

Clare Carlisle, 'Heidegger, Kierkegaard and the "Repetition" of the Tradition'

My contribution will examine parallels between key concepts in Division Two of *Being and Time*, and Kierkegaard's philosophy. In particular, I will consider how Heidegger draws on Kierkegaardian concepts such as repetition and 'the moment' in his analysis of Dasein's temporality. One of the main questions to be addressed will be the nature of Heidegger's appropriation of these 19th-century ideas relating to historicity and being-before-God, which themselves are embedded in a tradition of Christian thought. To what extent does Heidegger's concern with the question of being provide a radically new horizon for his anthropology, and how successful is his effort to 'repeat' in a new way elements of the European philosophical and theological tradition? Such questions will be considered in the light of some of Heidegger's later writings after *Being and Time*, in order to locate the 1927 text within his larger philosophical project.

George Pattison, 'Guilt and Nothingness in Luther, Kierkegaard and *Being and Time*'

In an exchange of letters with Rudolf Bultmann in 1927, Heidegger identifies his intellectual aim as 'a radicalization of ancient ontology and at the same time the universal extension of this in relation to the domain of history'. He further adds that 'Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard are philosophically essential for the construction of a radical understanding of Dasein'. With specific regard to the two Protestant figures, Luther and Kierkegaard, it seems obvious to look to the intertwined themes of guilt and nothingness that feature prominently in their work as they do in *Being and Time* itself, together with the associated phenomena of conscience and death. This contribution will therefore seek to show how Luther and Kierkegaard illuminate the argument of, in particular, Chapter Two of *Being and Time's* second division.

Mark A. Wrathall, 'Demanding Authenticity of Ourselves'

At the end of Chapter One of Division Two of *Being and Time*, Heidegger notes (apparently in passing) that we 'demand' authenticity of ourselves. This is a perhaps surprising claim, as many if not most people are oblivious to any such demand--so much so that they are uncertain, as Heidegger readily acknowledges, what authenticity is or whether authenticity is even possible. The claim that we demand authenticity of ourselves thus depends, firstly, on showing that we are in a state of self-deception about authenticity (a state evinced in our attitudes about death and guilt), and secondly on showing how it is possible to penetrate this self-deception to force us to acknowledge such a demand. In this chapter, I will reconstruct Heidegger's argument for this claim, suggesting that it is anything but an offhand remark, but rather that it lies at the very core of understanding his account of human being, authenticity, death and guilt.