Steven Galt Crowell, 'Being Answerable: Reason-Giving as Authentic Discourse'

Two charges are commonly levelled at the picture of human selfhood that Heidegger presents in Division Two of *Being and Time*: (1) that, in spite of Heidegger's intentions elsewhere, it retains too much of the 'Cartesianism' and subjectivism of the Kant/Husserl tradition; and (2) that it is 'decisionistic', leaving no room for reason in authentic choice and action. These objections are related. The subjectivism is seen to be part of Heidegger's failure to free himself from the transcendental project of the 'constitution' or 'construction' of meaning and objectivity (or, in his language, 'world') through subjective 'projects', and the decisionism is seen to be a consequence of the fact that Heidegger takes the constitutive achievements in question to be grounded in the 'care-structure' (*Sorge*) rather than in the *rational* or proto-rational 'categories' of the *animale rationale*. In previous papers I have argued that both of these objections are mistaken: though Heidegger does retain his ties to the project of transcendental constitution, his position is not 'subjectivistic' in the relevant sense, precisely *because* the subject in question is conceived as 'care'. In answer to the second objection, I have argued that Heidegger's conception of authentic Dasein implies that authentic Dasein has something like an obligation to give reasons for what it does. In the present piece, I want to develop this argument in detail, focusing on the key notion Heidegger uses to describe the difference between authentic and inauthentic Dasein: '*Verantwortlichkeit*'. This term is rightly translated as 'responsibility', but seen in light of Heidegger's analysis of the 'care-structure' in terms of three structurally inseparable elements (disposition, understanding, and discourse), it must also be understood in the sense of 'being answerable'. The present piece will provide an account of what being answerable is, and in so doing will go beyond the letter, but not the philosophical content, of Heidegger's text.

Stephen Mulhall, 'Nothingness and Phenomenology: Heidegger and Sartre'

I have argued in other writings on *Being and Time* that the concept of nothingness, negation or nullity is not only central to the second division of that book, but also requires us to reconceive the relation of Division Two to Division One, and hence to reconfigure our understanding of every element in Division One. If I am right about this, then it cannot simply be the case that Sartre's key contribution to the phenomenological tradition lies in his either introducing or giving a central role to the concept of nothingness (*pace* the implication of the title of his *magnum opus*). We must rather ask: in what ways, if any, does Sartre's treatment of the relation between Being and nothingness improve upon, or even differ from, that of Heidegger. In this chapter, I will make a start on trying to answer that question.

Peter Poellner, 'Sartre and Heidegger on Authenticity and Intersubjectivity'

A question often posed about the ideal of authenticity is whether it possesses fundamentally ethical and inter-subjective dimensions; this chapter will juxtapose answers to that question that Heidegger and Sartre offer. It will examine Jean-Paul Sartre's evolving conception of authenticity, from the *War Diaries* to the post-war *Notebooks on Ethics*, arguing that Sartre increasingly acknowledges, and attempts to explicate, an intersubjective ethical dimension as central to authenticity, a position which appeared to be ruled out in the 'canonical' statement of his early existentialism in *Being and Nothingness*. The chapter will critically compare Sartre's emerging position with Heidegger's response to parallel issues in *Being and Time*.