Skip to main navigationSkip to main content
The University of Southampton
Mathematical Sciences

Applied Seminar - Public good provision, sanctions and corruption, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar (University of Lancaster) Seminar

Applied Seminar
Time:
12:00 - 13:30
Date:
13 February 2018
Venue:
Room 4001, Ketley Room, Building 54, Mathematical Sciences, University of Southampton, Highfield Campus, SO17 1BJ

For more information regarding this seminar, please email Dr Philip Greulich at P.S.Greulich@southampton.ac.uk .

Event details

We consider a four-stage extensive form game involving two citizens and a governor. The citizens need to decide whether or not to pay taxes, given that they may be audited and punished (in case of non payment). Nature selects one of the citizens at random to audit. The total tax collected goes into a public fund. After the tax payment decisions have been made by the citizens, the governor has to decide how much of the fund to use to provide a public good. Finally citizens voice their opinion about the governor decision. The analysis of the model shows existence of multiple equilibria, given that they satisfy some parameter restrictions. We found conditions for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria where citizens will evade taxes; and conditions for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria where corruption exists.

Speaker information

Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar, University of Lancaster.

Privacy Settings