

### **Hubert Dreyfus, 'Authenticity and the Phenomenology of Action'**

The philosophy of action might be thought to be a characteristically analytic sub-discipline of philosophy. But this chapter will explore what the discussion of authenticity that is to be found in Division Two of *Being and Time* may have to teach us about the character of action. In exploring Heidegger's ideas, I will also consider how they shed light on contemporary neo-Aristotelian and neo-Kantian views of action.

### **Béatrice Han-Pile, 'Heidegger on Freedom in *Being and Time*'**

In this chapter, I examine the specific conception(s) of freedom which can be found in *Being and Time*, as well as their relation to authenticity. Inspired by Berlin's distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' freedom, I argue that even the inauthentic Dasein analysed in Division One is free, albeit in a negative sense only. Such freedom has three characteristics: a) the impossibility of accounting for Dasein's agency in naturalistic terms, b) Dasein's ability to project alternative possibilities and c) a capacity for self-determination (although this does not take a Kantian, reflective form but consists in Dasein's practically pressing ahead in one particular set of possibilities). I then suggest that Division Two presents a modified, positive conception of freedom which is characteristic of authentic comportment. It presupposes negative freedom but has three additional requirements: a) 'self-transparency', i.e. Dasein's background awareness of its 'thrownness' and 'guilt', b) 'non-evasiveness', i.e. Dasein's determination or 'choice' not to flee in the face of such awareness, and c) 'wholeness', in other words, Dasein's ability to project possibilities in the light of its finitude, so that each possibility is disclosed on the background of its existence as a whole. I argue that, for Heidegger, positive freedom thus defined represents the highest form of freedom available to Dasein. Throughout the chapter, I address the thorny issue of the relation between this conception of agency, which requires a minimum of self-awareness (but not Cartesian epistemic self-transparency), and the dominant, pragmatic interpretation(s) which tend to brush aside such notions as 'choice' and 'self-determination' in favour of a purely non-reflective account of authentic Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

### **Charles Guignon, 'Authenticity, Phenomenology, and the Question of Being'**

The fundamental principle guiding the method of *Being and Time* – that 'the ontological "truth" of the existential analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth' (*Being and Time*, p. 364) – tells us that understanding the Being of human existence must be grounded on a particular concrete mode of understanding of the individual who is engaged in the inquiry into the meaning of Being. The truth of 'existentiell' life – that is, of a distinctive, 'authentic' way of being of the philosopher – assures us that we are disclosing 'primordial and authentic truth' (*ibid*). I argue that Heidegger's conception of truth as a concrete mode of being of the individual is developed through an account of life that combines insights from Kierkegaard (*At a Graveside, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing*) with Husserl's concept of an intentional act as something that can be 'fulfilled' (as opposed to being 'empty'). Only by actually *being* what we are trying to find in our investigation can we achieve the sort of *certainty* demanded by the 'evidence situation' of phenomenological ontology.