

Communal Narcissism

Jochen E. Gebauer
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Constantine Sedikides
University of Southampton

Bas Verplanken
University of Bath

Gregory R. Maio
Cardiff University

An agency-communion model of narcissism distinguishes between *agentic narcissists* (individuals satisfying self-motives of grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power in agentic domains) and *communal narcissists* (individuals satisfying the same self-motives in communal domains). Five studies supported the model. In Study 1, participants listed their grandiose self-thoughts. Two distinct types emerged: agentic (“I am the most *intelligent* person”) and communal (“I am the most *helpful* person”). In Study 2, we relied on the listed communal grandiose self-thoughts to construct the Communal Narcissism Inventory. It was psychometrically sound, stable over time, and largely independent of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory—the standard measure of agentic narcissism. In Studies 3 and 4, agentic and communal narcissists shared the same self-motives, while crucially differing in their means for need satisfaction: Agentic narcissists capitalized on agentic means, communal narcissists on communal means. Study 5 revisited the puzzle of low self–other agreement regarding communal traits and behaviors. Attesting to the broader significance of our model, this low self–other agreement was partly due to communal narcissists: They saw themselves as high, but were seen by others as low, in communion.

Keywords: narcissism, communion, agency, Communal Narcissism Inventory, self

Selflessness is the vainest form of selfishness. (Russian proverb)

Altruism is perfected egoism. (Herbert Spencer)

A grandiose narcissist is a person who continuously seeks to validate his or her self-perceived grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power. Two recent reviews of the narcissism literature concur with this definition. W. K. Campbell and Foster (2007, p. 115) stated that “individuals with narcissistic personality possess highly inflated, unrealistically positive views of the self,” and Morf, Horvath, and Torchetti (2011, p. 399) maintained that narcissism is characterized by “grandiose self-views and a relentless addiction-like striving to continually assert their self-worth and superiority.” Several other authors have made similar claims (Raskin, Novacek,

& Hogan, 1991b; Sedikides, Cisek, & Hart, 2011; Sedikides & Gregg, 2001, 2008; Wink, 1991; Zeigler-Hill, Clark, & Pickard, 2008). For example, Raskin et al. (1991b) described narcissism as a strategy for managing self-esteem via grandiosity.

At the same time, research has documented that narcissists feed their self-views of grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power with unrealistically positive self-evaluations regarding *agency* (e.g., competence, extraversion, uniqueness) rather than *communion* (e.g., warmth, agreeableness, relatedness). For example, Gabriel, Critelli, and Ee (1994) reported that narcissists perceive themselves as more intelligent than nonnarcissists. Yet, narcissists did not differ from their counterparts in their actual IQ. Similarly, Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd (1998) reported that narcissists do not differ from nonnarcissists on their academic grades. Further, Rhodewalt and Morf (1998) administered IQ tests to participants. When narcissists received positive IQ feedback, they exceeded nonnarcissists in attributing this to ability, but when they received negative feedback, they exceeded nonnarcissists in attributing this to bad luck. W. K. Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, and Elliot (2000) reported a similar pattern with creativity feedback rather than IQ feedback. Finally, Paulhus and his colleagues (Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003) assessed participants’ knowledge across a broad range of academic topics. Participants were unaware that some items were real and some were foils. As detailed later, responses to real and foil items can be used to calculate exaggeration and accuracy indices. Narcissists inflated their knowledge across a wide array of academic topics, although they did not differ from nonnarcissists in knowledge accuracy. Together, these findings indicate that narcissists exaggerate their intelligence, course grades, creativity, and academic knowledge—exaggerations that

This article was published Online First August 13, 2012.

Jochen E. Gebauer, Institut für Psychologie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Constantine Sedikides, School of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom; Bas Verplanken, Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom; Gregory R. Maio, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales.

We thank Jens Asendorpf for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript, Barbara Friedrich for serving as the second rater in Study 1, and John Rauthmann for help with TripleR. We also thank Axel Burger, Jaap Denissen, and John Krantz for advertising our online studies on their web portals.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jochen E. Gebauer, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Psychologie, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany. E-mail: mail@JochenGebauer.info

fall into the agentic domain. (For conceptually similar findings, see Bleske-Rechek, Remiker, & Baker, 2008; Buss & Chiodo, 1991; Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998; John & Robins, 1994; Kernis & Sun, 1994; Paulhus, 1998; Raskin & Novacek, 1991; Rhodewalt, Tragakis, & Finnerty, 2006; Sedikides, Hart, Cisek, & Routledge, in press; Zeigler-Hill, Myers, & Clark, 2010.)

In contrast, narcissists do not self-enhance in the communal domain. In line with the research described above, W. K. Campbell, Rudich, and Sedikides (2002) found that narcissists exhibit pronounced better-than-average perceptions of their agentic attributes. Of importance, these authors found no evidence that narcissists manifest pronounced better-than-average perceptions of their communal attributes. W. K. Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, and Kernis (2007) replicated conceptually this pattern. In addition, these researchers reported that narcissists (compared to nonnarcissists) had strong implicit associations (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) between self and agentic traits; however, narcissists and nonnarcissists did not differ in their strength of implicit associations between self and communal traits. In conclusion, there is broad consensus that narcissists feed their self-views of grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power through agentic rather than communal means.

These empirical findings are reflected in contemporary models of grandiose narcissism. Paulhus and John (1998) described narcissism as an egoistic (i.e., agentic) rather than moralistic (i.e., communal) bias. Paulhus (2001) suggested that narcissism is best understood as an extreme form of agency. In line with W. K. Campbell's (1999) self-orientation model of narcissism, Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, and Gregg (2003) argued that narcissists are so preoccupied with agency that they devalue communion by endorsing an "others exist for me" illusion. Finally, Campbell and colleagues (W. K. Campbell, Brunell, & Finkel, 2006; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007) introduced an agency model of narcissism. (For a review of these models, see Bosson et al., 2008.)

In this article, we propose a new and broader formulation: the agency-communion model of narcissism. According to this model, past research has described one type of grandiose narcissism, *agentic* narcissism. Agentic narcissists satisfy their core self-motives (i.e., grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, power) through agentic means. However, we posit that there is another, equally relevant type of grandiose narcissism, *communal* narcissism. Communal narcissists possess the same core self-motives as agentic narcissists (i.e., grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, power). In contrast to agentic narcissists, however, communal narcissists satisfy these self-motives through communal means. We report five studies that test this model across 16 samples of participants. The studies address five questions. Is communal narcissism theoretically plausible (Study 1)? Are agentic narcissism and communal narcissism distinct personality traits (Study 2)? Do communal narcissists have the same self-motives as agentic narcissists (Study 3)? Do communal and agentic narcissists differ in how they satisfy these self-motives (Study 4)? And, finally, can communal narcissism explain previous evidence of a puzzlingly weak relation between self-reported and observer-reported communion (Study 5)? We elaborate on these questions below.

Is Communal Narcissism Theoretically Plausible?

On first sight, the notion of communal narcissism may seem an oxymoron. This is because the self-motives for grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power are agentic themselves. We submit,

however, that the agency-communion distinction can be applied not only for arranging personality traits in a circular structure (Abele, Cuddy, Judd, Yzerbyt, 2008; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Bakan, 1966; Helgeson, 1994; Wiggins, 1991) but also for arranging *means* to express certain personality traits (here: narcissism) into such a structure (Gebauer, Leary, & Neberich, in press; Gebauer, Paulhus, & Neberich, in press; see also Kruglanski et al., 2002). In particular, we propose that agency and communion are hierarchically structured in reference to traits and means. Agency and communion apply to traits at a higher level, and they additionally apply to means for expressing these traits at a lower level.

Our view that agency and communion span a circular structure that can simultaneously operate at multiple hierarchical levels is consistent with evidence that these dimensions are concurrently relevant to personality traits and social groups, with the latter representing a higher level in this hierarchy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Our view is also consistent with a hierarchy of values (Maio, 2010; Schwartz, 1992). Values can be arranged along the agency and communion dimensions (Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Roberts & Robins, 2000; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012), and values can operate at a personal level (Maio, 2010; Schwartz, 1992) and at a societal level (Bernard, Gebauer, & Maio, 2006; Schwartz, 1992). Most relevant, within the personal level, values can operate as conscious theories as well as even more fundamental entities organizing implicit memory (Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007). In all, we start from the idea that the agency-communion distinction can be applied to means for expressing the trait of grandiose narcissism, and this idea is congruent with past theory and research.

Agentic narcissism may then be understood as an agency-agency trait: an agentic trait that is expressed through agentic means. An inspection of items from the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988) indicates that this inventory indeed captures our reasoning. At the trait level, the NPI assesses the disposition to hold grandiose self-views—an agentic trait (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). At the means level, the NPI is also relevant to agency. In particular, NPI items reflect grandiose self-views on key components of agency, such as assertiveness ("I am assertive"), competence ("I am more capable than other people"), and authority ("People always seem to recognize my authority"). Paralleling this reasoning, communal narcissism may be understood as an agency-communion trait: an agentic trait that is expressed through communal means. Key components of communion are helpfulness, interpersonal warmth, and trustworthiness. Arguably, these traits can serve as means to express grandiose narcissism (W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf et al., 2011). For example, a communal narcissist would be a person who grandiosely views himself as "the *most* helpful person he knows," "the *most* caring person in his social surroundings," and "*extraordinarily* trustworthy."

The notion of communal narcissism is primarily dependent on whether people truly hold communal grandiose self-views and whether these are largely independent of agentic grandiose self-views. To test this notion, we asked participants in Study 1 to list their grandiose self-thoughts in an open-ended fashion. To foreshadow the results, participants reported agentic as well as communal grandiose self-thoughts. Next, we examined whether the quantity and extremity of a person's agentic grandiose self-thoughts were related to the quantity and extremity of this person's communal grandiose self-thoughts. Lastly, in Study 1, we examined whether the NPI is a measure of agentic, but not communal,

narcissism. If this were indeed the case, we would expect the NPI to correlate with the quantity and extremity of agentic, but not communal, grandiose self-thoughts.

Are Agentic Narcissism and Communal Narcissism Distinct Personality Traits?

Is communal narcissism a personality trait in and of itself (i.e., independently of the NPI)? In Study 2, we used the communal grandiose self-thoughts reported by Study 1 participants (Van de Vijver & Leung, 2001) to construct candidate items for the Communal Narcissism Inventory (CNI). We implemented exploratory factor analyses to derive the most appropriate CNI items, and we tested the CNI's psychometric properties. To find out if communal narcissism can be conceptualized as a personality trait, we tested for its temporal stability. Further, we explored the relation between the NPI and the CNI. A central tenet of our model is that agentic and communal narcissism are two distinct facets of grandiose narcissism. Finally, we examined the correlation between communal narcissism and clinical/vulnerable forms of narcissism. In contrast to agentic and (supposedly) communal narcissism, these latter forms of narcissism are not rooted in grandiosity (W. K. Campbell & Miller, 2011; Miller & Campbell, 2008). Hence, we expected particularly low relations between communal narcissism and clinical/vulnerable forms of narcissism.

Do Communal Narcissists Have the Same Core Self-Motives as Agentic Narcissists?

Following theoretical perspectives on grandiose narcissism (W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf et al., 2011; Raskin et al., 1991b; Sedikides et al., 2002), we have defined narcissists as people who continuously seek to validate their self-perceived grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power. We settled on these four constructs because they appear to constitute narcissists' core self-motives. In this section, we introduce theory and research that buttress the relevance of these self-motives.

A heightened desire to validate one's grandiose self-views has been called the "most central characteristic" of narcissism (Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski, 2009, p. 951; see also Buss, 1991). In fact, Morf et al. (2011) recently labeled NPI narcissism as *grandiose narcissism*. Empirical research has indeed documented that agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists feel particularly grandiose (Bleske-Rechek et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2009; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a, 1991b; Rosenthal, Hooley, & Steshenko, 2007).

Excessively high levels of explicit self-esteem have also been established as an integral part of the narcissistic personality (Bosson et al., 2008; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf et al., 2011; Sedikides & Gregg, 2001; Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007). Some researchers conceptualize self-esteem as narcissists' internal gauge for monitoring their progress in meeting their self-motives (Morf & Horvath, 2010). Another theoretical view of narcissism labeled it an addiction to self-esteem (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001). Finally, Raskin et al. (1991b) understood narcissists' incessant validation of their own grandiosity as a means to meet their core self-need: self-esteem. Not surprisingly then, much empirical research has documented that agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists report unusually high self-esteem (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; W. K. Campbell, 2001; Emmons, 1984, 1987; Gregg & Sedikides, 2010;

Raskin et al., 1991a; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004).

Narcissists are also said to have a pervasive sense of entitlement, given their grandiosity and excessively high self-esteem. They feel unique, special, and entitled to privileged treatment (Emmons, 1984; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2002). Empirical research has indeed documented that agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists report a heightened sense of entitlement (Brown et al., 2009; W. K. Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004; Emmons, 1987).

Finally, narcissists are believed to have a strong desire to validate their power. For one, their sense of grandiosity, superiority, and entitlement would seem to legitimize them having power over others rather than others having power over them. Also, power could be a means for gaining admiration and verifying their sense of grandiosity, superiority, and entitlement (W. K. Campbell & Baumeister, 2006; Rose & Campbell, 2004). Empirical research has indeed documented that agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists have a strong need for power (W. K. Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002; Carroll, 1987; Horton & Sedikides, 2009; Raskin & Novacek, 1991; Rose & Campbell, 2004). Agentic narcissists also exhibit a game-playing love style in their intimate relationships (W. K. Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002; Le, 2005), and this love style has been described as a means to exert power over intimate partners (Morf et al., 2011).

To summarize, research and theory converge on the conclusion that narcissists relentlessly feel the need to validate their self-views of grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power. It is fitting, then, to refer to these as narcissists' *core self-motives*. Importantly, we hold that these self-motives would not be limited to agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists but rather would apply equally to communal narcissists. We addressed these issues in Study 3.

Do Communal Narcissists Differ From Agentic Narcissists in How They Satisfy Their Core Self-Motives?

A central proposition of the agency-communion model of narcissism is that agentic and communal narcissists differ in the means they deploy for meeting the same self-motives: The former rely on agentic means, the latter on communal means. Stated otherwise, the model proposes a double dissociation between agentic and communal narcissism and between agentic and communal means. Past research has been consistent with part of this dissociation in showing that agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists self-enhance by displaying exaggerated better-than-average judgments on agentic, but not on communal, attributes (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). The agency-communion model additionally hypothesizes that communal (i.e., CNI) narcissists will self-enhance by judging themselves as better than average on communal, but not on agentic, attributes. We tested this hypothesis in Study 4.

The better-than-average task capitalizes on *social comparison* to capture agentic and communal means for need satisfaction (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010). We complemented this approach by using a *criterion-discrepancy* measure to capture communal means for need satisfaction. Specifically, we adapted the overclaiming task (Paulhus et al., 2003) to assess communal overclaiming. Agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists overclaim their knowledge on academic topics (Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus et al., 2003), which are largely agentic in nature (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007;

Bakan, 1966); agentic narcissists do not overclaim their knowledge about music artists (Nathanson, Williams, & Paulhus, 2003), which is a knowledge domain that is not agentic in nature and hence not ego-relevant for agentic narcissists (Paulhus, 2011). Based on these results, we proceeded to adapt the overclaiming task to assess overclaiming on communal topics (e.g., “humanitarian aid organizations,” “nature and animal protection organizations,” and “international health charities”). We hypothesized that communal, but not agentic, narcissists would overclaim their knowledge on communal topics.

Can Communal Narcissism Explain the Weak Self-Other Agreement Regarding Communal Behaviors and Traits?

We conducted Studies 1–4 with the goal of validating the agency-communion model of grandiose narcissism. We conducted Study 5 to test the potential of this model to inform the broader personality literature. Self–other agreement of traits (Funder & Colvin, 1988; Paulhus & Reynolds, 1995; Vazire, 2010; D. Watson, 1989) is “a centrally important issue in personality research” (D. Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000, p. 546).

One longstanding, well-replicated, and puzzling finding is this: Self–other agreement is higher for agentic traits than for communal traits (Allik, Realo, Mõttus, & Kuppens, 2010; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; John & Robins, 1993). Communal narcissism may be a piece of this puzzle. Specifically, communal narcissists should overclaim their communal behaviors and traits (Study 4). Hence, communal narcissism should be positively related to *self-reports* of communal behaviors and traits. In contrast, communal narcissism should *not* be positively related to *observer reports* of communal behaviors and traits. In fact, communal narcissists’ unremitting, if not tiring, striving for grandiosity, self-esteem, entitlement, and power may well lead to a *negative* relation between communal narcissism and observer-reported communal behaviors and traits (Study 3). In other words, for communal

narcissists, we expected a dissociation between self-reports and observer reports of communal behaviors and traits. Most importantly, due to this dissociation, communal narcissism should suppress self–other agreement regarding communion. Study 5 examined these hypotheses in a two-wave round-robin design.

Study 1: Is Communal Narcissism Theoretically Plausible?

In Study 1, we asked participants to report their grandiose self-thoughts in an open-ended question format. We tested the hypothesis that the NPI would relate to agentic, but not communal, grandiose self-thoughts. We also tested the hypothesis that agentic and communal grandiose self-thoughts would be largely unrelated to each other, as anticipated by prior literature on the independence of agency and communion (Abele et al., 2008; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Bakan, 1966; Helgeson, 1994; Wiggins, 1991).

Method

Participants. Table 1 contains information about the 16 samples that we used in the five reported studies. As can be seen, four samples were collected at U.K. universities, one sample was collected at a German university, and 11 samples were collected online: 10 of them via an American advertising portal of psychological research on the net (Krantz, 2012) and one via two German advertising portals (www.psytests.de, www.forschung-erleben.de). Sampling decisions were guided by feasibility and convenience. The advantage of such broad sampling is that results are not only applicable to a very specific group (such as psychology undergraduate students at a single university). With one exception, there was no need to exclude any participants from our 16 samples. The exception was Sample 16 (i.e., Study 5 data). In Sample 16, the performed analyses necessitated exclusion of participants with missing data (see Study 5’s method section for a detailed description). We tested Study 1’s hypotheses in Samples 1–3.

Table 1
Sample Characteristics

Sample	N (total)	Sex		Age		Country of residence: majority	Participants	Reward
		N (female)	N (male)	M	SD			
1	95	69	26	23.22	6.65	U.S.A. (87%)	Internet	none
2	120	94	25	25.51	10.09	U.S.A. (86%)	Internet	none
3	127	89	38	26.17	11.24	U.S.A. (86%)	Internet	none
4	195	107	14	—	—	U.K. (100%)	laboratory	course credit
5	120	91	28	20.45	6.58	U.S.A. (90%)	Internet	none
6	322	275	45	19.56	2.33	U.K. (100%)	laboratory	course credit
7	329	251	74	24.19	7.95	U.S.A. (68%)	Internet	none
8	224	167	56	23.88	10.52	U.S.A. (88%)	Internet	none
9	314	220	90	33.06	12.38	Germany (100%)	Internet	gift voucher
10	102	86	15	19.66	3.24	U.K. (100%)	laboratory	course credit
11	120	91	28	22.36	7.43	U.S.A. (90%)	Internet	none
12	103	77	25	22.91	9.02	U.S.A. (87%)	Internet	none
13	151	123	28	26.73	10.52	U.S.A. (92%)	Internet	none
14	145	105	38	28.88	11.58	U.S.A. (76%)	Internet	none
15	201	170	31	20.07	2.45	U.K. (100%)	laboratory	course credit
16	106	85	21	25.49	7.77	Germany (100%)	lecture hall	course credit

Note. In cases where numbers do not add up, this is due to missing data. Dashes indicate that no information was available.

Materials and procedure. In each of the three samples, participants completed one of three agentic narcissism measures and responded to open-ended questions assessing the grandiosity of their self-thoughts (see below). Different agentic narcissism measures were chosen to ascertain that results did not hinge on specifics of one measure (and for the same reason, we have attempted to use differing measures of the same construct throughout the whole article). Table 2 provides details about administration orders, information about which measure was used in which sample, and internal consistencies of the measures.

Narcissistic Personality Inventory. The 40-item NPI (NPI40; Raskin & Terry, 1988) asks participants to indicate for each item whether a narcissistic or nonnarcissistic statement describes them better. Example items are “I see myself as a good leader” (narcissistic statement) or “I am not sure if I would make a good leader” (nonnarcissistic statement), and “I am more capable than other people” (narcissistic statement) or “There is a lot I can learn from other people” (nonnarcissistic statement).

Narcissistic Personality Inventory—Short Version. The 16-item short version of the NPI (NPI16; Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006) uses the same forced-choice response format as the original NPI40, and the NPI16 is strongly related to the NPI40, $r(766) = .90$, $p = .001$ (Ames et al., 2006).

Narcissistic Personality Inventory—Rating Version. The 40-item rating version of the NPI (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna,

Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2001) asks participants to indicate the degree to which each of the 40 narcissistic statements of the original NPI40 applies to them (1 = *does not apply at all*, 7 = *applies completely*). In comparison to the original forced-choice version, this version has improved psychometric properties (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009).

Grandiose self-thought listing. We instructed participants in all three samples as follows: “People have all kinds of private thoughts about themselves. One type of thoughts all of us sometimes have are *grandiose self-thoughts*. That is, we have thoughts of our own grandiosity. From person to person, these grandiose self-thoughts can vary quite a lot in content.” Further, we asked participants to “take some time and think about the grandiose self-thoughts you occasionally have. Please list these thoughts in the textboxes below. Use one textbox for each grandiose self-thought.”

Results

Qualitative analyses. We proceeded with coding of the 1,167 grandiose self-thoughts that participants listed across all three samples. Coding took place in two steps. In the *content-classification* step, the first author classified each self-thought as either agentic or communal based on accepted definitions of agency and communion (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan, 1966; Helgeson, 1994; Wiggins, 1991). Given that the circumplex structure of

Table 2
Tasks/Measures per Sample

Sample	Tasks/measures in order of administration (Cronbach's alpha in parentheses)
1	Demographics → NPI40 (.82) → grandiose self-view listing → debriefing.
2	Demographics → NPI16 (.53) → grandiose self-view listing → debriefing.
3	Demographics → ratingNPI40 (.93) → grandiose self-view listing → debriefing.
4	Demographics → candidate CNI items → debriefing.
5	Demographics → candidate CNI items → debriefing.
6 (Wave 1)	Demographics → SLSC (.89) → NPI16 (.73) → CNI.
6 (Wave 2)	Eight-week lag: NPI16 (.74) → CNI → debriefing.
7	Demographics → at random: {NPI16 (.68) & CNI} → debriefing.
8	Demographics → at random: {NPI40 (.84), CNI, NPD-PDQ-4 (.59), & HNS (.73)} → debriefing.
9	Demographics → at random: {NPI16 (.68) → HIAGT (.95), CNI → HICGT (.95), UC (.80), BSRI (Masc [.90], Fem [.89]), COS (.79), EOS (.74), BFI (E [.88], O [.85], A [.76], C [.84], N [.89]), IAS (PA [.86], BC [.87], DE [.91], FG [.89], HI [.88], JK [.66], LM [.88], NO [.87])} → debriefing.
10	Demographics → NPI16 (.68) → CNI → PES (.86) → NGS (.95) → SLSC (.93) → AG- (.72) & CO- (.81) BTAT → debriefing.
11	Demographics → NPI16 (.77) → CNI → PowVal (.65) → PowNeed (.88) → debriefing.
12	Demographics → CNI → NPI16 (.72) → AG- (.71) & CO- (.70) BTAT → debriefing.
13	Demographics → CNI → CO-OCQ (.89) → debriefing.
14	Demographics → CNI & NPI16 (.74) (at random) → CO-OCQ (.88) → debriefing.
15	Demographics → at random: {CNI, NPI40 (.84), AG-OCQ (.71), & CO-OCQ (.79)} → debriefing.
16 (self-report)	Demographics → at random: {CO-traits (self-report [.72]) & CNI}.
16 (Round-Robin 1)	CO-traits (peer report [.54]) → CO-behaviors (peer report [.80]).
16 (Round-Robin 2)	CO-traits (peer report [.57]) → CO-behaviors (peer report [.83]) → debriefing.

Note. NPI40 = 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory; NPI16 = 16-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory; ratingNPI40 = rating scale version of the NPI40; CNI = Communal Narcissism Inventory; SLSC = Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale; NPD-PDQ-4 = Narcissistic Personality Disorder subscale of the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4; HNS = Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale; HIAGT = Habitual Index of Agentic Grandiose Thinking; HICGT = Habitual Index of Communal Grandiose Thinking; UC = Unmitigated Communion Scale; BSRI = Bem Sex Role Inventory (Masc = Masculinity subscale; Fem = Femininity subscale); COS = Communal Orientation Scale; EOS = Exchange Orientation Scale; BFI = Big Five Inventory (E = Extraversion subscale; O = Openness subscale; A = Agreeableness subscale; C = Conscientiousness subscale; N = Neuroticism subscale); IAS = Interpersonal Adjectives Scales (PA = Assured-Dominant subscale; BC = Arrogant-Calculating subscale; DE = Cold-Hearted subscale; FG = Aloof-Introverted subscale; HI = Unassured-Submissive subscale; JK = Unassuming-Ingenuous subscale; LM = Warm-Agreeable subscale; NO = Gregarious-Extraverted subscale); PES = Psychological Entitlement Scale; NGS = Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale; AG-BTAT = agentic better-than-average task; CO-BTAT = communal better-than-average task; PowVal = Power Values Scale; PowNeed = Need for Power Scale; AG-OCQ = Agentic Overclaiming Questionnaire; CO-OCQ = Communal Overclaiming Questionnaire; CO-traits = communal traits (i.e., agreeableness and conscientiousness); CO-behaviors = communal behaviors in work groups.

personality traits allows some traits to be simultaneously high on agency and on communion, a portion of self-thoughts (18%) were classified as not clearly attributable to either the agentic or communal domain and were thus excluded from further analyses. From the 950 clearly agentic or communal grandiose self-thoughts, 640 were classified as agentic (66%) and 310 were classified as communal (33%). It is not surprising that agentic grandiose self-thoughts outnumbered communal grandiose self-thoughts. This is because the NPI preceded the listing task, with NPI items consisting of agentic, but not communal, content. Hence, completion of the NPI should have primed agentic grandiose self-thoughts (Strack & Schwarz, 2007). Nonetheless, participants listed a sufficiently large amount of communal grandiose self-thoughts to proceed with the analyses. On average, each participant listed $M = 1.87$ (66%; $SD = 2.03$) agentic grandiose self-thoughts and $M = .91$ (33%; $SD = 1.47$) communal grandiose self-thoughts. Considering the means, the standard deviations of agentic and communal grandiose self-thoughts were large and comparable. This suggests considerable individual differences in the *variety* of grandiose self-thoughts that people hold, and thus provides the first indication for meaningful individual differences not only in agentic narcissism but also in communal narcissism.

In the *grandiosity-rating* step, the first author rated each self-thought according to the extent of grandiosity reflected by this self-thought (1 = *not at all grandiose*, 7 = *extremely grandiose*). We computed indices of agentic and communal grandiose self-thoughts for each participant. With these indices, we wanted to capture both the *variety* of grandiose self-thoughts and the *extent* of grandiosity reflected by each self-thought. Thus, for each participant, we computed an agentic grandiose self-thoughts index by multiplying the number of this participant's agentic grandiose self-thoughts (reflecting variety) by the mean grandiosity of this participant's agentic grandiose self-thoughts (reflecting extent). We used the same formula to compute a communal grandiose self-thoughts index. To ensure validity of these indices, a second judge also provided content classifications followed by grandiosity ratings for one sample. Interrater reliability was high, $r(89) = .81$, $p = .001$, and both raters were unaware of participants' NPI scores.

Quantitative analyses. In support of the hypothesis that the NPI assesses agentic, but not communal, narcissism, (a) the relation between the NPI and agentic grandiose self-thoughts was positive in all three samples ($.36 < r < .55$, all $ps < .01$), and (b) the relation between the NPI and communal grandiose self-thoughts was not significant in all three samples ($-.13 < r < .04$, all $ps > .17$). Also, in support of the hypothesis that agentic and communal grandiose self-thoughts constitute two independent dimensions, agentic and communal grandiose self-thoughts were uncorrelated with each other in all three samples ($-.13 < r < -.01$, all $ps > .19$).

Discussion

The strength of the relation between the NPI and agentic grandiose self-thoughts is remarkably high, given that the NPI is a self-report scale and the self-thoughts were assessed with an open-ended measure and then rated by judges (who were unaware of NPI scores). Study 1's results are important for two reasons. First, they provide direct evidence that the NPI assesses agentic narcissism only. Second, the presence of communal grandiose self-thoughts suggests the presence of communal narcissism.

ism only. Second, the presence of communal grandiose self-thoughts suggests the presence of communal narcissism.

Study 2: Are Agentic Narcissism and Communal Narcissism Distinct Personality Traits?

In Study 2, we used the communal grandiose self-thoughts listed by Study 1 participants as candidate items for a Communal Narcissism Inventory (CNI). We conducted exploratory factor analyses to select appropriate CNI items and then conducted confirmatory factor analyses to verify the CNI's factor structure. Moreover, we examined whether the CNI assesses a relatively stable personality trait and tested our agency-communion model's assumption that agentic and communal narcissism are largely independent. Furthermore, we examined the relation between communal narcissism and NPI subfacets (Ackerman, Witt, Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, & Kashy, 2011). In continuation of Study 1's research question, we wanted to further explore the prevalence of communal grandiose self-thoughts (compared to agentic grandiose self-thoughts). Hence, we tested for the frequency/habituality (Verplanken, Friborg, Wang, Trafimow, & Woolf, 2007) with which agentic and communal narcissists hold agentic and communal grandiose self-thoughts, respectively. We also examined the relation between communal narcissism and clinical/vulnerable forms of narcissism (W. K. Campbell & Miller, 2011) as well as unmitigated communion (Helgeson & Fritz, 1998). We further investigated sex differences in agentic and communal narcissism and tested for the relations between agentic and communal narcissism and sex roles (Bem, 1974). In addition, we tested the relation between agentic and communal narcissism on the one hand and communal and exchange orientations in interpersonal relationships on the other hand (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). Finally, we explored the relation of communal narcissism to the five-factor model of personality (Digman, 1990; McCrae & John, 1992; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996) and to the eight factors of the Interpersonal Adjective Lists (Wiggins, 1991).

Method

Participants. We tested Study 2's hypotheses in Samples 4–9 (see Table 1).

Materials and procedure. Below, we describe those Study 2 measures that have not been used—and thus described—in Study 1. As a reminder, Table 2 provides details about administration orders, information about which measure was used in which sample, and internal consistencies of the measures.

Candidate CNI items. We considered all communal grandiose self-thoughts listed by Study 1 participants as candidate CNI items. We deleted redundant communal grandiose self-thoughts, and we expressed in abstract form concrete communal grandiose self-thoughts in order to increase their relevance to participants at large (e.g., "I am the best mother on this planet" → "I am [going to be] the best parent on this planet"). This resulted in a total of 34 communal grandiose self-thoughts as CNI candidate items. Participants proceeded to rate each item (1 = *disagree strongly*, 7 = *agree strongly*).

Subfacets of the NPI40. The NPI40 contains three subfacets (Ackerman et al., 2011). The 11-item Leadership/Authority subscale assesses extremely positive self-views largely in the agentic

Table 3
 Items of the Communal Narcissism Inventory and Its Factor Loadings

Item number	Item	Factor loadings		
		Sample 4	Sample 5	Samples 4 and 5 combined
1	I am the most helpful person I know.	.65	.68	.68
2	I am going to bring peace and justice to the world.	.68	.65	.70
3	I am the best friend someone can have.	.64	.71	.71
4	I will be well known for the good deeds I will have done.	.79	.76	.79
5	I am (going to be) the best parent on this planet.	.64	.68	.68
6	I am the most caring person in my social surrounding.	.65	.67	.68
7	In the future I will be well known for solving the world's problems.	.67	.76	.73
8	I greatly enrich others' lives.	.72	.73	.76
9	I will bring freedom to the people.	.68	.72	.73
10	I am an amazing listener.	.68	.69	.68
11	I will be able to solve world poverty.	.65	.65	.66
12	I have a very positive influence on others.	.64	.75	.71
13	I am generally the most understanding person.	.64	.74	.69
14	I'll make the world a much more beautiful place.	.74	.80	.79
15	I am extraordinarily trustworthy.	.62	.52	.60
16	I will be famous for increasing people's well-being.	.70	.81	.77

1974). To this end, we repeated the exploratory factor analysis described above using Sample 5 data (predominantly American Internet participants). The single factor had an eigenvalue of 15.47 and explained 45.50% of the total variance. As shown in Table 3, all 16 items previously selected for the CNI again loaded highly on the single factor. The correlation between the CNI and the mean of all 34 candidate items was again very high, $r(120) = .98, p = .001$.

Table 3 also shows the factor loadings of the 16 CNI items from an exploratory factor analysis that combined Samples 4 and 5. Such an analysis is useful because the larger overall sample size ($N = 315$) reveals more stable estimates of individual items' true factor loadings.

In all, exploratory factor analyses in samples derived from two countries revealed that the 34 communal grandiose self-thoughts listed by Study 1 participants loaded on a single factor. This supports the presence of a global trait that we labeled communal narcissism. Based on these analyses, we chose 16 items for the final CNI. The 16-item version correlated highly with the mean of all 34 candidate items. This high correlation suggests that the CNI captures communal narcissism broadly and exhaustively, given that the candidate items reflect the entire range of communal grandiose self-thoughts listed by Study 1 participants.

Confirmatory factor analyses. Confirmatory factor analyses, using maximum-likelihood estimation, formed the next step of scale construction. This step enabled us to address three questions. First, do the 16 CNI items fit the expected one-factor solution sufficiently well? Second, do the 16 CNI items form a factor independent of the NPI16 items? Finally, are the results of the confirmatory factor analyses the same across British undergraduate participants and (predominantly) American Internet participants?

We conducted the first confirmatory factor analysis using Sample 6 data (predominantly British undergraduate students). We first specified a structural model in which each of the 16 CNI items served as an indicator (manifest variable) of communal narcissism (latent variable). Following recommendations by Schumacker and Lomax (2004), we allowed the error variances of the eight present-

focused communal grandiose self-thoughts as well as the eight future-focused communal grandiose self-thoughts to correlate with each other (Trope & Liberman, 2003). In line with expectations, this one-factor model fit the data well ($\chi^2/df = 3.21$, comparative fit index [CFI] = .96, root-mean-square error of approximation [$RMSEA$] = .08; cf. Hu & Bentler, 1999).¹

Next, we added a second latent variable to the model. We labeled this latent variable *agentic narcissism* and defined it with 16 observed variables—the items of the NPI16. We allowed the two latent variables to intercorrelate. The latent-variable correlation between agentic and communal narcissism was not significant ($r = .12, p = .11$), supporting our prediction about the independence of these two constructs. Due to well-known problems with the internal consistency of the NPI (Brown & Tamborski, 2011), the resultant two-factor model fit the data somewhat weakly

¹ In this analysis, we assumed that differences between present- and future-focused CNI items are due to systematic differences in the error variances of these items. Alternatively, differences between these items may be due to a meaningful two-dimensional structure underlying communal narcissism. Specifically, the CNI may entail two components: present- and future-focused communal narcissism. To test for this possibility, we compared the fit of the original one-factor model of communal narcissism with the fit of a two-factor model consisting of two correlated factors (i.e., present- and future-focused communal narcissism). This two-factor model fit the data rather poorly, $\chi^2/df = 4.76, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .11$, whereas the one-factor model fit the data significantly better, $\Delta\chi^2 = 320.32, \Delta df = 50, p = .001$. To examine this issue further, we repeated twice all analyses reported in this article. In the first set of analyses, we replaced the full 16-item CNI with the mean of the eight present-focused CNI items (Items 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 15). In a second set of analyses, we replaced the full 16-item CNI with the mean of the eight future-focused CNI items (Items 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, and 16). The results involving the present-focused CNI items were virtually identical to the results involving the future-focused CNI items. Together, we found no support for the utility of distinguishing between present- and future-focused CNI items. Indeed, the confirmatory factor analyses show that the one-factor model of communal narcissism is psychometrically superior to a distinction between present- and future-focused communal narcissism.

($\chi^2/df = 2.32$, $CFI = .84$, $RMSEA = .06$).² (It has been argued that the NPI's low internal consistency reflects its role as a broad and divergent construct; Miller & Campbell, 2011.) For the purpose of validating the CNI, this is not a problem as long as the fit of our agency-communion model of narcissism provides a better fit than the fit of a rival one-factor model subsuming all 32 items of the NPI16 and the CNI. In line with the agency-communion model, the two-factor solution fit the data significantly better than the one-factor solution ($\Delta\chi^2 = 259.16$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p = .001$; fit statistics for the one-factor model: $\chi^2/df = 2.94$, $CFI = .76$, $RMSEA = .08$).

Next, we tested the replicability of these findings using Sample 7 data (predominantly American Internet participants). The analyses were identical to those mentioned above. Again, the 16 CNI items described the communal narcissism factor well ($\chi^2/df = 2.62$, $CFI = .96$, $RMSEA = .07$). And, again, our agency-communion model of narcissism fit the data sufficiently well ($\chi^2/df = 2.28$, $CFI = .84$, $RMSEA = .06$). More important, the latent variable correlation between agentic and communal narcissism in our model was marginal ($r = .15$, $p = .07$), while the agency-communion model fit significantly better than the rival one-factor model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 257.61$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p = .001$; fit statistics for the one-factor model: $\chi^2/df = 2.90$, $CFI = .75$, $RMSEA = .08$).

Overall, confirmatory factor analyses in samples derived from two countries supported the CNI's one-dimensional factor structure, and showed that the CNI and NPI items describe two distinct facets of narcissism. Thus, the CNI complements the NPI. Together, they are likely to cover the full range of grandiose narcissism, because the agency and communion dimensions span a circular structure including an *exhaustive* list of personality traits (Abele et al., 2008; Helgeson, 1994; Wiggins, 1991).

Psychometric properties, descriptive statistics, and temporal stability. Table 4 shows that the internal consistencies of the CNI were excellent in all 13 applicable samples ($.86 \leq \alpha_s \leq .95$). Table 4 also displays the means and standard deviations of the CNI. As can be seen, the mean scores ranged around the midpoint of the rating scale ($3.30 \leq M \leq 4.21$; overall $M = 3.76$), and the standard deviation ranged around one ($.79 \leq SD \leq 1.22$; overall $SD = 1.05$). In line with this, the CNI had a near-perfect normal distribution across all participants. Next, we examined the temporal stability of the CNI relative to the NPI in Sample 6. The CNI's 8-week test-retest reliability was high, $r(322) = .71$, $p = .001$, and similar to the NPI's 8-week test-retest reliability, $r(322) = .79$, $p = .001$.

In all, the psychometric properties of the CNI were commendable. The internal consistency of the scale was excellent and its temporal stability was high. Together, these findings suggest that the CNI truly captures a personality trait.

Relations to the NPI and NPI40 subfacets. The relation between the CNI and the NPI was moderately positive across all 10 applicable samples, omnibus correlation: $r(1,971) = .27$, $p = .001$ (see Table 4). This is consistent with our proposition that both measures cover facets of grandiose narcissism.

Next, we examined the relation between the CNI and the three subfacets of the NPI40 (Ackerman et al., 2011). For these analyses, we aggregated all samples that included the CNI as well as the NPI40 (i.e., Samples 8 and 15). The leadership/authority facet concerns highly positive self-views and thus most strongly taps into narcissistic self-motives, as indicated by a substantial relation with self-esteem in Ackerman et al.'s (2011) research, $\beta(3,349) =$

$.42$, $p < .001$. Hence, we expected (see also Study 3) and found a positive relation between communal narcissism and the leadership/authority facet, $\beta(423) = .41$, $p < .001$ (following Ackerman et al., 2011, the other two NPI subfacets were controlled). The grandiose exhibitionism facet concerns physical appearance, which is largely agentic (Gebauer, Leary, & Neberich, in press). Also, this facet is unrelated to narcissistic self-motives, as indicated by its independence to self-esteem in Ackerman et al.'s research, $\beta(3,349) = .03$, *ns*. Hence, we expected (see also Study 3) and found no relation between communal narcissism and the grandiose exhibitionism facet, $\beta(423) = .07$, $p = .13$ (controlling for the other two NPI subfacets). Finally, the exploitativeness/entitlement facet concerns explicitly devaluing others. Thus, communal narcissists should explicitly reject such exploitativeness. In line with this, we found a negative relation between communal narcissism and the exploitativeness/entitlement facet, $\beta(423) = -.10$, $p = .03$.

Finally, we also tested whether the strength of correlation between the CNI and the NPI16 depends on administration order. Sample 7 participants who were randomly assigned to complete the CNI immediately *before* the NPI showed a correlation of $r(153) = .22$, $p = .006$, between the two measures. Sample 7 participants who were randomly assigned to complete the CNI immediately *after* the NPI showed a correlation of $r(174) = .27$, $p = .001$ between the two measures. A regression analysis, with dummy coding for measure order, revealed that order did not moderate the strength of correlation between the CNI and NPI, $\beta(321) = -.08$, $p = .63$.

In all, correlations between the CNI and NPI further corroborate that agentic narcissism and communal narcissism are distinct constructs. Yet the moderately positive correlation between the two measures is in line with our theoretical argument that both measures assess facets of narcissism. Further, the relations between the CNI and NPI40 subfacets were similar to, but somewhat weaker than, the relations between self-esteem and NPI40 subfacets. This provides support for our hypotheses that agentic and communal narcissism partially overlap because both forms of narcissism are based on the same narcissistic self-motives (e.g., for self-esteem; Baumeister & Vohs, 2001). Finally, CNI and NPI administration order did not moderate their intercorrelation; these measures were robust to order effects.

Frequency/habituality of communal grandiose self-thoughts. In Study 1, we used the occurrence of communal grandiose self-thoughts as an indicator of communal narcissism's existence. But how frequently/habitually do communal narcissists hold communal grandiose self-thoughts? In particular, are communal grandiose self-thoughts among communal narcissists more or less frequent/habitual than agentic grandiose self-thoughts among agentic narcissists? To answer this question, we compared (in Sample 9) the frequency/habituality of communal grandiose self-thoughts among communal narcissists (i.e., participants scoring above the theoretical midpoint on the CNI) with the frequency/habituality of agentic

² We conducted all analyses using the CNI twice, once as reported in the ensuing main text and once including sex as a moderator of CNI relations. We consistently found no moderation by sex in Study 2 (all $\beta_s < .09$, all $ps > .16$), Study 3 (all $\beta_s < 1.111$, all $ps > .23$), Study 4 (all $\beta_s < 1.091$, all $ps > .34$), and Study 5 (all $\beta_s < .17$, all $ps > .12$).

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of the Communal Narcissism Inventory

Sample	Reliability (α)	Relation with NPI (r)	M	SD
4	.92	—	3.11	0.98
5	.94	—	3.93	1.11
6 (Wave 1)	.89	.20***	3.59	0.79
6 (Wave 2)	.90	.30***	3.68	0.89
7	.91	.24***	4.21	0.98
8	.92	.39***	4.08	1.12
9	.95	.39***	3.30	1.11
10	.89	.29***	3.71	0.74
11	.86	.00	4.18	0.77
12	.94	.32***	3.52	1.22
13	.91	—	4.18	0.97
14	.91	.13	4.06	1.04
15	.91	.20**	3.52	0.86
16	.91	—	3.86	0.99

Note. Dashes indicate that no information was available. NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory.
 ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

grandiose self-thoughts among agentic narcissists (i.e., participants scoring above the theoretical midpoint on the NPI). The results revealed that communal narcissists possess communal grandiose self-thoughts as frequently/habitually ($M = 3.87$, $SD = 1.33$) as agentic narcissists possess agentic grandiose self-thoughts ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.49$, $t = 1.30$, $p = .21$). More precisely, frequency/habituality indices among communal narcissists and among agentic narcissists significantly differed from the low point (i.e., 1) of the Mental Habits Index ($ts > 14.08$, $ps < .001$). This result indicates that communal narcissists frequently/habitually think about themselves in communally grandiose ways, whereas agentic narcissists frequently/habitually think about themselves in agentially grandiose ways. Moreover, frequency/habituality indices among communal narcissists and among agentic narcissists did not differ significantly from the theoretical midpoint (i.e., 4) of the Mental Habits Index ($ts < 1.911$, $ps > .36$). This result indicates that communal and agentic narcissists both think about themselves in grandiose ways with considerable frequency/habituality (Verplanken et al., 2007).

Relations to clinical/vulnerable narcissism and unmitigated communion. The agency-communion model describes agentic and communal narcissism as two complementary forms of grandiose narcissism. At the same time, past literature has described grandiose narcissism as the intrapersonally adaptive form of narcissism (W. K. Campbell, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2004). In contrast, the clinical and vulnerable forms of narcissism have been described as intrapersonally maladaptive (Hendin & Cheek, 1997; Miller & Campbell, 2008). Hence, we expected that communal narcissism would relate more strongly to agentic narcissism than to clinical and vulnerable narcissism, with relatively low relations between communal narcissism and clinical and vulnerable narcissism. In support of these hypotheses, communal narcissism related moderately to agentic narcissism, $r(224) = .39$, $p = .001$, but weaker to clinical narcissism, $r(224) = .23$, $p = .001$, and even slightly negatively to vulnerable narcissism, $r(224) = -.14$, $p = .04$ (Sample 8). The correlation between communal and agentic narcissism was significantly higher than the correlations between communal and clinical/vulnerable narcissism ($2.48 < z_s < 5.56$, $ps < .02$).

Unmitigated communion is defined as “a focus on and involvement with others to the exclusion of the self” (Helgeson & Fritz, 1998, p. 173). Given this definition, is unmitigated communion identical to communal narcissism? Theoretically, communal narcissists and individuals scoring high on unmitigated communion should share the conviction that they focus on and are particularly involved with others. In contrast to individuals scoring high on unmitigated communion, however, communal narcissists should not show this other-focus to the *exclusion* of the self. To the contrary, claims of extreme communion among communal narcissists should serve as means to bolster their unrealistic and inflated self-views. Together, we expected a modest positive relation between unmitigated communion and communal narcissism. In contrast, we expected a modest negative relation between unmitigated communion and agentic narcissism, because agentic narcissists not only are self-focused (as communal narcissists are) but also tend to devalue communal other-focus (Sedikides et al., 2002). We tested these hypotheses in Sample 9, and found a positive relation between unmitigated communion and communal narcissism, $r(313) = .20$, $p = .001$, and a negative relation between unmitigated communion and agentic narcissism, $r(314) = -.14$, $p = .02$. Thus, communal narcissism and unmitigated communion are clearly distinct from each other.

Sex differences and relations to sex roles. A specific pattern of sex differences in agentic and communal narcissism follows the agency-communion model of narcissism. In particular, the agency-communion model conceptualizes agentic narcissism as an agency-agency trait. Given that men score higher on agency than women (Bem, 1974), the agentic mean component as well as the agentic trait component of agentic narcissism should lead to higher agentic narcissism in men than in women. Indeed, much prior research supports this prediction (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003; Gabriel et al., 1994; Tschanz, Morf, & Turner, 1998). What predictions does the agency-communion model make regarding communal narcissism? The agency-communion model conceptualizes communal narcissism as an agency-communion trait. Because men score higher on agency than women, but women score higher on communion than men (Bem, 1974), the agentic traits component should lead to

higher communal narcissism in men than in women, but the communal means component should lead to higher communal narcissism in women than in men. Overall, then, men and women should not differ in communal narcissism. To examine these predictions, we first tested for independent main effects of sex on agentic narcissism scores across all applicable samples. We aggregated available data because of small numbers of male participants in most samples (see Table 1). A one-factor analysis of variance yielded a main effect of sex on agentic narcissism. As in prior research, men ($M = .36$, $SD = .21$; scale: 0–1) scored higher on the NPI than women ($M = .28$, $SD = .18$), $F(1, 1961) = 61.58$, $p = .001$. Next, we repeated this analysis with the CNI as the sole dependent variable. No main effect of sex on the CNI emerged, $F(1, 2345) = .13$, $p = .72$. Men ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 1.10$; scale: 1–7) and women ($M = 3.78$, $SD = 1.02$) did not differ on communal narcissism.

Do relations to sex roles parallel these sex differences? Our evidence (from Sample 9) suggests that they do. Specifically, agentic narcissism was positively related to masculinity, $r(313) = .43$, $p = .001$, and unrelated to femininity, $r(313) = -.01$, $p = .88$, rendering agentic narcissism more masculine than feminine ($z = 6.90$, $p = .001$). Communal narcissism, however, was positively related to masculinity, $r(313) = .28$, $p = .001$, as well as to femininity, $r(313) = .32$, $p = .001$, rendering communal narcissism not any more masculine than feminine (or vice versa; $z = .67$, $p = .50$).

Relations to communal and exchange orientations in interpersonal relationships. M. S. Clark and colleagues distinguished between two types of interpersonal relationship orientations—namely, a communal orientation (M. S. Clark et al., 1987) and an exchange orientation (Mills & Clark, 1994). Individuals high on communal orientation value interpersonal relationships in which self and others behave in an other-profitable manner. In contrast, individuals high on exchange orientation value interpersonal relationships in which self and others behave in a tit-for-tat manner. To what degree do agentic and communal narcissists value these interpersonal orientations? We explored this question in Sample 9. We expected that

communal narcissists, but not agentic narcissists, would report higher communal and exchange orientations because both orientations resonate to some degree with communal means for goal attainment. Indeed, we found that communal narcissism was positively related to a communal orientation, $r(313) = .24$, $p = .001$, and to an exchange orientation, $r(313) = .16$, $p = .005$. At the same time, agentic narcissism was related neither to a communal orientation, $r(314) = -.02$, $p = .76$, nor to an exchange orientation, $r(314) = .04$, $p = .50$. Again, the strength of these relations illustrates that communal narcissism is distinct from communal and exchange orientations.

Relations to the five-factor model of personality and interpersonal adjectives. How is communal narcissism related to the five-factor model of personality (Digman, 1990; McCrae & John, 1992; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996)? The agency-communion model of narcissism makes clear predictions regarding these relations. Communal narcissism contains agentic elements (at the trait level—i.e., narcissism) as well as communal elements (at the means level—i.e., communion). As such, and in line with the above results for sex roles, we expected communal narcissism to be positively related to agentic factors in the five-factor model (i.e., Extraversion and Openness; W. K. Campbell et al., 2004; Paulhus & John, 1998), and we expected communal narcissism to be positively related to communal factors in the five-factor model (i.e., Agreeableness and Conscientiousness; W. K. Campbell et al., 2004; Paulhus & John, 1998). Further, we expected a negative relation to Neuroticism, due to Neuroticism's strong link to self-esteem (Judge, Erez, Thoresen, & Bono, 2002), with self-esteem being one of narcissists' presumed self-motives (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001). The upper part of Table 5 shows that these expectations were met (using Sample 9 data). Table 5 also shows the relations between agentic narcissism and the five factors of the five-factor model. These relations square with much prior research (Ames et al., 2006; W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Paulhus & John, 1998; Sedikides et al., 2004) as well as with the theoretical predictions derived from the agency-communion model, which conceptualizes agentic narcissism as an agency-agency trait.

Table 5
Relations to the Five-Factor Model of Personality and Interpersonal Adjectives

Criterion	Zero-order correlation		Multiple regression	
	CNI	NPI	CNI	NPI
Extraversion	.25***	.39***	.12*	.33***
Openness	.23***	.27***	.14*	.21***
Agreeableness	.17**	-.18**	.26***	-.27***
Conscientiousness	.16**	.12*	.12*	.07
Neuroticism	-.21***	-.21***	-.14**	-.16**
Assured-dominant	.27***	.45***	.10†	.40***
Arrogant-calculating	.23***	.29***	.13*	.24***
Cold-hearted	-.12*	.11*	-.18**	.18**
Aloof-introverted	-.27***	-.17**	-.23***	-.07
Unassured-submissive	-.11*	-.34***	.02	-.32***
Unassuming-ingenuous	.07	-.27***	.20***	-.33***
Warm-agreeable	.25***	-.11†	.31***	-.23***
Gregarious-extraverted	.34***	.23***	.30***	.11†

Note. CNI = Communal Narcissism Inventory; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory.
† $p \leq .10$. * $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

How is communal narcissism related with the eight factors in the Interpersonal Adjective Lists (Wiggins, 1991)? Our predictions again follow the agency-communion model of narcissism and square with our findings regarding sex roles and the five factors from the five-factor model. Specifically, communal narcissism should be positively related to factors reflecting high agency (i.e., assured-dominant) and high communion (i.e., warm-agreeable). Conversely, communal narcissism should be negatively related to factors reflecting low agency (i.e., unassured-submissive) and low communion (i.e., cold-hearted). The Interpersonal Adjective Lists also contain a factor simultaneously reflecting high agency and high communion (i.e., gregarious-extraverted), and it follows from the conceptualization of communal narcissism (as an agency-communion trait) that it should be particularly positively related to this factor. Conversely, the Interpersonal Adjective Lists also contain a factor simultaneously reflecting low agency and low communion (i.e., aloof-introverted), and it follows from the conceptualization of communal narcissism (as an agency-communion trait) that it should be particularly negatively related to this factor. The lower part of Table 5 shows that these expectations were met (using Sample 9 data). Table 5 also illustrates the relations between agentic narcissism and the Interpersonal Adjective Lists. These relations square with much prior research (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Gurtman, 1992; Miller, Price, Gentile, Lynam, & Campbell, 2012) as well as with the theoretical predictions derived from the agency-communion model, which conceptualizes agentic narcissism as an agency-agency trait.

Study 3: Do Communal and Agentic Narcissists Have the Same Self-Motives?

On theoretical grounds, narcissists should differ from nonnarcissists in regard to their core self-motives. NPI narcissists indeed have strong desires for grandiosity (Brown et al., 2009; Raskin et al., 1991b; Rosenthal et al., 2007), self-esteem (W. K. Campbell, 2001; Gregg & Sedikides, 2010; Sedikides et al., 2004), entitlement (Brown et al., 2009; W. K. Campbell et al., 2004; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001), and power (W. K. Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002; Horton & Sedikides, 2009; Raskin & Novacek, 1991; Rose & Campbell, 2004). Our model anticipates that communal narcissists would share these core self-motives with agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists. Study 3 tested this hypothesis.

We began with an attempt to replicate past research showing that agentic narcissists have heightened self-motives for grandiosity, self-esteem, entitlement, and power. We also aimed to show that these self-motives are the same for communal narcissists. In addition, we tested whether agentic and communal narcissism each explains unique variance in the four core self-motives. Finally, we examined the relation between NPI and CNI on the one hand and the four self-motives on the other. Individuals who score highly on both the NPI and the CNI should have particularly strong self-motives for grandiosity, self-esteem, entitlement, and power. This effect may be due to an additive effect of agentic and communal narcissism (i.e., two independent main effects) or alternatively due to a multiplicative effect (i.e., an interaction between the NPI and the CNI). We put these two possibilities to an empirical test.

Method

Participants. We tested Study 3's hypotheses in Samples 7, 8, and 10 (see Table 1).

Materials and procedure. Below, we describe those Study 3 measures that have not been used—and thus described—in Studies 1 and 2. As a reminder, Table 2 provides details about administration orders, information about which measure was used in which sample, and internal consistencies of the measures.

Grandiosity. The 16-item Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale (Rosenthal et al., 2007; see also Brown et al., 2009) assesses grandiose self-views. Example items, preceded by the stem "I usually feel that I am . . .", are ". . . perfect," ". . . superior," ". . . glorious." Participants responded using a 7-point scale that ranged from 1 (*definitely wrong*) to 7 (*definitely right*).

Self-esteem. The 16-item Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale—Revised (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001) assesses self-esteem broadly (Tafarodi & Milne, 2002; Verplanken et al., 2007). Example items are "I feel great about who I am" and "I sometimes fail to fulfill my goals" (reverse-scored). Participants responded using a 7-point scale from 1 (*definitely wrong*) to 7 (*definitely right*).

Entitlement. The nine-item Psychological Entitlement Scale (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004) assesses beliefs about own entitlement. Example items are "I honestly feel I'm just more deserving than others" and "I do not necessarily deserve special treatment" (reverse-scored). Participants responded using a 7-point scale from 1 (*definitely wrong*) to 7 (*definitely right*).

Power. Riketta's (2008) 20-item adaptation of the Need for Power Scale (Schmidt & Frieze, 1997) assesses a desire for power. Example items are "I find satisfaction in having influence over others" and "I would like doing something important where people looked up to me." Participants responded using a 7-point scale from 1 (*definitely wrong*) to 7 (*definitely right*).

Additionally, we administered Bernard et al.'s (2006) five-item version of the Power Values Scale (Schwartz, 1992). This scale assesses the importance that people place on power values. Example items are "authority (the right to lead or command)" and "influential (having an impact on people and events)." Participants rated the importance of each value as a guiding principle in their life ($-1 = \textit{opposed to my values}$, $7 = \textit{extremely important}$).

Results

Table 6 displays the zero-order correlations between the four core self-motives and the NPI (Data Column 1) as well as the CNI (Data Column 2) in Samples 7, 8, and 10. Replicating past research, agentic narcissists reported heightened levels of self-motives for grandiosity, self-esteem, entitlement, and power. More important, communal narcissists also reported heightened levels of these self-motives. Next, we examined the relations between the four self-motives and the NPI independently of the CNI (see Table 6's Data Column 3), as well as the relations between these self-motives and the CNI independently of the NPI (see Table 6's Data Column 4). As hypothesized, agentic and communal narcissists, independently of each other, reported heightened levels of the core self-motives.

Finally, we examined the interaction between NPI and CNI on each of the four self-motives. To this end, we conducted a series of

Table 6
Narcissism and the Four Core Narcissistic Self-Motives

Criterion	Predictors				
	Zero-order correlation		Multiple regression		
	NPI	CNI	NPI	CNI	NPI × CNI
Grandiosity	.36***	.37***	.27**	.29**	-.09
Self-esteem					
Sample 6	.30***	.30***	.25***	.25***	-.04
Sample 10	.42***	.47***	.31***	.38***	-.01
Entitlement	.27**	.38***	.18 [†]	.33***	.08
Power					
Need for power	.35***	.47***	.35***	.47***	.04
Power values	.30***	.37***	.30***	.37***	.09

Note. NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory; CNI = Communal Narcissism Inventory.
[†] $p \leq .10$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

multiple regression analyses, simultaneously regressing each self-motive on the NPI (centered), the CNI (centered), and their interaction term. Table 6's final data column displays the results of these interactions. As can be seen, the standardized regression coefficients of the interactions were consistently close to zero. The p levels were far from significance.

Discussion

This study showed that agentic (i.e., NPI) and communal (i.e., CNI) narcissists share the same self-motives for grandiosity, self-esteem, entitlement, and power. Agentic and communal narcissism, independently of each other, explained variance in these self-motives. In other words, agentic and communal narcissism exhibited additive effects on grandiosity, self-esteem, entitlement, and power. We additionally tested whether the two facets of narcissism interact in predicting the four core self-motives. We consistently found no evidence for such an interaction. Nonetheless, narcissists scoring high on the NPI and the CNI also scored high on each self-need, but this was due to additive rather than multiplicative effects of the NPI and the CNI.

Study 4: Do Agentic and Communal Narcissists Differ in How They Satisfy Their Self-Motives?

A central tenet of the agency-communion model is that agentic and communal narcissists share core self-motives, but differ in the means by which they strive to meet them. Agentic narcissists rely on agency but not on communion, whereas communal narcissists rely on communion but not on agency. We tested this tenet in Study 4.

As a reminder, W. K. Campbell, Rudich, and Sedikides (2002) showed that agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists manifested higher better-than-average judgments on agentic, but not on communal, attributes. We attempted to replicate this finding, while also expecting that communal (i.e., CNI) narcissists would exhibit pronounced better-than-average judgments on communal, but not on agentic, attributes. In addition, we hypothesized that overclaiming knowledge on communal topics would be related to communal, but not agentic, narcissism, whereas overclaiming knowledge on agentic topics would be related to agentic, but not communal, narcissism.

Such overclaiming results would conceptually replicate the better-than-average results, using a criterion-based rather than a social comparative measure of self-enhancement. Overclaiming results in line with our hypotheses would also complement and extend the finding that agentic narcissists overclaim knowledge on agentic topics (Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus et al., 2003).

Method

Participants. We tested Study 4's hypotheses in Samples 10 and 12–15 (see Table 1).

Materials and procedure. Below, we describe those Study 4 measures that have not been used—and thus described—in Studies 1–3 (see also Table 2).

Better-than-average task. W. K. Campbell, Rudich, and Sedikides's (2002) agency versus communion adaptation of the better-than-average task (Alicke, 1985; Alicke & Govorun, 2005) asks participants to indicate their perceived stand on several attributes relative to the average person (0 = *much less than the average person*, 8 = *much more than the average person*). In Sample 10, the four attributes covering agency were "assertive," "ambitious," "dominant," and "blunt," whereas the four attributes covering communion were "helpful," "caring," "understanding," and "trustworthy." In Sample 12, the six attributes covering agency were "successful," "ambitious," "extraverted," "stupid" (reverse-scored), "shy" (reverse-scored), and "quiet" (reverse-scored), whereas the six attributes covering communion were "helpful," "kind," "honest," "rude" (reverse-scored), "immoral" (reverse-scored), and "cold" (reverse-scored).

Overclaiming task. In the original overclaiming task (Paulhus et al., 2003), participants indicated their familiarity with specific instantiations of several academic topics. For example, within the topic of "physical sciences," participants rated their familiarity with "alloy," "photon," and "ultra-lipid." Participants were not told that some of the items are foils (here: "ultra-lipid"). Paulhus et al. (2003) computed overclaiming and knowledge scores for each participant based on the familiarity ratings of these foils relative to the real items (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).

To assess overclaiming on communal topics, we presented participants with four communal topics in Samples 13 and 14: "humanitarian aid organizations," "nature and animal protection or-

ganizations,” “parenting and childcare,” and “international health charities.” Participants rated their familiarity with 17 instantiations of each topic (0 = *I never heard of it*, 6 = *I am very familiar with it*). Thirteen of these instantiations were real and four were foils. Examples of “humanitarian aid organization” items are “Red Cross International” (real), “Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières” (real), and “International Well-Being Fund (IWBF)” (foil). Examples of “nature and animal protection organization” items are “Greenpeace” (real), “WWF International” (real), and “WildlifeProtected” (foil). Examples of “parenting and childcare” items are “Overparenting” (real), “Declaration of the Rights of the Child” (real), and “UN Act Against Childism (UNAC)” (foil). Lastly, examples of “international health charity” items are “The Stroke Association” (real), “International Children’s Heart Foundation” (real), and “Asch AIDS Aid (AAA)” (foil). We used Paulhus et al.’s (2003) commonsense signal detection formulae to calculate overclaiming and true knowledge scores for each of the four communal topics.

Based on the results of Samples 13 and 14, we devised a 12-item short form of our communal overclaiming task and complemented this short form with a parallel 12-item agentic overclaiming task. This allowed us to replicate conceptually the results obtained with the agentic versus communal better-than-average task, and we attempted this replication in Sample 15. The short form of the communal overclaiming task contained the same four communal topics as did the long form described above. However, each topic only included three items: two real items and one foil. The items of the short form are those given as example items for the long form above. The parallel agentic overclaiming task consisted of the following four agentic topics: “international stock market” (items: “Nikkei” [real], “blue chips” [real], “Alpha Centauri Index [ACI]” [foil]), “chemistry & physics” (items: “the theory of general relativity” [real], “thermodynamics” [real], “the Mander periodical equation” [foil]), “market principles” (items: “Nash equilibrium” [real], “game theory” [real], “Saturated market hub” [foil]), and “leading educational institutions” (items: “Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT]” [real], “London School of Economics and Political Science [LSE]” [real], “the Wall Institute Berlin [WIB]” [foil]).

Results

Better-than-average judgments. Table 7 displays the relations between narcissism and better-than-average judgments. First, Data Column 1 shows the results of Sample 10. In line with the

agency-communion model, communal narcissism was positively related to communal better-than-average judgments, but not to agentic better-than-average judgments, and the difference between the two effects was marginal ($z = 1.70, p = .09$). At the same time, agentic narcissism was positively related to agentic better-than-average judgments, but not to communal better-than-average judgments, and the difference between the two effects was significant ($z = 4.78, p = .001$).

Second, Data Column 2 shows the results of Sample 12. Again, communal narcissism was positively related to communal better-than-average judgments, but not to agentic better-than-average judgments, and the difference between the two effects was significant ($z = 3.70, p = .001$). At the same time, agentic narcissism was again positively related to agentic better-than-average judgments, but not to communal better-than-average judgments, and the difference between the two effects was also significant ($z = 7.92, p = .001$).

Overclaiming. Table 8 displays the relations between narcissism and overclaiming. First, Data Columns 1 and 2 show the results of Sample 13, which only included measures of communal narcissism and communal overclaiming. In line with the agency-communion model, communal narcissism was positively related to communal overclaiming, but not to better knowledge in the communal domain, and the difference between the two effects was significant ($z = 3.36, p = .001$).

Second, Data Column 2 shows the results of Sample 14, which included measures of agentic and communal narcissism and communal overclaiming. Replicating Sample 13 results, communal narcissism was positively related to communal overclaiming, but negatively related to better knowledge in the communal domain, and the difference between the two effects was significant ($z = 3.64, p = .001$). Furthermore, agentic narcissism was related neither to communal overclaiming nor to communal knowledge, and the difference between communal and agentic narcissisms’ relations to communal overclaiming was significant ($z = 3.63, p = .001$).

Third, Data Column 3 shows the results of Sample 15, which included measures of agentic and communal narcissism and agentic and communal overclaiming. Replicating Sample 13 results, communal narcissism was positively related to communal overclaiming, but unrelated to knowledge in the communal domain, and the difference between the two effects was significant ($z = 2.14, p = .03$). Furthermore, replicating Sample 14 results, agentic narcissism was negatively related to communal overclaiming and

Table 7
Narcissism and Better-Than-Average Judgments

Criterion	Simultaneous predictors			
	Sample 10		Sample 12	
	CNI	NPI	CNI	NPI
Communal better-than-average task	.33***	-.14	.41***	-.38***
Agentic better-than-average task	.11	.48***	-.03	.58***

Note. CNI = Communal Narcissism Inventory; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory.
*** $p \leq .001$.

Table 8
Agentic and Communal Narcissism and Agentic and Communal Overclaiming

Criterion	Simultaneous predictors					
	Sample 13		Sample 14		Sample 15	
	CNI	NPI	CNI	NPI	CNI	NPI
Communal overclaiming						
Overclaiming	.26**	—	.26**	-.13	.18**	-.17**
True knowledge	-.10	—	-.17*	-.10	-.05	-.11
Agentic overclaiming						
Overclaiming	—	—	—	—	.02	.20***
True knowledge	—	—	—	—	-.02	-.07

Note. Dashes indicate that no information was available. CNI = Communal Narcissism Inventory; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

unrelated to communal knowledge, and the difference between communal and agentic narcissisms' relations to communal overclaiming was significant ($z = 3.85, p = .001$). Finally, agentic narcissism was positively related to agentic overclaiming, but unrelated to knowledge in the agentic domain, and the difference between the two effects was significant ($z = 3.09, p = .002$). At the same time, communal narcissism was related neither to agentic overclaiming nor to agentic knowledge, and the difference between agentic and communal narcissisms' relations to agentic overclaiming was significant ($z = 2.04, p = .04$).

Discussion

Across five independent samples, communal narcissists manifested exaggerated better-than-average judgments on communal, but not on agentic, attributes, and they overclaimed their knowledge on communal, but not on agentic, topics. In addition, there was no evidence that communal narcissists actually possessed more communal knowledge than nonnarcissists. In fact, in all three studies, communal narcissists possessed *less* communal knowledge than nonnarcissists, albeit this effect was only significant in Sample 14. This pattern is consistent with the anecdotal know-it-all, who sees no need for knowledge acquisition because he knows everything (including foils) anyway. Irrespective, the overall result pattern shows that communal narcissists' self-ratings reflect style rather than substance: Communal narcissists believe that they are particularly advanced in communal matters, but they are not. This parallels the pattern of results obtained with agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists' beliefs about agentic matters (Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus et al., 2003; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Finally, in the current study, agentic narcissism was unrelated to overclaiming and true knowledge on communal topics. This finding furthers the agency-communion model's tenet that agentic and communal narcissists differ in their means of satisfying their core self-motives.

Study 5: Can Communal Narcissism Explain Weak Self-Other Agreement Regarding Communal Behaviors and Traits?

Studies 1–4 support the agency-communion model of grandiose narcissism. These studies show that the fundamental distinction

between agency and communion helps to explain more fully grandiose narcissism. Yet how relevant to the broader personality literature is the construct of communal narcissism? We argue that communal narcissism can help in solving longstanding puzzles in the personality literature. A relatively weak self–other agreement regarding communal behaviors and traits is one such example (Allik et al., 2010; Gosling et al., 2003; John & Robins, 1993). We have reasoned, in the introduction, that communal narcissism may weaken self–other agreement regarding communal behaviors and traits. This should be the case because communal narcissists overclaim their communality in self-reports (Study 4), but are likely to be seen as less communal by others (Study 3). In Study 5, then, we expected a positive relation between communal narcissism and self-reported communality, but a negative relation between communal narcissism and observer-reported communality. Hence, communal narcissism should suppress the self–other agreement regarding communal traits. We tested these hypotheses using a round-robin design (Warner, Kenny, & Stoto, 1979). To assure robustness and consistency of our findings, we assessed observer reports twice, with a time lag of 7 weeks in between.

Method

Participants and procedure. In the first week of the semester, 131 newly enrolled Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Berlin, Germany) first-year undergraduate psychology students completed the CNI and measures of self-reported communal traits. Three weeks later, each participant was randomly allocated into one of 20 work groups with a maximum of seven students per group. From that week onwards (until the end of the study), each work group met on average at least once per week for group work as part of a personality psychology lecture. Seven weeks after the study's beginning (i.e., the self-report portion), 123 of the original participants (reparticipation rate: 94%) completed the first round-robin wave (i.e., observer reports of their group members' communal behavior during group discussion, observer reports of their group members' communal traits). Another 7 weeks later (i.e., 14 weeks after the self-report part), 115 of the original participants (reparticipation rate: 88%) completed the second round-robin wave, which was identical to the first one. (None of the round-robin waves included the assessment of self-report measures.) Overall,

106 participants completed all measures in all three waves of measurement (i.e., [a] self-report wave, [b] Round-Robin Wave 1, [c] Round-Robin Wave 2) and hence qualified for statistical analyses (see Table 1, Sample 16). All assessments took place in a large lecture theatre, and participants were rewarded with course credit.

Materials.

Self-report. In the self-report part, we assessed communal narcissism with the CNI, and we assessed communal traits with the BFI's Agreeableness and Conscientiousness subscales (Lang et al., 2001). This operationalization of communal traits follows W. K. Campbell, Rudich, and Sedikides (2002), who described the aggregate of agreeableness and conscientiousness as prototypical for communion and ideally suited to capture moralistic (i.e., communal) bias (Paulhus & John, 1998). Indeed, factor analyses have confirmed that agreeableness and conscientiousness are appropriately subsumed by a larger communion factor (Saucier, 2009). The aggregate of the Agreeableness subscale (eight items; e.g., "I see myself as someone who . . ." ". . . is helpful and unselfish with others," ". . . is considerate and kind to almost everyone"; rating scale from 0 [*not at all*] to 4 [*very much*]) and the Conscientiousness subscale (nine items; e.g., "I see myself as someone who . . ." ". . . can be somewhat careless" [reverse-scored], ". . . is a reliable worker"; rating scale from 0 [*not at all*] to 4 [*very much*]) was internally consistent ($\alpha = .72$).

Round-robin. In both round-robin waves, participants judged the communality of all their group members (i.e., each participant judged up to six other participants). First, participants judged their group members' communal *traits*, using Rammstedt and John's (2007) German short forms of the BFI's Agreeableness and Conscientiousness subscales (Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). In line with the conceptualization of communion as a broad construct, the internal consistency of the aggregated Agreeableness subscale (two items; "Person X . . ." ". . . is generally trusting," ". . . tends to find fault with others" [reverse-scored]; rating scale from 0 [*not at all*] to 4 [*very much*]) and Conscientiousness subscale (two items; "Person X . . ." ". . . does a thorough job," ". . . tends to be lazy" [reverse-scored]; rating scale from 0 [*not at all*] to 4 [*very much*]) indicated measurement breadth in Wave 1 ($\alpha = .54$) and in Wave 2 ($\alpha = .57$; L. A. Clark & Watson, 1995). Importantly, an adequate test of the measure's reliability—namely, a test–retest correlation between Wave 1 and Wave 2—strongly supported the measure's reliability, $r(106) = .72, p = .001$ (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Second, participants judged their group members' communal behaviors on five items from Moskowitz's (1994) behavioral self-report items. These items were chosen because they are communal in nature, while being applicable to the participants' group discussions: "Person X . . ." ". . . listens attentively to the others," ". . . complements or praises group members," ". . . smiles and laughs with others," ". . . makes concessions to avoid unpleasantness," and ". . . expressed reassurance." The internal consistency of the measure was high in Wave 1 ($\alpha = .80$) and in Wave 2 ($\alpha = .83$), and the test–retest correlation between Wave 1 and Wave 2 was also high, $r(106) = .71, p = .001$.

Results

From Sample 16's round-robin data, we extracted scores for each participant that indicated how this participant had been

judged by his or her group members regarding (a) communal behaviors and (b) communal traits. In the language of the social relations model (Kenny, 1994), we estimated *partner effects* for each participant regarding communal behaviors and communal traits. For these estimations, we used the TripleR package (Schönbrodt, Back, & Schmukle, 2012) for the statistical software R (R Development Core Team, 2008), while taking the multiple group design into account.

Once partner effects for communal behaviors and traits were obtained, we used multilevel modeling (HLM 6.06; Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2004) to test our hypotheses. Because participants were nested in groups but group variables were of no interest to us, all reported effects take place on Level 1. (Nonetheless, HLM appropriately takes the nested data structure into account.)

First, we tested the hypothesis that (self-reported) communal narcissism is positively related to self-reported communal traits, but is negatively related to observer-reported communal traits. To this end, we simultaneously regressed communal narcissism on self-reported communal traits and on observer-reported communal traits from the first round-robin wave. In line with the hypothesis, communal narcissists judged themselves as particularly high on communal traits, $b = .69, SE = .21, t(103) = 3.36, p = .001$, whereas communal narcissists were judged as particularly low on communal traits by observers, $b = -.69, SE = .20, t(103) = -3.51, p = .001$.

Second, we tested whether these results held when observer-reported communal traits from the first round-robin wave were replaced with observer-reported communal traits from the second round-robin wave (7 weeks later). And indeed they did so. Again, communal narcissists were judged as particularly low on communal traits by observers, $b = -.69, SE = .16, t(103) = -4.33, p = .001$.

Third, we tested whether the same pattern held when replacing observer-reported communal traits with observer-reported communal behaviors. Using observer reports of communal behavior from the first round-robin wave, communal narcissists showed particularly little communal behavior in the eyes of their group members, $b = -.47, SE = .16, t(103) = -2.97, p = .004$. Yet this effect did not reach significance when using observer reports of communal behavior from the second round-robin wave, $b = -.28, SE = .21, t(103) = -1.38, p = .17$, albeit the effect was in the same direction as before.

Fourth, we tested whether the observer reports of communal behavior mediated the link between communal narcissism and observer reports of communal traits. Stated otherwise, did the observed communal behaviors constitute cues that functioned as the process linking high communal narcissism to low observer-reported communal traits? In line with this hypothesis, a Sobel (1982) test revealed a significant path from higher communal narcissism over lower observer-reported communal behavior (Round-Robin Wave 1) to lower observer-reported communal traits (Round-Robin Wave 1; $z = -2.63, SE = .02, p = .008$). Similarly, a Sobel test revealed a significant path from higher communal narcissism over lower observer-reported communal behavior (Round-Robin Wave 1) to lower observer-reported communal traits (Round-Robin Wave 2; $z = -2.66, SE = .02, p = .008$).

These results constitute necessary preconditions for Study 5's main hypothesis: Does communal narcissists' communal self-

aggrandizement suppress self–other agreement in the communal domain? To test this hypothesis, we first examined self–other agreement using observer-reported communal traits from Round-Robin Wave 1. That is, we regressed self-rated communal traits on observer-rated communal traits. We obtained a marginal positive relation, $b = .20$, $SE = .11$, $t(104) = 1.94$, $p = .06$. Given that we previously found communal narcissism to relate positively to self-reported communion, but to relate negatively to observer-reported communion, it is likely that controlling for communal narcissism boosts this marginal self–other agreement. Indeed, this was the case. Controlling for communal narcissism rendered self–other agreement regarding communal traits significant, $b = .27$, $SE = .10$, $t(103) = 2.73$, $p = .008$, and the increase in the self–other agreement itself was also significant ($z = -2.12$, $SE = .03$, $p = .03$).

Finally, we tested the robustness of our findings by using observer-reported communal traits from Round-Robin Wave 2. To begin with, we regressed self-reported communal traits on observer-reported communal traits. Self–other agreement did not reach significance, $B = .19$, $SE = .13$, $t(104) = 1.45$, $p = .15$. Again, however, when controlling for communal narcissism, self–other agreement became significant, $B = .26$, $SE = .12$, $t(103) = 2.14$, $p = .03$, and, again, this increase was significant ($z = -2.29$, $SE = .02$, $p = .02$).

Discussion

Study 5 confers two crucial contributions. First, it buttresses the conceptualization of communal narcissism as a personality trait that describes individuals who exaggerate their communal qualities (Study 4). In line with this conceptualization, communal narcissists described themselves as particularly high on communion, but their acquaintances described them as particularly low on communion. Further, the link between communal narcissism at Time 1 and particularly low levels of observer-reported communion at Time 3 was mediated by observer reports of relatively low communal behaviors at Time 2. These behaviors were concrete actions observed during many hours of group work as part of a personality psychology lecture. The resultant high ecological validity is a noteworthy strength of the present study.

Over and above this first merit, the present study provides one example for the usefulness of introducing communal narcissism to personality theory and research. The study shows that puzzlingly low relations between self-reported and observer-reported communion are attributable, in part, to the existence of communal narcissism: Communal narcissists overclaim their communal traits, while being seen as low in communion (behaviors and traits) by observers, and this dissociation is the reason why communal narcissism suppresses the otherwise substantial self–other agreement in the communal domain. This effect was obtained both 7 and 14 weeks after the self-report phase, attesting to the robustness of this effect.

General Discussion

Much theory and research have been devoted to examining the nature of grandiose narcissism. These efforts have culminated in the conclusion that grandiose narcissism is what we have currently labeled an agency-agency trait: an agentic trait (here: self-

aggrandizement; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf et al., 2011) that is expressed through agentic means. For example, W. K. Campbell, Rudich, and Sedikides (2002) reported that narcissists display exaggerated better-than-average judgments on agentic, but not on communal, attributes. Based on this and similar findings, contemporary models of narcissism (W. K. Campbell, 1999; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007; Paulhus, 2001; Paulhus & John, 1998; Sedikides et al., 2002) converge in positing that narcissists meet their core self-motives (i.e., grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power) through agentic means.

The current approach aimed to complement and extend prior theorizing and research. In particular, we have proposed an agency-communion model of narcissism. The model describes *agentic narcissists* as individuals who meet their core self-motives through agentic means. In keeping with prior narcissism theories (W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007; Paulhus, 2001) and research (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Paulhus et al., 2003), we accepted the utility of the NPI as a suitable measure of agentic narcissism (Miller & Campbell, 2011). More important, the model includes a second, previously unidentified form of narcissism. *Communal narcissists* have the same core self-motives as agentic narcissists. However, communal narcissists meet these self-motives through communal means. Five studies across 16 samples lent support to the model.

Overview of the Findings

In Study 1, participants listed their grandiose self-thoughts in an open-ended measure. Content analyses revealed that participants listed both agentic and communal grandiose self-thoughts. Moreover, NPI narcissists reported a higher amount and extremity of agentic, but not of communal, grandiose self-thoughts. This is consistent with prior evidence that NPI narcissists show elevated better-than-average judgments on agentic, but not on communal, attributes (W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; see also W. K. Campbell et al., 2007). At the same time, this finding supports our claim that the NPI only assesses agentic narcissism (see also W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007). In Study 2, we used the communal grandiose self-thoughts listed by Study 1 participants as candidate items for the CNI. We carried out exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses to construct the final 16-item CNI (see the Appendix). This self-report measure has good psychometric properties and high temporal stability, and it is largely independent of the NPI. Thus, these results provide additional support for our model, while providing support for the CNI as an adequate measure of communal narcissism. Further corroborating the model, Study 3 demonstrated that agentic and communal narcissists share the same core self-motives for grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power. Study 4 backed the model's proposition that agentic and communal narcissists differ in their means for need satisfaction. Agentic narcissists manifested higher better-than-average judgments on agentic, but not on communal, attributes. Conversely, communal narcissists manifested higher better-than-average judgments on communal, but not on agentic, attributes. Furthermore, agentic narcissists overclaimed their knowledge regarding agentic, but not communal, topics. Conversely, communal narcissists overclaimed their knowledge regarding communal, but not agentic, topics. Finally, Study 5 provided one example for the usefulness of the communal narcissism

construct for personality psychology more generally. Communal narcissism helped to explain the puzzle concerning relatively low self–other agreement in communal personality judgment. Specifically, communal narcissism suppressed the otherwise substantial relation between self-reported and observer-reported communion because communal narcissists saw themselves as particularly communal but were seen as particularly noncommunal by observers.

Placing the Agency-Communion Model of Narcissism in the Literature

The agency-communion model of narcissism complements and extends three existing theoretical models—namely, the agency model of narcissism (W. K. Campbell et al., 2006; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007), the dynamic self-regulatory processing model (Morf, 2006; Morf et al., 2011; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001), and the self-perception bias model (Paulhus & John, 1998).

The agency-communion model borrows its conceptualization of agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissism from the agency model (W. K. Campbell et al., 2006; W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007). Indeed, our results involving the NPI are consistent with the agency model. More important, the agency-communion model also borrows from the agency model in conceptualizing communal narcissism. Specifically, we see communal narcissism as the *communal equivalent* of W. K. Campbell and colleagues' conceptualization of agentic narcissism, and the current results are in line with this view. The agency-communion model, then, extends the agency model's conceptualization of NPI narcissism into the communal domain. The agency model relies on a foundation of decades of NPI research and thus manages to provide a conceptual map of agentic narcissism that is empirically richer than the conceptual map of communal narcissism. Yet Studies 2–5 make decisive steps towards closing this gap. Further research is needed, though, to catch up with the long tradition of agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissism.

The agency-communion model also intersects with the dynamic self-regulatory processing model (Morf, 2006; Morf et al., 2011; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). So called *IF . . . THEN . . .* situation-behavior patterns (Mischel & Morf, 2003; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) lie at the heart of the dynamic self-regulatory processing model. According to Morf et al. (2011, p. 402), narcissists' typical self-signatures are "IF opportunity for promotion or demonstration of the grandiose and superior self, THEN self-affirm, self-promote and self-enhance!" Past research, however, suggests that NPI narcissists' typical self-signatures are limited to *agentic* self-affirmation, self-promotion, and self-enhancement (W. K. Campbell et al., 2000; W. K. Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Paulhus et al., 2003). Acknowledging the existence of a communal facet of narcissism broadens the scope of narcissistic self-affirmation, self-promotion, and self-enhancement. In other words, the agency-communion model supports the existence of *IF . . . THEN . . .* situation-behavior patterns among narcissists that extend into the communal domain.

In an influential theoretical review, Paulhus and John (1998) suggested a broad self-perception bias model. This model distinguishes between two independent dimensions of self-favoring tendencies—an egoistic and a moralistic bias in self-perception. According to Paulhus and John (1994), a pronounced egoistic bias can be loosely described as a superhero-type bias, whereas a pronounced moralistic bias can be loosely described as a saint-type

bias (see also Paulhus & John, 1998). By definition, then, superheroes and saints show pervasive self-aggrandizement, but superheroes self-aggrandize on the agentic domain, whereas saints self-aggrandize on the communal domain. Following agency models of narcissism (W. K. Campbell & Foster, 2007; Paulhus, 2001), narcissism is located on the broader superhero dimension of Paulhus and John's (1998) theoretical model. However, this latter model lacks a counterpart to narcissism on the saint dimension (see Figure 2 of Paulhus & John, 1998). We believe that the agency-communion model of narcissism can narrow this gap. Echoing Paulhus and John's (1998) theoretical account of narcissism, the agency-communion model describes NPI narcissism as the agentic facet of narcissism—reflecting a superhero-type bias in self-perception. Adding to Paulhus and John's (1998) theoretical account of narcissism, the agency-communion model describes CNI narcissism as the communal facet of narcissism—reflecting a saint-type bias in self-perception. In fact, communal narcissism may even be the prototype of the broader saint-type bias in self-perception. At least this is suggested by a grandiose self-view listed by one of our participants. In Study 1's open-ended measure of grandiose self-thoughts this participant wrote, "I will be the second Mother Theresa." Although the correspondent candidate CNI item did not make the final cut of the CNI, the correlation between the CNI and this item was high in both item-selection samples: Sample 4, $r(120) = .56, p < .001$, and Sample 5, $r(194) = .50, p < .001$. Future research will do well to examine the prototypicality of communal narcissism for the broader saint-type bias in self-perception.

Implications for Future Research

The agency-communion model of narcissism generates a number of questions for future research. For example, agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists react aggressively when threatened (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Bushman et al., 2009; Jones & Paulhus, 2010; Reidy, Zeichner, Foster, & Martinez, 2008; Stucke & Sporer, 2002). Communal narcissists may also react aggressively to threats, but they may react particularly sensitively to threats in the communal domain. Furthermore, communal narcissists may express their aggression via more communal means (e.g., gossiping, passive aggression).

Perhaps partly due to their aggressive reactions, agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists are initially liked but later disliked by others (Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2010; Paulhus, 1998). A similar but perhaps even more dramatic pattern may be obtained for communal narcissists. These individuals think that they are more other-oriented than others, and may show off this belief. Thus, compared to agentic narcissists, communal narcissists may make an even more favorable first impression (Morf et al., 2011). With the passage of time, however, their self-centered style (e.g., overclaiming, better-than-average self-perceptions) will be identified as such (Study 5). In turn, others' realization that communal narcissists not only are self-focused but hypocritically proclaim to be particularly other-focused may render the communal narcissist particularly unpopular.

Another research direction concerns the prevalence of communal narcissism. Agentic narcissism is frequent (Lasch, 1979; Twenge & Campbell, 2009) and increasing (Foster et al., 2003; Twenge & Foster, 2010; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, &

Bushman, 2008a, 2008b). Mean CNI levels (see Table 2) suggest that individuals on average harbor a considerable amount of communal narcissism. Is communal narcissism susceptible to cohort effects the way agentic narcissism is?

In a related vein, future research could examine the prevalence of communal narcissism in cultures with values that oppose agentic self-enhancement and thus agentic narcissism. China, for example, has traditionally been a collectivist culture that holds values opposing agentic self-enhancement (Cai, Kwan, & Sedikides, in press), and in line with this, agentic narcissism is not very prevalent in China (Foster et al., 2003; but see Cai et al., in press). However, communal narcissism may be prevalent in China, and preliminary results suggest that communal narcissism is indeed prevalent among particularly collectivist Chinese persons. Specifically, a subset of this article's authors (Gebauer, Lei, Cai, Sedikides, & Gaertner, 2012) has been involved in an ongoing project comparing CNI scores of Chinese students with CNI scores of Chinese governmental officials. Chinese students were collectivist and endorsed Chinese cultural values. However, relative to students, governmental officials were even more collectivist and endorsed Chinese cultural values even more. At the same time, communal narcissism was prevalent among Chinese students. Importantly, communal narcissism was even more prevalent among governmental officials. Thus, communal narcissism is present in different occupational groups in China, and its prevalence increases with increasing endorsement of collectivist values. These results are in line with research showing that people self-enhance primarily on attributes that are central to themselves (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005).

Research on agentic and communal narcissism in China may also shed light on the origins of communal narcissism in the West. Specifically, people in collectivist cultures may capitalize not on agency but on communion in order to satisfy their narcissistic self-motives because their cultural setting renders *communal values particularly self-central*. The same "self-centrality breeds self-enhancement" principle (Gebauer, Wagner, Sedikides, & Neberich, 2012) should also explain why some Western narcissists capitalize on the agentic domain for narcissistic self-need fulfillment (i.e., agentic narcissists), whereas other Western narcissists capitalize on the communal domain for narcissistic self-need fulfillment (i.e., communal narcissists). Specifically, factors rendering agentic values self-central should make narcissistic self-motive fulfillment in the agentic domain particularly appealing. Conversely, factors rendering communal values self-central should make narcissistic self-motive fulfillment in the communal domain particularly appealing. Thus, in order to understand why some Western narcissists are agentic narcissists whereas other Western narcissists are communal narcissists, it may be useful to study the origins of the centrality of agentic versus communal values. One such origin should be parental upbringing. Parents who foster agentic values should render agentic values particularly self-central in their children, and these children—provided they possess narcissistic self-motives—should attempt self-motive satisfaction via agentic means. This process then should lead to the development of agentic narcissism. Conversely, parents who foster communal values should render communal values particularly self-central in their children, and these children—provided they possess narcissistic self-motives—should attempt self-motive satisfaction

via communal means. This process then should lead to the development of communal narcissism. Preliminary evidence is in line with this hypothesis. Specifically, Gebauer, Sedikides, Noebels, and Diehl (2012) found that, according to acquaintances of communal narcissists' parents (i.e., rather impartial observers), these parents habitually told their children (i.e., the later communal narcissists) that they were extraordinarily communal.

Finally, communal narcissism may contribute towards answering the question why religiosity persists (Sedikides & Gebauer, in press). A frequent psychological answer is that religiosity can fulfill basic human motives, such as attachment (Gebauer & Maio, 2012), but also self-enhancement (Gebauer, Sedikides, & Neberich, 2012; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). Given that a communal life orientation is strongly encouraged by all world religions and that religiosity provides one means for self-enhancement, communal narcissists may be drawn to religiosity particularly strongly.

As described above, the agency-communion model conceptualizes agentic and communal narcissism as agency-agency and agency-communion traits, respectively. Stated otherwise, our model conceptualizes narcissism hierarchically in terms of traits and their means. This hierarchical conceptualization of narcissism may be seen as one specific instantiation of a broader means-for-traits account, and it may be fruitful to think of other constructs (not only narcissism) in conjunction with differing means. Our distinction between agentic and communal overclaiming is one further example illustrating the fruitfulness of the means-for-traits account. Specifically, it is well known that overclaiming captures self-enhancement (Paulhus et al., 2003). However, although self-enhancement is an agentic trait (Paulhus & John, 1998), the means-for-traits account stipulates that people can differ in their overclaiming means—that is, whether they overclaim agentic knowledge or communal knowledge. In the present research, we provided evidence from three independent samples supporting the applicability of the means-for-traits account to overclaiming. This evidence directly responds to Paulhus's (2011, p. 161) call that a "remaining challenge is to determine if the overclaiming method can be applied to *moralistic biases* [i.e., communal self-enhancement] as well as *egoistic biases* [i.e., agentic self-enhancement]." Our data strongly suggest that it can.

Concluding Remarks

In this article, have we proposed an agency-communion model of narcissism, distinguishing between agentic and communal narcissists and between agentic and communal means to pursue narcissists' core self-motives. Following the construction of a suitable measure of communal narcissism, we amassed empirical evidence in support of the model. Agentic and communal narcissists share the same self-motives for grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power, while deploying different means to pursue these self-motives. Agentic narcissists deploy agentic means, whereas communal narcissists deploy communal means.

We concede that, to some, our research efforts and conclusions may appear somewhat cynical. After all, why would a researcher want to demonstrate that even a seemingly benevolent life orientation may mask self-oriented motives? Our research aim, though, was not motivated by cynicism. Instead, our research was built on

earlier investigations documenting the astoundingly creative implementation repertoire of core self-motives (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Baumeister, 1998; Dunning, 1993; Gebauer, Görtz, Hofmann, & Sedikides, 2012; Hepper, Sedikides, & Cai, in press). The current findings perhaps push this principle to its extreme. We reasoned and documented that the core self-motives are pursued even by individuals who proclaim a particularly strong focus on the needs of others. Indeed, as our opening quotes stated, self-perceived selflessness can sometimes be “the vainest form of selfishness,” and in that case, it may constitute “perfected egoism.”

References

- Abele, A. E., Cuddy, A. J. C., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2008). Fundamental dimensions of social judgment. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 38*, 1063–1065. doi:10.1002/ejsp.574
- Abele, A. E., & Wojciszke, B. (2007). Agency and communion from the perspective of self and others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93*, 751–763. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.751
- Ackerman, R. A., Witt, E. A., Donnellan, M. B., Trzesniewski, K. H., Robins, R. W., & Kashy, D. A. (2011). What does the Narcissistic Personality Inventory really measure? *Assessment, 18*, 67–87.
- Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and controllability of trait adjectives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49*, 1621–1630. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.49.6.1621
- Alicke, M. D., & Govorun, O. (2005). The better-than-average effect. In M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I. Krueger (Eds.), *Studies in self and identity* (pp. 85–106). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Alicke, M. D., & Sedikides, C. (2009). Self-enhancement and self-protection: What they are and what they do. *European Review of Social Psychology, 20*, 1–48. doi:10.1080/10463280802613866
- Allik, J., Realo, A., Mõttus, R., & Kuppens, P. (2010). Generalizability of self–other agreement from one personality trait to another. *Personality and Individual Differences, 48*, 128–132. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.09.008
- Ames, D. R., Rose, P., & Anderson, C. P. (2006). The NPI-16 as a short measure of narcissism. *Journal of Research in Personality, 40*, 440–450. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2005.03.002
- Back, M. D., Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B. (2010). Why are narcissists so charming at first sight? Decoding the narcissism–popularity link at zero acquaintance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98*, 132–145. doi:10.1037/a0016338
- Bakan, D. (1966). *The duality of human existence*. Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley.
- Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 680–740). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Narcissism as addiction to esteem. *Psychological Inquiry, 12*, 206–210.
- Bem, S. L. (1974). The measurement of psychological androgyny. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42*, 155–162. doi:10.1037/h0036215
- Bem, S. L. (1981). *Bem Sex Role Inventory: Professional manual*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
- Benet-Martínez, V., & John, O. P. (1998). *Los Cinco Grandes* across cultures and ethnic groups: Multitrait multimethod analyses of the Big Five in Spanish and English. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75*, 729–750. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.729
- Bernard, M. M., Gebauer, J. E., & Maio, G. R. (2006). Cultural estrangement: The role of personal and societal value discrepancies. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32*, 78–92. doi:10.1177/0146167205279908
- Bleske-Rechek, A., Remiker, M. W., & Baker, J. P. (2008). Narcissistic men and women think they are so hot—but they are not. *Personality and Individual Differences, 45*, 420–424. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2008.05.018
- Bosson, J. K., Lakey, C. E., Campbell, W. K., Zeigler-Hill, V., Jordan, C. H., & Kernis, M. H. (2008). Untangling the links between narcissism and self-esteem: A theoretical and empirical review. *Personality and Social Psychology Compass, 2*, 1415–1439. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00089.x
- Bradlee, P. M., & Emmons, R. A. (1992). Locating narcissism within the interpersonal circumplex and the five-factor model. *Personality and Individual Differences, 13*, 821–830. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(92)90056-U
- Brown, R. P., Budzek, K., & Tamborski, M. (2009). On the meaning of narcissism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35*, 951–964. doi:10.1177/0146167209335461
- Brown, R. P., & Tamborski, M. (2011). A critical view of the measurement of trait narcissism in social-personality research. In W. K. Campbell & J. D. Miller (Eds.), *The handbook of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatments* (pp. 141–145). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Bushman, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Threatened egotism, narcissism, self-esteem, and direct and displaced aggression: Does self-love or self-hate lead to violence? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75*, 219–229. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.219
- Bushman, B. J., Baumeister, R. F., Thomaes, S., Ryu, E., Begeer, S., & West, S. G. (2009). Looking again, and harder, for a link between low self-esteem and aggression. *Journal of Personality, 77*, 427–446. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00553.x
- Buss, D. M. (1991). Evolutionary personality psychology. *Annual Review of Psychology, 42*, 459–491. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.42.020191.002331
- Buss, D. M., & Chiodo, L. M. (1991). Narcissistic acts in everyday life. *Journal of Personality, 59*, 179–215. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1991.tb00773.x
- Cai, H., Kwan, V., & Sedikides, C. (in press). A sociocultural approach to narcissism: The case of modern China. *European Journal of Personality*.
- Campbell, T., Gillaspay, J. A., Jr., & Thompson, B. (1997). The factor structure of the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI): Confirmatory analysis of long and short forms. *Educational and Psychological Measurement, 57*, 118–124.
- Campbell, W. K. (1999). Narcissism and romantic attraction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*, 1254–1270. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1254
- Campbell, W. K. (2001). Is narcissism really so bad? *Psychological Inquiry, 12*, 214–216.
- Campbell, W. K., & Baumeister, R. F. (2006). Narcissistic personality disorder. In J. E. Fisher & W. O'Donohue (Eds.), *Practitioners' guide to evidenced based psychotherapy* (pp. 423–431). New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-28370-8_42
- Campbell, W. K., Bonacci, A. M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2004). Psychological entitlement: Interpersonal consequences and validation of a new self-report measure. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 83*, 29–45. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa8301_04
- Campbell, W. K., Bosson, J. K., Goheen, T. W., Lakey, C. E., & Kernis, M. H. (2007). Do narcissists dislike themselves “deep down inside”? *Psychological Science, 18*, 227–229. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01880.x
- Campbell, W. K., Brunell, A. B., & Finkel, E. J. (2006). Narcissism, interpersonal self-regulation, and romantic relationships: An agency model approach. In K. D. Vohs & E. J. Finkel (Eds.), *Self and relationships: Connecting intrapersonal and interpersonal processes* (pp. 57–83). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Campbell, W. K., Foster, C. A., & Finkel, E. J. (2002). Does self-love lead to love for others? A story of narcissistic game playing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83*, 340–354. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.2.340

- Campbell, W. K., & Foster, J. D. (2007). The narcissistic self: Background, an extended agency model, and ongoing controversies. In C. Sedikides & S. J. Spencer (Eds.), *The self* (pp. 115–138). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Campbell, W. K., & Miller, J. D. (2011). Narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Six suggestions for unifying the field. In W. K. Campbell & J. D. Miller (Eds.), *The handbook of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatments* (pp. 485–488). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Campbell, W. K., Reeder, G., Sedikides, C., & Elliot, A. J. (2000). Narcissism and comparative self-enhancement strategies. *Journal of Research in Personality, 34*, 329–347. doi:10.1006/jrpe.2000.2282
- Campbell, W. K., Rudich, E., & Sedikides, C. (2002). Narcissism, self-esteem, and the positivity of self-views: Two portraits of self-love. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*, 358–368. doi:10.1177/0146167202286007
- Carroll, L. (1987). A study of narcissism, affiliation, intimacy, and power motives among students in business administration. *Psychological Reports, 61*, 355–358. doi:10.2466/pr0.1987.61.2.355
- Cattell, R. B. (1966). The scree test for the number of factors. *Multivariate Behavior Research, 1*, 245–276. doi:10.1207/s15327906mbr0102_10
- Chen, S., Lee-Chai, A. Y., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). Relationship orientation as a moderator of the effects of social power. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80*, 173–187. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.80.2.173
- Clark, L. A., & Watson, D. (1995). Constructing validity: Basic issues in objective scale development. *Psychological Assessment, 7*, 309–319. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.7.3.309
- Clark, M. S., Ouellette, R., Powell, M. C., & Milberg, S. (1987). Recipient's mood, relationship type, and helping. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53*, 94–103. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.53.1.94
- Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. *Psychological Bulletin, 52*, 281–302. doi:10.1037/h0040957
- Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the five-factor model. *Annual Review of Psychology, 41*, 417–440. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.41.020190.002221
- Dunning, D. (1993). Words to live by: The self and definitions of social concepts and categories. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 4, pp. 99–126). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Emmons, R. A. (1984). Factor analysis and construct validity of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 48*, 291–300. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_11
- Emmons, R. A. (1987). Narcissism: Theory and measurement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*, 11–17. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.1.11
- Farwell, L., & Wohlwend-Lloyd, R. (1998). Narcissistic processes: Optimistic expectations, favorable self-evaluations, and self-enhancing attributions. *Journal of Personality, 66*, 65–83. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00003
- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*, 878–902. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878
- Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Twenge, J. M. (2003). Individual differences in narcissism: Inflated self-views across the lifespan and around the world. *Journal of Research in Personality, 37*, 469–486. doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00026-6
- Funder, D. C., & Colvin, C. R. (1988). Friends and strangers: Acquaintanceship, agreement, and the accuracy of personality judgment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55*, 149–158. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.1.149
- Gabriel, M. T., Critelli, J. W., & Ee, J. S. (1994). Narcissistic illusions in self-evaluations of intelligence and attractiveness. *Journal of Personality, 62*, 143–155. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00798.x
- Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., & Chang, K. (2008). On pancultural self-enhancement: Well-adjusted Taiwanese self-enhance on personally valued traits. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 39*, 463–477. doi:10.1177/0022022108318431
- Gebauer, J. E., Görtz, A. S., Hofmann, W., & Sedikides, C. (2012). Self-love or other-love? Explicit other-preference but implicit self-preference. *PLoS ONE 7*(7), e41789. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041789
- Gebauer, J. E., Leary, M. R., & Neberich, W. (in press). Big Two personality and Big Three mate preferences: Similarity attracts, but country-level mate preferences crucially matter. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*.
- Gebauer, J. E., Lei, X., Cai, H., Sedikides, C., & Gaertner, L. (2012). *Communal self-enhancement in China*. Unpublished manuscript, Institut für Psychologie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany.
- Gebauer, J. E., & Maio, G. R. (2012). The need to belong can motivate belief in God. *Journal of Personality, 80*, 465–501. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00730.x
- Gebauer, J. E., Paulhus, D. L., & Neberich, W. (in press). Big Two personality and religiosity across cultures: Communals as religious conformists and agentic as religious contrarians. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/1948550612442553
- Gebauer, J. E., Sedikides, C., & Neberich, W. (2012). Religiosity, social self-esteem, and psychological adjustment: On the cross-cultural specificity of the psychological benefits of religiosity. *Psychological Science, 23*, 158–160. doi:10.1177/0956797611427045
- Gebauer, J. E., Sedikides, C., Noebels, K., & Diehl, M. (2012). *Childhood origins of communal narcissism*. Unpublished manuscript, Institut für Psychologie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany.
- Gebauer, J. E., Wagner, J., Sedikides, C., & Neberich, W. (2012). Agency-communion and self-esteem relations are moderated by culture, religiosity, age, and sex: Evidence for the “Self-Centrality Breeds Self-Enhancement” principle. *Journal of Personality*. Advance online publication. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2012.00807.x
- Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective narcissism and its social consequences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97*, 1074–1096. doi:10.1037/a0016904
- Gorsuch, R. L. (1974). *Factor analysis*. Philadelphia, PA: Saunctors.
- Gosling, S. D., John, O. P., Craik, K. H., & Robins, R. W. (1998). Do people know how they behave? Self-reported act frequencies compared with on-line codings by observers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 1337–1349. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1337
- Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality domains. *Journal of Research in Personality, 37*, 504–528. doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1
- Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 1464–1480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464
- Gregg, A. P., & Sedikides, C. (2010). Narcissistic fragility: Rethinking its links to explicit and implicit self-esteem. *Self and Identity, 9*, 142–161. doi:10.1080/15298860902815451
- Gurtman, M. B. (1992). Construct validity of interpersonal personality measures: The interpersonal circumplex as a nomological net. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63*, 105–118. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.1.105
- Helgeson, V. S. (1994). Relation of agency and communion to well-being: Evidence and potential explanations. *Psychological Bulletin, 116*, 412–428. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.3.412
- Helgeson, V. S., & Fritz, H. L. (1998). A theory of unmitigated communion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2*, 173–183. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0203_2
- Hendin, H. M., & Cheek, J. M. (1997). Assessing hypersensitive narciss-

- sism: A re-examination of Murray's Narcissism Scale. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 31, 588–599. doi:10.1006/jrpe.1997.2204
- Hepper, E. G., Gramzow, R. H., & Sedikides, C. (2010). Individual differences in self-enhancement and self-protection strategies: An integrative analysis. *Journal of Personality*, 78, 781–814. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00633.x
- Hepper, E. G., Sedikides, C., & Cai, H. (in press). Self-enhancement and self-protection strategies in China: Cultural expressions of a fundamental human motive. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*.
- Horton, R. S., & Sedikides, C. (2009). Narcissistic responding to ego threat: When the status of the evaluator matters. *Journal of Personality*, 77, 1493–1526. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2009.00590.x
- Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling*, 6, 1–55. doi:10.1080/10705519909540118
- Hyder, S. E. (1994). *Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire–4*. Unpublished test.
- Jacobs, I., & Scholl, W. (2007). Übersetzung und Validierung der Skala zur Erfassung übermäßiger Communion von Helgeson und Fritz [Translation and validation of Helgeson and Fritz's Unmitigated Communion Scale]. *Diagnostica*, 53, 57–67. doi:10.1026/0012-1924.53.2.57
- John, O. P., & Robins, R. W. (1993). Determinants of interjudge agreement: The Big Five, observability, evaluativeness, and the unique perspective of the self. *Journal of Personality*, 61, 521–551. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1993.tb00781.x
- John, O. P., & Robins, R. W. (1994). Accuracy and bias in self-perception: Individual differences in self-enhancement and the role of narcissism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66, 206–219. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.1.206
- Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L. (2010). Different provocations trigger aggression in narcissists and psychopaths. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 1, 12–18. doi:10.1177/1948550609347591
- Jordan, C. H., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Hoshino-Browne, E., & Correll, J. (2003). Secure and defensive high self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85, 969–978. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.969
- Judge, T. A., Erez, A., Thoresen, C. J., & Bono, J. E. (2002). Are measures of self-esteem, neuroticism, locus of control, and generalized self-efficacy indicators of a common core construct? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83, 693–710.
- Kenny, D. A. (1994). *Interpersonal perceptions: A social relations analysis*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Kernis, M. H., & Sun, C.-R. (1994). Narcissism and reactions to interpersonal feedback. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 28, 4–13. doi:10.1006/jrpe.1994.1002
- Krantz, J. H. (2012). *Psychological research on the Net*. Retrieved July 26, 2012, from <http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html>
- Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W.-Y., & Sleeth-Keppler, D. (2002). A theory of goal systems. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 34, 331–378. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(02)80008-9
- Lang, F. R., Lüdtke, O., & Asendorpf, J. B. (2001). Testgüte und psychometrische Äquivalenz der deutschen Version des Big Five Inventory (BFI) bei jungen, mittelalten und alten Erwachsenen [Validity and psychometric equivalence of the German version of the Big Five Inventory with young, middle-aged, and old adults]. *Diagnostica*, 47, 111–121. doi:10.1026/0012-1924.47.3.111
- Lasch, C. (1979). *The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Le, T. N. (2005). Narcissism and immature love as mediators of vertical individualism and ludic love style. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 22, 543–560. doi:10.1177/0265407505054522
- Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (1991). *Detection theory: A user's guide*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Maio, G. R. (2010). Mental representations of social values. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 42, 1–43. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(10)42001-8
- McCrae, R. R., & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its applications. *Journal of Personality*, 60, 175–215. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00970.x
- Miller, J. D., & Campbell, W. K. (2008). Comparing clinical and social-personality conceptualizations of narcissism. *Journal of Personality*, 76, 449–476. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00492.x
- Miller, J. D., & Campbell, W. K. (2011). Addressing criticisms of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). In W. K. Campbell & J. D. Miller (Eds.), *The handbook of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatments* (pp. 146–152). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Miller, J. D., Price, J., Gentile, B., Lynam, D. R., & Campbell, W. K. (2012). Grandiose and vulnerable narcissism from the perspective of the interpersonal circumplex. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 53, 507–512. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2012.04.026
- Mills, J., & Clark, M. S. (1994). Communal and exchange relationships: Controversies and research. In R. Erber & R. Gilmour (Eds.), *Theoretical frameworks for personal relationships* (pp. 29–42). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Mischel, W., & Morf, C. C. (2003). The self as a psycho-social dynamic processing system: A meta-perspective on a century of the self in psychology. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *Handbook of self and identity* (pp. 15–43). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. *Psychological Review*, 102, 246–268. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.102.2.246
- Morf, C. C. (2006). Personality reflected in a coherent idiosyncratic interplay of intra- and interpersonal self-regulatory processes. *Journal of Personality*, 74, 1527–1556. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00419.x
- Morf, C. C., & Horvath, S. (2010). Self-regulation processes and their signatures: Dynamics of the self-system. In R. Hoyle (Ed.), *Handbook of personality and self-regulation* (pp. 117–144). Malden, MA: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781444318111.ch6
- Morf, C. C., Horvath, S., & Torchetti, L. (2011). Narcissistic self-enhancement: Tales of (successful?) self-portrayal. In M. D. Alicke & C. Sedikides (Eds.), *Handbook of self-enhancement and self-protection* (pp. 399–424). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic self-regulatory processing model. *Psychological Inquiry*, 12, 177–196. doi:10.1207/S15327965PLI1204_1
- Moskowitz, D. S. (1994). Cross-situational generality and the interpersonal circumplex. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66, 921–933. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.921
- Nathanson, C., Williams, K. M., & Paulhus, D. L. (2003, August). *Accuracy and bias in academic and music knowledge*. Poster session presented at annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
- Pakizeh, A., Gebauer, J. E., & Maio, G. R. (2007). Basic human values: Inter-value structure in memory. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 43, 458–465. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.04.007
- Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 1197–1208. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1197
- Paulhus, D. L. (2001). Normal narcissism: Two minimalist views. *Psychological Inquiry*, 12, 228–230.
- Paulhus, D. L. (2011). Overclaiming on personality questionnaires. In M. Ziegler, C. MacCann, & R. D. Roberts (Eds.), *New perspectives in faking in personality assessments* (pp. 151–164). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387476.003.0045
- Paulhus, D. L., & Harms, P. D. (2004). Measuring cognitive ability with

- the overclaiming technique. *Intelligence*, 32, 297–314. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2004.02.001
- Paulhus, D. L., Harms, P. D., Bruce, M., & Lysy, D. C. (2003). The over-claiming technique: Measuring self-enhancement independent of ability. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 890–904. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.890
- Paulhus, D. L., & John, O. P. (1994, August). *How many dimensions of evaluation are there?* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, CA.
- Paulhus, D. L., & John, O. P. (1998). Egoistic and moralistic bias in self-perceptions: The interplay of self-deceptive styles with basic traits and motives. *Journal of Personality*, 66, 1025–1060. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00041
- Paulhus, D. L., & Reynolds, S. (1995). Enhancing target variance in personality impressions: Highlighting the person in person perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69, 1233–1242. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1233
- Paulhus, D. L., & Trapnell, P. D. (2008). Self presentation on personality scales: An agency-communion framework. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed., pp. 493–517). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 36, 556–563.
- R Development Core Team. (2008). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing*. Vienna, Austria: Basic Books.
- Rammstedt, B., & John, O. P. (2007). Measuring personality in one minute or less: A 10-item short version of the Big Five Inventory in English and German. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 41, 203–212. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2006.02.001
- Raskin, R., & Novacek, J. (1991). Narcissism and the use of fantasy. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 47, 490–499. doi:10.1002/1097-4679(199107)47:4<490::AID-JCLP2270470404>3.0.CO;2-J
- Raskin, R., Novacek, J., & Hogan, R. T. (1991a). Narcissism, self-esteem, and defensive self-enhancement. *Journal of Personality*, 59, 19–38. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1991.tb00766.x
- Raskin, R., Novacek, J., & Hogan, R. (1991b). Narcissistic self-esteem management. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60, 911–918. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.60.6.911
- Raskin, R., & Terry, H. (1988). A principal-components analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and further evidence of its construct validity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54, 890–902. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.5.890
- Raudenbush, S. W., Bryk, T., & Congdon, R. (2004). HLM for Windows (Version 6.06) [Computer software]. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International.
- Reidy, D. E., Zeichner, A., Foster, J. D., & Martinez, M. A. (2008). Effects of narcissistic entitlement and exploitativeness on human physical aggression. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 44, 865–875. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.10.015
- Rhodewalt, F., & Morf, C. C. (1995). Self and interpersonal correlates of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory: A review and new findings. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 29, 1–23. doi:10.1006/jrpe.1995.1001
- Rhodewalt, F., & Morf, C. C. (1998). On self-aggrandizement and anger: A temporal analysis of narcissism and affective reactions to success and failure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 672–685. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.672
- Rhodewalt, F., Tragakis, M. W., & Finnerty, J. (2006). Narcissism and self-handicapping: Linking self-aggrandizement to behavior. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 40, 573–597. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2005.05.001
- Riketta, M. (2008). “Who identifies with which group?” The motive-feature match principle and its limitations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 38, 715–735. doi:10.1002/ejsp.534
- Roberts, B. W., & Robins, R. W. (2000). Broad dispositions, broad aspirations: The intersection of personality traits and life goals. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26, 1284–1296. doi:10.1177/0146167200262009
- Rose, P., & Campbell, W. K. (2004). Greatness feels good: A telic model of narcissism and subjective well-being. In S. P. Shohov (Ed.), *Advances in psychology research* (Vol. 31, pp. 3–26). Huntington, NY: NOVA Science.
- Rosenthal, S. A., Hooley, J. M., & Steshenko, Y. (2007). *Distinguishing grandiosity from self-esteem: Development of the Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale*. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, Harvard University.
- Saucier, G. (2009). What are the most important dimensions of personality? Evidence from studies of descriptors in diverse languages. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 3, 620–637. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00188.x
- Saucier, G., & Goldberg, L. R. (1996). The language of personality: Lexical perspectives on the five-factor model. In J. S. Wiggins (Ed.), *The five-factor model of personality: Theoretical perspectives* (pp. 21–50). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Schmidt, L. C., & Frieze, I. H. (1997). A mediational model of power, affiliation and achievement motives and product involvement. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 11, 425–446. doi:10.1007/BF02195890
- Schönbrodt, F. D., Back, M. D., & Schmukle, S. C. (2012). TripleR: An R package for social relations analyses based on round robin designs. *Behavior Research Methods*, 28, 87–94.
- Schumacker, R. E., & Lomax, R. G. (2004). *A beginner's guide to structural equation modeling* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1–65. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6
- Sedikides, C., Campbell, W. K., Reeder, G., Elliot, A. J., & Gregg, A. P. (2002). Do others bring out the worst in narcissists? The “others exist for me” illusion. In Y. Kashima, M. Foddy, & M. Platos (Eds.), *Self and identity: Personal, social, and symbolic* (pp. 103–124). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Sedikides, C., Cisek, S., & Hart, C. M. (2011). Narcissism and brand name consumerism. In W. K. Campbell & J. Miller (Eds.), *The handbook of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatments* (pp. 382–392). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Toguchi, Y. (2003). Pancultural self-enhancement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 60–79. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.60
- Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Vevea, J. L. (2005). Pancultural self-enhancement reloaded: A meta-analytic reply to Heine (2005). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89, 539–551. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.4.539
- Sedikides, C., & Gebauer, J. E. (2010). Religiosity as self-enhancement: A meta-analysis of the relation between socially desirable responding and religiosity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14, 17–36. doi:10.1177/1088868309351002
- Sedikides, C., & Gebauer, J. E. (in press). Religion and the self. In V. Saroglou (Ed.), *Religion, personality, and social behavior*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2001). Narcissists and feedback: Motivational surfeits and motivational deficits. *Psychological Inquiry*, 12, 237–239.
- Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self-enhancement: Food for thought. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 3, 102–116. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00068.x
- Sedikides, C., Gregg, A. P., & Hart, C. M. (2007). The importance of being

- modest. In C. Sedikides & S. Spencer (Eds.), *The self: Frontiers in social psychology* (pp. 163–184). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Sedikides, C., Hart, C. M., Cisek, S. Z., & Routledge, C. (in press). Finding meaning in the mirror: The existential pursuits of narcissists. In J. A. Hicks & C. Routledge (Eds.), *The experience of meaning in life: Perspectives from the psychological sciences*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbul, C. (2004). Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy? Self-esteem matters. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87*, 400–416. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.3.400
- Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic intervals for indirect effects in structural equations models. In S. Leinhardt (Ed.), *Sociological methodology 1982* (pp. 290–312). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Strack, F., & Schwarz, N. (2007). Asking questions: Measurement in the social sciences. In M. Ash & T. Sturm (Eds.), *Psychology's territories: Historical and contemporary perspectives from different disciplines* (pp. 225–250). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Stucke, T. S., & Sporer, S. L. (2002). When a grandiose self-image is threatened: Narcissism and self-concept clarity as predictors of negative emotions and aggression toward ego threat. *Journal of Personality, 70*, 509–532. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.05015
- Tafarodi, R. W., & Milne, A. B. (2002). Decomposing global self-esteem. *Journal of Personality, 70*, 443–484. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.05017
- Tafarodi, R. W., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2001). Two-dimensional self-esteem: Theory and measurement. *Personality and Individual Differences, 31*, 653–673. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00169-0
- Tamborski, M., & Brown, R. P. (2011). The measurement of trait narcissism in social-personality research. In W. K. Campbell & J. D. Miller (Eds.), *The handbook of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatments* (pp. 133–140). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Trapnell, P. D., & Paulhus, D. L. (2012). Agentic and communal values: Their scope and measurement. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 94*, 39–52. doi:10.1080/00223891.2011.627968
- Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. *Psychological Review, 110*, 403–421. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.403
- Tschanz, B. T., Morf, C. C., & Turner, C. M. (1998). Gender differences in the structure of narcissism: A multi-sample analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. *Sex Roles, 38*, 863–870. doi:10.1023/A:1018833400411
- Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2009). *The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of entitlement*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Twenge, J. M., & Foster, J. D. (2010). Birth cohort increases in narcissistic personality traits among American college students, 1982–2009. *Social Psychological and Personality Science, 1*, 99–106. doi:10.1177/1948550609355719
- Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. J. (2008a). Egos inflating over time: A cross-temporal meta-analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. *Journal of Personality, 76*, 875–902. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00507.x
- Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. J. (2008b). Further evidence of an increase in narcissism among college students. *Journal of Personality, 76*, 919–928. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00509.x
- Van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (2001). Personality in cultural context: Methodological issues. *Journal of Personality, 69*, 1007–1031. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.696173
- Vazire, S. (2010). Who knows what about a person? The self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98*, 281–300. doi:10.1037/a0017908
- Verplanken, B., Friberg, O., Wang, C. E., Trafimow, D., & Woolf, K. (2007). Mental habits: Metacognitive reflection on negative self-thinking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92*, 526–541. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.3.526
- Warner, R., Kenny, D. A., & Stoto, M. (1979). A new round robin analysis of variance for social interaction data. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37*, 1742–1757. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.10.1742
- Watson, C., & Bagby, R. M. (2011). Assessment of narcissistic personality disorder. In W. K. Campbell & J. D. Miller (Eds.), *The handbook of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatments* (pp. 119–132). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Watson, D. (1989). Strangers' ratings of the five robust personality factors: Evidence of a surprising convergence with self-report. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 120–128. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.1.120
- Watson, D., Hubbard, B., & Wiese, D. (2000). Self–other agreement in personality and affectivity: The role of acquaintanceship, trait visibility, and assumed similarity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78*, 546–558. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.3.546
- Wiggins, J. S. (1991). Agency and communion as conceptual coordinates for the understanding and measurement of interpersonal behavior. In W. M. Grove & D. Cicchetti (Eds.), *Thinking clearly about psychology: Vol. 2. Personality and psychopathology* (pp. 89–113). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wink, P. (1991). Two faces of narcissism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61*, 590–597. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.61.4.590
- Zeigler-Hill, V., Clark, C., & Pickard, J. D. (2008). Narcissistic subtypes and contingent self-esteem: Do all narcissists base their self-esteem on the same domains? *Journal of Personality, 76*, 753–774. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00503.x
- Zeigler-Hill, V., Myers, E. M., & Clark, C. B. (2010). Narcissism and self-esteem reactivity: The role of negative achievement events. *Journal of Research in Personality, 44*, 285–292. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2010.02.005

(Appendix follows)

Appendix

The Communal Narcissism Inventory

Instructions:

People have all kinds of private thoughts about themselves. From person to person, these self-thoughts can vary quite a lot in content. We are interested in the sort of self-thoughts you possess. Below you will find a list of self-thoughts you may have. For each self-thought, please indicate whether you have this or a similar thought. Be as honest as possible. Remember, your responses are totally anonymous.

Response Format:

disagree strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree strongly

Items:

1. I am the most helpful person I know.
2. I am going to bring peace and justice to the world.
3. I am the best friend someone can have.
4. I will be well known for the good deeds I will have done.
5. I am (going to be) the best parent on this planet.
6. I am the most caring person in my social surrounding.
7. In the future I will be well known for solving the world's problems.
8. I greatly enrich others' lives.
9. I will bring freedom to the people.
10. I am an amazing listener.
11. I will be able to solve world poverty.
12. I have a very positive influence on others.
13. I am generally the most understanding person.
14. I'll make the world a much more beautiful place.
15. I am extraordinarily trustworthy.
16. I will be famous for increasing people's well-being.

Received November 11, 2011
 Revision received July 2, 2012
 Accepted July 12, 2012 ■