Conservative divisions over Europe – the long view
David Cameron seems to show little or no interest in the past, not least the history of his party. Winston Churchill’s ostensible call for a united Europe is cited by enthusiasts for European integration. Yet close scrutiny of his 1949 speech suggests a standard cross-party view of western Europe early in the Cold War: enthusiastic promotion and where necessary direct engagement, but no involvement in any integrationist initiative. In the 1950s Churchill’s and Eden’s Conservative governments relied on an evolving Commonwealth and a transatlantic alliance. The Suez debâcle of 1956 scarcely dented such complacency, with Anthony Eden indifferent to ‘The Six’ building on the success of the European Coal and Steel Community.
No fear of party division over ‘Europe’ at this point, nor surprisingly in 1961 when the Macmillan Government applied to join the Common Market. Right-wing critics instead focused on accelerated decolonisation and high public spending. Nevertheless, President de Gaulle’s veto saw several Tory backbenchers write off ‘Supermac’ as damaged goods, and he was soon gone. A decade later, Edward Heath established his credentials as this country’s least Atlanticist and most pro-European prime minister. Securing office against the odds in 1970 the Prime Minister faced scant internal opposition to a now third attempt to join the European Community. Heath faced down concerns over Commonwealth trading partners, and in 1972 a Conservative government signed the treaty of accession. Once out of power the Tories disguised their own differences by highlighting Labour divisions over Europe. Yet Cameron could learn from how Harold Wilson held his government together throughout the 1975 referendum campaign.
Margaret Thatcher urged party members in 1975 to endorse continued membership. Her record before and after becoming prime minister, notably her acceptance of the Single European Act in 1987, are seen by Brexit advocates as their heroine simply endorsing the free movement of capital, services, and goods. She was, they insist, instinctively anti-integrationist, but was too often badly advised or even deceived. Thus the real Mrs Thatcher emerged briefly in 1984 when demanding Britain’s budget rebate, and four years later in her fateful Bruges speech; but she only came into her own after expulsion from office, witness her mauling of the Maastricht Treaty in the Lords.
As with all narratives firmly rooted in myth there is an element of truth, but this version of events ignores Thatcher’s pragmatism, and her capacity to compromise. The Tories’ most ardent advocates of withdrawal are often dedicated free marketeers who relish a deregulated, de-Commissioned Britain. Their icon and inspiration must thus be seen as untainted by any inconvenient qualification of national sovereignty or accommodation of EU conformity and constraint. These evangelists of economic liberalisation maintain Britain can enjoy a truly global status, restoring historic trading partnerships with conservative governments in what was once known as ‘the old [for which read white] Commonwealth.’ Awkwardly, Margaret Thatcher never had much time for the Commonwealth, whether ‘new’ or ‘old’; the Liberals’ victory in the Canadian election suggests a fraying of new right hegemony; and these once and future partners had and have no interest in cultivating close bilateral relationships with a ‘mother country’ previously indifferent to preserving post-colonial ties. Here are echoes of tariff reform, which seriously damaged the Conservative Party at the start of the last century. What the debate over protection versus free trade did to the Tories then is what the debate over Europe is doing to them at the present time. If in fact the Prime Minister is sensitive to the past then he must surely see history repeating itself, not as tragedy but –courtesy of Boris Johnson – as pure farce.
Emeritus Professor of Modern History, Faculty of Humanities
