A New Decentralised Combinatorial Auction for Subadditive Bidders Event
- Time:
- 16:00 - 17:00
- Date:
- 17 March 2016
- Venue:
- Room 3041 Building 2, Southampton Business School
For more information regarding this event, please telephone Yuan Huang on +44(2)2380595168 or email yuan.huang@soton.ac.uk .
Event details
We present a new decentralised combinatorial auction for bidders with subadditive valuations. The auction proceeds in stages where bidders compete over sets allocated to bidders in previous stages. The first stage of the auction considers bids on the sets of all items in the auction; subsequent stages consider bids on progressively smaller subsets of items which bidders allocate to themselves. With submodular valuations and identical items, the revenue generated by the new auction is at least as large as the revenue generated by the VCG mechanism. We show that there are examples in which the new auction can result in a different outcome than that obtained by the VCG mechanism with a revenue strictly larger than that of the VCG mechanism. (Joint work with Mahyar Salek.)
Speaker information
Professor Richard Steinberg,London School of Economics,Richard Steinberg holds the Chair in Operations Research at the London School of Economics. He served as Head of the Management Science Group at LSE from 2010 to 2013. Previously, he held faculty positions at Columbia University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Cambridge. He has also served as Member of Technical Staff at Bell Laboratories, and Visiting Researcher at Microsoft Research. Professor Steinberg has advised the US Federal Communications Commission regarding the design of combinatorial auctions for the allocation of spectrum. He served as Supporting Advisor and Project Lead for the UK National Audit Office on a project to evaluate the UK 4G spectrum auction held in January-February 2013. During 2015, he provided bidder support in the Canadian 2500 MHz auction.