Maria Theresia Starzmann). Other exceptions are discussed below.
3. As the USA’s General H. Petraeus put it in a recent interview, “while ‘military action is absolutely necessary’, other resources are required to gain the advantage and ‘capitalise on gains in the security arena” (Geracimos 2008).
 4. The most comprehensive database of newspaper articles on the issue, covering the period between March 2003 and May 2006, is still the one set up by Francis Deblauw (<http://iwa.univie.ac.at/iraqarchive1.html>; accessed 12 November 2008). In more recent years, a number of edited volumes and exhibition catalogues has also appeared, such as Foster et al. 2005; Emberling and Hanson 2008; Rothfield 2008; Stone and Farchakh Bajjaly 2008. See also the volume by Khaled Nashef (2004), in Arabic (I owe this information, and the translation of the title, to Zainab Bahrani).
 5. E.g. Stone (2005:3) mentions a “selective list of 36 of the most important sites, ranging from Neanderthal to Islamic”.
 6. Bahrani Z. 2003. Video at the Columbia University Website (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/vforum/02/access_of_evil/index.html; accessed 12 November 2008).
 7. According to data gathered by Opinion Research Business (ORB) (http://www.opinion.co.uk/Newsroom_details.aspx?NewsId=88; accessed November 2008).
 8. Oxfam and the Coordination Committee in Iraq, 2007, *Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq* (http://web.mit.edu/humancostiraq/reports/oxfam_iraq.pdf; accessed 12 November 2008).
 9. E.g. the survey carried out in the summer of 2003 and funded by *National Geographic*, which documented the extent of the looting, but also established that most declared and known archaeological sites were not directly hit during the bombing, probing one of the members of the team, Henry Wright, to state in a interview “Somebody in the US government deserves positive credit for sparing the archaeological sites from bombing” (Vedantam 2003).
 10. <http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/dcmt/index.jsp>; accessed 19 November 2008.
 11. <http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/dcmt/symposia/list%20of%20events/page11224.jsp>; accessed 27 June and 12 November 2008.
 12. A recent expression of this “cultural turn” is the Minerva Consortia Project, launched by the USA Department of Defence. The then (and current) Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates, in his speech to the Association of American Universities in Washington DC on April 14 2008, outlined the philosophy of this programme, which plans to fund from the Department’s budget a range of research projects (including one on Iraq) in the humanities and social sciences, and, following the experience of “game theory and Kremlinology, two fields developed during the Cold War”, to “engage additional intellectual disciplines—such as history, anthropology, sociology and evolutionist psychology” (<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1228>; accessed 12 November 2008); for a range of critical responses to this programme, see <http://www.ssrc.org/essays/minerva/>; accessed 18 November 2008.
 13. Space limitations do not allow discussion of the most blatant aspects of this recent militarised archaeology, which I am sure they are met with universal condemnation, including from the specialists I have critiqued here: for example, Al-Hussainy and Matthews (2008:96) refer to “archaeologists working with occupation troops without the legal authority of the Iraqi State Board. In April 2006 the Italian epigraphist

- G. Pettinato announced the find of 500 cuneiform texts at the famous site of Ur...We still do not know what was really found at Ur in spring 2006 but we do know that whatever it was, it was illegally found as no permit was issued from the State Board". It is worth comparing the case of archaeology with that of anthropology: critiques have recently argued that initiatives such as the Pentagon's Human Terrain Programme, that is the employment of anthropologists by the US army (uniformed, and armed in some cases) in order to "study" local people in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other initiatives lead to the "weaponisation" of anthropology (González 2007, 2008). The American Anthropological Association (AAA) has voiced its strong objection to these initiatives. See news and commentary in the AAA's *Anthropology News*, and the site of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists (<http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/>; accessed 12 November 2008). This is a much more direct and more blatant militarization of a discipline, than the archaeological case.
14. See the passionate article by Saad Eskander, director of the Iraq National Library and Archives, who has been campaigning for this cause for some time now (http://www.ssrc.org/essays/minerva/2008/10/29/eskander/#_ftn1; accessed 19 November 2008).
 15. Elsewhere (Hamilakis 2004:96–97), I discuss briefly the substantial financial support made by USAID towards USA universities in order to, amongst other things, train Iraqi students in archaeology, an aid that, as was explicitly stated, aimed at "strengthening pro-democracy elements and pro-US teaching allies in Iraq".
 16. <http://www.ifla.org/VI/4/admin/protect.htm>; accessed 12 November 2008; also <http://www.ifla.org/VI/4/admin/nc-req.htm>; accessed 18 November 2008. On some thoughtful discussion comparing the work of humanitarian organisations and that of archaeologies in situations of warfare, see Bernbeck 2008b.
 17. http://www.uscbs.org/about_us.htm; accessed 18 November 2008.
 18. See Hamilakis 2003.

References Cited

- Al-Hussainy, A., and R. Matthews
 2008. The Archaeological Heritage of Iraq in Historical Perspective. *Public Archaeology* 7(2):91–100. doi:10.1179/175355308X329973.
- Bahrani, Z.
 2006. Babylon: A Case Study in the Military Occupation of an Archaeological site. In *Of the Past, for the Future: Integrating Archaeology and Conservation*, edited by N. Agnew and J. Bridgland, pp. 240–246. The Getty Conservation Institute, Los Angeles.
- 2008a. In What Ways Have Artists, Academics and Cultural Institutions Responded to the US-led Invasion and Occupation of Iraq? Response to a Questionnaire. *October* 123:11–13.
- 2008b. The Battle for Babylon. In *The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq*, edited by P. Stone and J. Farchakh Bajjal, pp. 165–171. The Boydell Press, Woodbridge.

- Bernbeck, R.
2008a. Structural Violence in Archaeology. *Archaeologies* 4(3):390–413. doi:[10.1007/s11759-008-9076-6](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11759-008-9076-6).
2008b. *Humanitarian Aid vs. Looting of Archaeological Sites: Towards an Ethics of Interference*. Paper presented at the 6th World Archaeological Congress, Dublin, Ireland.
- Bodganos, M.
2005. The Casualties of War: the Truth About the Iraq Museum. *American Journal of Archaeology* 109(3):477–526.
- Brown, K.
2008. All They Understand is Force: Debating Culture in Operation Iraqi Freedom. *American Anthropologist* 110(4):443–453. doi:[10.1111/j.1548-1433.2008.00077.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2008.00077.x).
- Curtis, J.
2003. Letter from Baghdad. *Current World Archaeology* 1(1):5–9.
2008. The Site of Babylon Today. In *Babylon: Myth and Reality*, edited by I.L. Finkel and M.J. Seymour, pp. 213–220. The British Museum, London.
- Emberling, G., and K. Hanson (editors)
2008. *Catastrophe! The Looting and Destruction of Iraq's Past*. The Oriental Institute, Chicago.
- El-Haj, Abu N.
2005. Edward Said and the Political Present. *American Ethnologist* 32(4):538–555. doi:[10.1525/ae.2005.32.4.538](https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.2005.32.4.538).
- Fisk, R.
2008. Foreword. In *The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq*, edited by P. Stone, and J. Farchakh Bajjaly, pp. xi–xiii. The Boydell Press, Woodbridge.
- Foster, B.R., K.P. Foster, and P. Gerstenblith
2005. *Iraq Beyond the Headlines: History, Archaeology and War*. World Scientific, Singapore.
- Foucault, M.
1980. In *Power/Knowledge* edited by G. Gordon. Pantheon, New York.
- Geracimos, A.
2008. Soldiering Forward, Culturally Aware. *The Washington Times*, 17 October 2008.
- Global Policy Forum.
2007. *War and Occupation in Iraq*. New York (report available on-line at www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/report; accessed 18 November 2008).

González, R.J.

2007. Towards Mercenary Anthropology? The New US Army Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3–24 and the Military–Anthropology Complex. *Anthropology Today* 23(3):14–19. doi:[10.1111/j.1467-8322.2007.00511.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8322.2007.00511.x).
2008. Human Terrain: Past, Present and Future Applications. *Anthropology Today* 24(1):1–32. doi:[10.1111/j.1467-8322.2008.00561.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8322.2008.00561.x).

Gregory, D.

2004. *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq*. Blackwell, Oxford.
2008. The Rush to the Intimate: Counterinsurgency and the Cultural Turn. *Radical Philosophy* 150:8–23.

Groarke, L., and G. Warrick

2006. Stewardship Gone Astray? Ethics and the SAA. In *The Ethics of Archaeology: Philosophical Perspectives on Archaeological Practice*, edited by C. Scarre, and G. Scarre, pp. 163–180. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hamilakis, Y.

1999. La trahison des archéologues? Archaeological practice as intellectual activity in postmodernity. *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 6(1):60–79.
2003. Iraq, Stewardship and the Record: An Ethical Crisis for Archaeology. *Public Archaeology* 3:104–111.
2004. Whose World and Whose Archaeology? The Colonial Present and the Return of the Political. *Archaeologies* 1(2):94–101. doi:[10.1007/s11759-005-0024-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11759-005-0024-4).
2007. From Ethics to Politics. In *Archaeology and Capitalism: From Ethics to Politics*, edited by Hamilakis, Y., and P. Duke, pp. 15–40. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, CA.

Joyce, R.

2002. *The Languages of Archaeology*. Blackwell, Oxford.

Klein, N.

2007. *The Shock Doctrine*. Penguin, London.

MacLeod, D.

2003. US Lobby Could Threaten Iraqi Heritage. *The Guardian*, 10 April 2003.

Mirzoeff, N.

2008. In What Ways Have Artists, Academics and Cultural Institutions Responded to the US-led Invasion and Occupation of Iraq? Response to a Questionnaire. *October* 123:119–121.

Nashef, K.

2004. *Tadmir al turath al hadhari al iraqi* (in Arabic; *The Destruction of Iraqi Cultural Heritage*), Dar Al Hamra Publishers, Beirut.

Pollock, S., and R. Bernbeck (editors)

2005. *Archaeologies of the Middle East: Critical Perspectives*. Blackwell, Oxford.

Price, D.H.

2008. *Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War*. Duke University Press, Durham and London.

Rothfield, L. (editor)

2008. *Antiquities Under Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection after the Iraq War*. Altamira Press, Lanham.

Rose, M.

2003. A Conversation with Matthew F. Bogdanos. *Archaeology*, 16 October 2003 (<http://www.archaeology.org/online/interviews/bogdanos/>; accessed 25 January 2009).

Said, E.

2003[1978]. *Orientalism*. Vintage, New York.

Silliman, S.W.

2008. The “Old West” in the Middle East: U.S. Military Metaphors in Real and Imagined Indian Country. *American Anthropologist* 110(2):237–247. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1433.2008.00029.x.

Stone, P.

2005. The Identification and Protection of Cultural Heritage During the Iraq Conflict: A Peculiarly English Tale. *Antiquity* 79:1–11.

Stone, P., and J. Farchakh Bajjaly (editors)

2008. *The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq*. The Boydell Press, Woodbridge.

Tarlow, S.

2006. Archaeological Ethics and the People of the Past. In *The Ethics of Archaeology: Philosophical Perspectives on Archaeological Practice*, edited by C. Scarre, and G. Scarre, pp. 199–216. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Teijgeler, R.

2008. Embedded Archaeology: An Exercise in Self-Reflection. In *The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq*, edited by P. Stone, and J. Farchakh Bajjaly, pp. 173–182. The Boydell Press, Woodbridge.

Vedantam, S.

2003. Worst Looting May be in Remote Parts of Iraq. *Washington Post* 12(June).

Waldbaum, J.C.

2005. From the President: Tell it to the Marines...*Archaeology* 58(6) (available at: <http://www.archaeology.org/0511/etc./president.html>; accessed 18 November 2008).

Wilkie, N.

2008. Governmental Agencies and the Protection of Cultural Property in Times of War. In *Antiquities Under Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection after the Iraq War*, edited by L. Rothfield, pp. 237–247. Altamira Press, Lanham.

Wylie, A.

2005. The Promises and Perils of Stewardship. In *Embedding Ethics*, edited by L. Meskell, and P. Pels, pp. 47–68. Berg, Oxford.