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Personal Identity - Derek Parfit

Consider now a variant of the original 'body swapping' case brought to prominence by Derek Parfit. This time, not only is Barry's consciousness transplanted into Gary’s body, it is also transplanted into Larry’s body and Carrie’s body as well.

So what has happened to Barry in this case? It seems as if Barry cannot be the Gary-body person, the Larry-body person, or the Carrie-body person, since they are all distinct from each another - we have three people here, not one! And it seems arbitrary to say that Barry is just one of the three - what could decide which of these is really Barry?

This case seems to show that you can have psychological successors who are not you - the Gary-body person, the Larry-body person, and the Carrie-body person are all psychologically continuous with Barry, but none of them are Barry. And you have said, because of the foetus case, that you can exist without any psychological states at all.

So perhaps you'd like to reconsider your answer to the original 'body swapping' case and say that Barry and Gary do not swap bodies after all.

If so click hereIf you'd like to stick with your original verdict, click here
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