

Basic and Applied Social Psychology
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t775648090

Reputational Implications of Procedural Fairness for Personal and Relational Self-Esteem

David De Cremer [a]; Constantine Sedikides [b]
[a] Tilburg University,
[b] University of Southampton,

Online Publication Date: 01 January 2008

To cite this Article: De Cremer, David and Sedikides, Constantine (2008) 'Reputational Implications of Procedural Fairness for Personal and Relational Self-Esteem', Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 30:1, 66 — 75

To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/01973530701866557
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01973530701866557

BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 30:66–75, 2008

ISSN: 0197-3533 print/1532-4834 online
DOI: 10.1080/01973530701866557

Psychology Press
Taylor & Francis Group

Reputational Implications of Procedural Fairness for Personal and Relational Self-Esteem

David De Cremer
Tilburg University

Constantine Sedikides
University of Southampton

Four studies showed that procedural fairness (fair vs. unfair treatment by an authority figure) has reputational implications for personal and relational self-esteem. Participants relied on procedural fairness to infer their reputation, especially when they were identifiable (Study 1). Furthermore, concern for reputation moderated the influence of procedural fairness on self-esteem: Variations in procedural fairness were more strongly associated with the personal self-esteem of individuals high rather than low in concern for reputation (Studies 2–3). Finally, violations in procedural fairness (i.e., unfair treatment) led to a more substantial reduction in the relational self-esteem of positive-reputation than negative-reputation participants: The former felt more relationally devalued than the latter, when they were denied voice (Study 4).

Procedural fairness is defined in terms of how fair decision-making procedures are perceived to be. The construct is typically operationalized as the extent to which employees, group members, or interaction partners are given the opportunity to provide input to resource allocation decisions (i.e., referred to as "voice"; Folger, 1977; Van den Bos, 1999). Procedural fairness influences self-esteem, emotions, outcome evaluations, impressions of supervisors, compliance with supervisors, and organizational citizenship (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer, 2004; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Why do individuals react so strongly to variations (i.e., lack vs. provision) in procedural fairness?

An answer to this question is that procedural fairness has implications for one's reputation. *The New Oxford Dictionary of English* (Pearsall, 1998, p. 1576) defines reputation as "the beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone." Reputation, then, is a judgment that emerges from the received treatment from others (Emler & Hopkins, 1990; Emler & Reicher, 1995; Ferris, Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, & Treadway, 2003). This judgment refers to a set of impressions or behavioral expectations that are based on a history of social interactions. These interactions can be with ingroup members, outgroup members, or the generalized other (Anderson, 1999; Fine, 1996; Fombrun, 1996). Furthermore, the judgment can be communicated directly or indirectly (i.e., as gossip).

No doubt reputation is positively correlated with such constructs as group standing (Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002, 2005), respect (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Simon & Stuermer, 2005), and acceptance (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005b; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). However, the empirical literature has produced enough inconsistencies to warrant an independent treatment of reputation. For example, group standing does not influence responses to the provision or denial of procedural fairness (Van Prooijen et al., 2005), and intragroup acceptance does not mediate intragroup respect (Simon & Stuermer, 2005). Thus, reputation appears to be an overlapping but partially autonomous construct: It is possible for a person to have a positive global reputation regardless of whether the person occupies a relatively high or low standing in a specific group,

Correspondence should be sent to David De Cremer, Department of Social Psychology, Center of Justice and Social Decision Making, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000-LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: D.deCremer@uvt.nl

whether the person is respected by the members of an ingroup (as opposed to members of outgroups), or whether the person is accepted by the members of an ingroup.

Reputation, then, is a prized possession to be protected or augmented. This is because reputation reflects the way others (e.g., enacting authorities) perceive and assess important characteristics or skills an individual possesses. Reputation indicates how a person is evaluated by others (Leary, 1996; Mead, 1934; Tyler & Smith, 1999) and, as such, is an integral part of the social self (James, 1890; Tyler, 1999, 2001). People are motivated to obtain, sustain, and protect a positive social self or a positive reputational self (Sedikides & Green, 2000; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Given that a vital function that self-protection and self-enhancement serve is to maintain or elevate self-esteem, positive reputations (i.e., as reflected in favorable social or relational evaluations, such as fair supervisory treatment) will be associated with relatively high self-esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995).

Do organizational procedures indeed communicate information about one's reputation? This notion has received indirect support in a limited number of correlational studies (Tyler, 1999, 2001; Tyler & Smith, 1999). An objective of the present investigation is to test this notion directly (i.e., experimentally), and we do so in Study 1. The more important objective of the investigation, however, is to test the hypothesis that procedural fairness has implications for one's reputation, which affects personal and relational self-esteem. Given that reputational concerns vary (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a), we hypothesize that individuals who either are high in concern for reputation or enjoy a positive reputation will have more at stake in fair supervisory treatment and will thus be more strongly affected by variations in procedural fairness compared to individuals who either are low in concern for reputation or suffer a negative reputation. Motivated to maintain and protect their positive reputation, the former will be more attentive toward variations in procedural fairness. As such, their self-esteem will be more strongly influenced by procedural fairness information. We test this hypothesis both in scenario (Studies 2 and 4) and experimental (Study 3) investigations.

Note that, across all studies, the majority (70–80%) of participants were female. This uneven gender composition of our samples precluded a conclusive investigation into gender differences, although preliminary data analyses revealed none. All participants were paid undergraduate students at Dutch universities. At the end of each experimental session, participants were thoroughly debriefed.

STUDY 1

In Study 1, we tested the notion that procedures communicate information about one's reputation. As an operationalization of procedural fairness, participants either received or were denied voice (i.e., the opportunity to express their opinions or ideas toward an allocation decision) from their supervisor. Voice is the most widely used manipulation of procedural fairness (Brockner et al., 1998; Folger, 1977; Van den Bos, 1999). This manipulation was implemented while participants were either identifiable or unidentifiable to other group members.

We hypothesized that participants would report that their supervisor considered their reputation more seriously when they received than were deprived of voice. Furthermore, we expected this effect to be accentuated when participants were identifiable. Identifiability is associated with evaluation apprehension (Sedikides & Herbst, 2002; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002) and is thus likely to intensify concerns about one's reputational social self.

Method

Participants and Design

Seventy-seven participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (procedural fairness: voice vs. no-voice) $\times$ 2 (identifiability: identifiable vs. unidentifiable) between-subjects design.

Procedure

Participants were handed a stimulus booklet for a "decision-making and relationships" study. They were instructed that, in a few moments, they would ostensibly engage in a group problem-solving task overseen by a supervisor whom they would meet later. In the meantime, the supervisor would decide on how particular resources (e.g., a financial bonus, stationery for the task, extra time slots) would be allocated. The supervisor might or might not solicit input from the group members regarding the resource allocation decision.

The identifiability manipulation followed. In the *identifiable* condition, participants learned that every other member of the group would know whether the supervisor decided to consult with the participant (i.e., give her or him voice or not) on the matter of resource allocation. In the *unidentifiable* condition, participants learned that no one else in the group would know whether the supervisor decided to consult with the participant regarding resource allocation. Subsequently, the procedural fairness manipulation was implemented. In the *voice* condition, participants learned that the supervisor had decided to solicit their opinion: They would be

listened to. In the *no-voice* condition, participants learned that the supervisor had decided not to solicit their opinion: They would not be listened to.

Next, participants responded to three manipulation checks and the dependent measure (1 [*not at all*] to 7 [*very much so*]). They were asked to what extent they received voice (*voice manipulation check*) and to what extent they thought their supervisor acted in a fair manner (*fairness manipulation check*). (These two manipulation checks were correlated, $r = .33$, $p < .001$). Participants were also asked to what extent other group members were aware of whether the supervisor solicited their opinion or not (*identifiability manipulation check*). Finally, participants indicated the extent to which they believed the supervisor took into consideration their reputation (i.e., how they were thought of and evaluated by others) in arriving at the consultation decision (*reputational consideration*).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks

A 2×2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the voice manipulation check revealed that participants reported receiving more voice in the voice ($M = 5.27$) than the no-voice ($M = 2.57$) condition, procedural fairness main effect, $F(1, 73) = 72.58$, $p < .001$. Neither the identifiability main effect, $F(1, 73) = .10$, $p < .75$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 73) = 2.99$, $p < .10$, was significant. Also, a 2×2 ANOVA on the fairness manipulation check revealed that participants perceived the supervisor as fairer in the voice ($M = 3.68$) than the no-voice ($M = 2.35$) condition, procedural fairness main effect, $F(1, 73) = 15.50$, $p < .001$. Neither the identifiability main effect, $F(1, 73) = .03$, $p < .88$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 73) = .56$, $p < .46$, was significant. In conclusion, the procedural fairness manipulation was successful.

Furthermore, a 2×2 ANOVA revealed that, compared to their unidentifiable counterparts ($M = 3.05$), identifiable participants ($M = 4.29$) believed that other group members were aware of whether the supervisor solicited their opinion, identifiability main effect, $F(1, 73) = 8.96$, $p < .005$. Neither the procedural fairness main effect, $F(1, 73) = .53$, $p < .47$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 73) = .07$, $p < .79$, was significant. The identifiability manipulation check was successful.

Reputational Consideration

We carried out an ANOVA on the extent to which the supervisor took into consideration participants' reputation. The identifiability main effect was marginal: Compared to their identifiable ($M = 3.26$) counterparts, unidentifiable participants ($M = 3.92$) tended to report that the supervisor gave increased consideration to their reputation, $F(1, 73) = 3.57$, $p < .07$. Of importance, the procedural fairness main effect was significant: Participants reported that the supervisor took their reputation more seriously into consideration when they received ($M = 3.97$) than were denied ($M = 3.25$) voice, $F(1, 73) = 5.67$, $p < .05$. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis.

These effects were qualified by a significant interaction, $F(1, 73) = 5.67$, $p < .05$. It was identifiable participants who reported that the supervisor took their reputation more seriously when they received ($M = 4.06$) than were denied ($M = 2.55$) voice, $F(1, 73) = 10.41$, $p < .005$; indeed, there was no difference in reported reputational concerns among unidentifiable participants regardless of whether they received ($M = 3.90$) or were denied ($M = 3.95$) voice, $F(1, 73) < 1$, $p < .91$.[1] The interaction pattern is also consistent with our hypothesis. In summary, Experiment 1 demonstrated that perceived fairness of procedures does have reputational implications.

STUDY 2

Study 2 examined the relation among procedural fairness, reputation, and personal self-esteem. The study implemented a scenario manipulation and the Concern for Reputation scale (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a, 2005b). Scenario manipulations are common in the fairness literature and yield results similar to those of online manipulations (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, in press; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; van Prooijen et al., 2005). Also, scenario manipulations have been advocated on the grounds that they approximate real-life situations and make readily salient (and thus cognitively accessible) to participants social fairness issues (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

The Concern for Reputation scale consists of seven items: "I want to have a good reputation"; "I find it important that others consider my reputation as a serious matter"; "I am rarely concerned about my reputation" (reverse-scored); "I do not consider what others say about me" (reverse-scored); "If my reputation is not good, I feel very bad"; "I try hard to work on my reputation in my relationships with others"; and "I find it difficult if others paint an incorrect image of me." Responses are recorded on a 5-point scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*), with high scores

[1]We also carried out a regression analysis, using the perceived fairness (rather than the voice manipulation) score as one independent variable and identifiability as the other. Fairness perceptions influenced participants' accounts that the supervisor took their reputation seriously, but this pattern tended to emerge among identifiable ($\beta = .30$, $p = .06$) rather than unidentifiable ($\beta = .20$, $p < .10$) participants.

indicating high reputational concern. The items load on a single factor that accounts for 48% of the variance (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a).

Past literature has indicated that procedural fairness induces momentary changes in personal self-esteem (De Cremer, 2003; Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Shroth & Shah, 2000). We expected to replicate this finding. More important, we wanted to know whether concern for reputation moderates the influence of procedural fairness on self-esteem. We tested the hypothesis that procedural fairness would be more strongly associated with self-esteem fluctuations among participants high rather than low in reputational concern. That is, the former would experience lower self-esteem when they were denied than provided voice, whereas the latter would be unaffected by the denial or provision of voice.

Pilot Study

We conducted a pilot study in an effort to establish discriminant validity for the concern for reputation scale. In particular, we would need to show that the concern for reputation scale correlates positively with scales assessing theoretically similar constructs but does not correlate with scales assessing theoretically distinct constructs (Crocker & Algina, 1986; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992).

One hundred twenty-three participants completed (a) the Concern for Reputation scale, (b) the Public Self-Consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), (c) the Psychological Entitlement scale (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004), and (d) the Need for Structure scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). All these measures were presented in a single packet and were collected at the same study session. The Concern for Reputation scale is assumed to measure a theoretically similar construct to that of the Public Self-Consciousness scale (i.e., the extent to which one is concerned with others' perception and evaluations of the self). Indeed, the two scales were positively correlated ($r = .44$, $p < .001$). The moderate size of the correlation indicates a tolerable degree of conceptual overlap (19.36% of shared variance). Of importance, the Concern for Reputation scale was uncorrelated with the Psychological Entitlement scale ($r = .03$, $p < .70$) and with the Need for Structure scale ($r = .11$, $p < .22$). In summary, the pilot study yielded satisfactory discriminant validity for the Concern for Reputation scale.

Main Study

Method

Participants and design. We assessed concern for reputation at the beginning of the experimental session and manipulated procedural fairness (voice vs. no-voice). One hundred eighty-one participants were randomly allocated to the procedural fairness conditions.

Experimental procedure. Participants were instructed that they would take part in two ostensibly unrelated studies. The first study pertained to scale validation. In actuality, participants completed the Concern for Reputation scale ($\alpha = .78$). As part of the second study, participants imagined the following scenario: "You are an employee at a banking company. Pretty soon there will be several opportunities to get a promotion. You like the prospect of getting a promotion and, as such, you apply for one of these promotion positions. This application procedure consists of interviews and several tests."

The voice manipulation followed. All participants read, "During the application procedure, your supervisor might or might not ask your opinion about the selection procedure and interviews." In the voice condition, participants subsequently read, "Your supervisor decides to ask your opinion about the selection procedure. Thus your ideas and suggestions will be listened to." In the no-voice condition, participants subsequently read, "Your supervisor decides not to ask your opinions and ideas concerning the selection procedure. Thus, your ideas and suggestions will not be listened to."

Next, participants completed the voice and fairness manipulation checks (as in Study 1). (The manipulation checks were correlated, $r = .50$, $p < .001$.) We proceeded to assess personal self-esteem by asking participants to what extent they would feel "competent," "valued," "good about myself," and "bad about myself" (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .85$). These four items were taken or modified from McFarland and Ross (1982) and Leary, Cottrell, and Phillips (2001). All responses were made on a 7-point scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on the voice manipulation check. We centered concern for reputation by subtracting the mean from each score (Aiken & West, 1991). We entered the main effects of procedural fairness (coded as a dummy variable) and the centered concern for reputation scale in the first step, followed by the interaction in the second step. This analysis yielded a positive and significant procedural fairness main effect ($\beta = .91$, $p < .001$), suggesting that participants reported receiving more voice in the voice than the no-voice condition. Neither the concern for reputation main effect ($\beta = .04$, $p < .20$) nor the interaction ($\beta = .07$, $p < .10$) was significant. In addition, we conducted a similar hierarchical



FIGURE 1 Personal self-esteem as a function of procedural fairness and concern for reputation in Study 2. *Note*. Low reputational concern = 1 *SD* below the mean; high reputational concern = 1 *SD* above the mean.

regression analysis on the fairness manipulation check. Again, this analysis yielded a positive and significant procedural fairness main effect ($\beta = .48$, $p < .001$) suggesting that participants perceived the supervisor as fairer in the voice than the no-voice condition. Neither the concern for reputation main effect ($\beta = –.05$, $p < .41$) nor the interaction ($\beta = .07$, $p < .27$) was significant. In conclusion, the procedural fairness manipulation was successful.

Personal self-esteem. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on personal self-esteem with centered scores for concern of reputation (Aiken & West, 1991) and procedural fairness coded as a dummy variable. In replication of past research, procedural fairness was positively related to personal self-esteem ($\beta = .19$, $p < .05$). Of importance, the interaction was significant ($\beta = .25$, $p < .005$; see Figure 1). We followed up with simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Consistent with the hypothesis, the positive relation between procedural fairness and self-esteem was significant among participants high ($\beta = .58$, $p < .001$) but not low ($\beta = –.19$, $p < .15$) in concern for reputation.[2] The personal self-esteem of the former dipped when they were denied as opposed to provided voice, but the personal self-esteem of the latter was unaffected by the denial or provision of voice.

STUDY 3

The results of Study 2 indicated that procedural fairness impacts more strongly on the personal self-esteem of individuals who are high (rather than low) in concern for reputation. The objective of Study 3 was to replicate conceptually and extend this finding in a controlled environment (i.e., a laboratory experiment), in which participants are faced with actual procedural fairness feedback.

Method

Participants and Design

We assessed concern for reputation at the beginning of the experimental session and manipulated procedural fairness (voice vs. no-voice). Sixty-nine participants were randomly allocated to the procedural fairness conditions.

Experimental Procedure

Participants were tested in individual cubicles. They expected to complete two ostensibly unrelated studies. The first study involved scale validation. Here, participants filled out the concern for reputation scale ($\alpha = .82$). They learned that, as part of the second study, an investigation of group behavior, they would take a brief language test. Three word pairs would appear on the computer screen. Each time a pair appeared, participants would have to think of a third word that would fit the pair. The test results would be sent via e-mail to another person present in the laboratory (i.e., the group leader) whose task was to generate a group solution out of the individual ones. The quality of the group solution would then be evaluated by the experimenter. The group that generated the best solution would be rewarded with a financial bonus. Thus, it was clear to participants that the better the quality of the group solution, the higher the chances of receiving additional financial benefits.

Participants also learned that the leader would decide whether to give them an opportunity to review the generated group solution and express their opinion before sending it off to the experimenter. In the voice condition, the leader informed participants that they would have the opportunity to review the group solution. In the no-voice condition, the leader informed participants that they would not have such an opportunity.

Next, participants completed the manipulation checks and dependent measures (from 1 [*not at all*] to 7 [*very much so*]). As part of the voice manipulation check, participants indicated the extent to which they were allowed to express their opinion. As part of the fairness manipulation check, participants indicated the extent to which they considered the procedures "just" and "fair" ($r = .80$, $p < .001$). The two manipulation checks were correlated ($r = .64$, $p < .001$). We assessed personal self-esteem by asking participants how "positive about themselves" and "valued" they felt in this situation ($r = .46$, $p < .001$).

[2]We also carried out a regression analysis, using the perceived fairness (rather than the voice manipulation) score as one independent variable and reputation as the other. Fairness perceptions influenced the personal self-esteem of high ($\beta = .56$, $p < .001$) but not low ($\beta = .19$, $p < .12$) concern for reputation participants.

Results

Manipulation Checks

We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on the voice manipulation check. We centered concern for reputation by subtracting the mean from each score (Aiken & West, 1991). We entered the main effects of procedural fairness (coded as a dummy variable) and the centered Concern for Reputation scale in the first step, followed by the interaction in the second step. This analysis yielded a positive and significant procedural fairness main effect ($\beta = .73$, $p < .001$), suggesting that participants reported receiving more voice in the voice than the no-voice condition. The analysis also yielded a positive and significant concern for reputation main effect ($\beta = .18$, $p < .05$), suggesting that participants reported receiving more voice when being high rather than low in reputational concern. The interaction was not significant ($\beta = .02$, $p < .85$). In addition, a similar hierarchical regression analysis on the fairness manipulation check yielded a procedural fairness main effect ($\beta = .52$, $p < .001$), showing that participants perceived the supervisor as more fair and just in the voice ($M = 4.54$) than the no-voice ($M = 2.98$) condition. Neither the concern for reputation main effect ($\beta = .03$, $p < .80$) nor the interaction ($\beta = .11$, $p < .30$) was significant. In conclusion, the procedural fairness manipulation was successful.

Personal Self-Esteem

We carried out a hierarchical regression analysis on personal self-esteem (and centered all variables). Concern for reputation was negatively related to personal self-esteem ($\beta = –.39$, $p < .005$). It is important to note that the interaction was significant ($\beta = .24$, $p < .05$; see Figure 2). Replicating Study 2, simple slope analyses indicated that the positive relation between procedural fairness and self-esteem was significant among participants high ($\beta = .50$, $p < .001$) but not low ($\beta = –.17$, $p < .39$) in concern for reputation.[3] The personal self-esteem of the former deteriorated when they were denied than were given voice, whereas the personal self-esteem of the latter was unaffected by the denial or provision of voice.



FIGURE 2 Personal self-esteem as a function of procedural fairness and concern for reputation in Study 3. *Note*. Low reputational concern = 1 *SD* below the mean; high reputational concern = 1 *SD* above the mean.

STUDY 4

In Studies 2 to 3, variations in procedural fairness influenced the personal self-esteem of participants with a relatively high concern for reputation. It is as if these participants had more to lose by unfair procedures than their counterparts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). If so, it follows that participants with a positive reputation would be more affected by procedural unfairness than those with a negative reputation, especially when relational (rather than personal) self-esteem was at stake.

We tested this hypothesis in Study 4 by manipulating orthogonally reputational valence (i.e., positive vs. negative) and procedural fairness. Half of the participants imagined situations in which they enjoyed a positive reputation, whereas the other half imagined situations in which they suffered a negative reputation. Then participants considered social contexts in which they were either given or denied voice. Furthermore, we broadened the scope of this investigation by introducing relational self-esteem, which refers to the extent to which participants felt that supervisor's use of an unfair procedure devalued his or her relationship with them.

The rationale for our hypothesis (i.e., procedural fairness will influence to a greater degree the relational self-esteem of positive-reputation than negative-reputation participants) is based on several bodies of literature. Assuming that a positive reputation implies social acceptance, whereas a negative reputation implies social rejection (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a) and that lack of voice reflects social rejection (De Cremer & Alberts, 2004), the impact of lack of voice will be stronger on individuals with a positive than a negative reputation. This rationale is consistent with research on self-threat which shows that high (compared to low) self-esteem persons (a) react more defensively to perceived threat than their low self-esteem counterparts (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999) and (b) are more likely to engage in ingroup bias (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000).

[3]We also conducted a regression analysis, using the perceived fairness (rather than the voice manipulation) score as one independent variable and reputation as the other. Fairness perceptions influenced the personal self-esteem of high ($\beta = .37$, $p < .05$) but not low ($\beta = .03$, $p < .90$) concern for reputation participants.

Method

Participants and Design

Forty-four participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (reputational valence: positive vs. negative reputation) × 2 (procedural fairness: voice vs. no-voice) between-subjects factorial design.

Experimental Procedure

Participants expected a two-part study. The first part was about autobiographical memory. They recalled either a social situation in which their reputation was clearly positive or a social situation in which their reputation was clearly negative. They wrote a detailed description of this situation on a separate sheet for 3 min. Given that imagination scenarios involving valenced memories can influence mood (Sedikides, 1992, 1995), we asked participants to indicate how sad they felt (from 1 [*not at all*] to 7 [*very much*]). An ANOVA on mood revealed only a significant reputational valence main effect: Participants in the negative reputation condition ($M = 3.19$) reported feeling sadder than those in the positive reputation condition ($M = 1.75$), $F(1, 38) = 10.06$, $p < .005$. Thus, we used mood as a covariate in the subsequent analyses.

In the second part of the study, participants read the following scenario:

> You work in an organization called ZYON. At the moment, all kinds of changes are taking place at ZYON that will influence financial rewards, the distribution of resources relevant to production, and promotion itself. Your supervisor is very busy coordinating some of these changes and, as such, is looking for feedback and input from others.

The procedural fairness manipulation followed. Participants read, "In this process, your supervisor asks/does not ask your opinion regarding these changes and how to implement them."

Finally, we collected the manipulation checks, as in Studies 1 and 2. The two voice manipulation checks were correlated ($r = .50$, $p < .001$). We assessed whether participants felt valued by their relationship with the supervisor by asking them to what extent they thought that "your supervisor did not value your opinion," "your supervisor's treatment harmed your reputation," and "your supervisor trusted you" (reverse-coded). We combined these items to form a composite score of *relational devaluation* ($\alpha = .74$). High scores indicated high levels of relational devaluation. All responses were made on a 7-point scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*). Both voice manipulation and fairness perceptions correlated significantly and negatively with relational devaluation ($r = -.74$, $p < .001$, and $r = -.41$, $p < .005$, respectively).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the voice manipulation check yielded a procedural fairness main effect: Participants in the voice condition ($M = 5.47$) reported having received more voice than participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 1.18$), $F(1, 40) = 233.13$, $p < .001$. Neither the reputational valence main effect, $F(1, 40) = .48$, $p < .50$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 40) = .00$, $p < .94$, was significant. Also, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the fairness manipulation check yielded a procedural fairness main effect: Participants in the voice condition ($M = 4.51$) considered the supervisor to be fairer than those in the no-voice condition ($M = 3.16$), $F(1, 40) = 12.85$, $p < .001$. Neither the reputational valence main effect, $F(1, 40) = 2.72$, $p < .12$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 40) = .71$, $p < .41$, was significant. In conclusion, the procedural fairness manipulation was successful.

Relational Devaluation

An analysis of covariance on the relational devaluation composite, with mood and Mood × Voice as covariates, revealed a procedural fairness main effect: Participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 5.19$, $SD = 1.13$) reported that they were valued less by their supervisor than participants in the voice condition ($M = 2.55$, $SD = 0.94$), $F(1, 36) = 19.67$, $p < .001$. The reputational valence main effect was not significant, $F(1, 36) = 1.63$, $p < .21$.

It is important to note that this main effect was qualified by the interaction, $F(1, 36) = 4.47$, $p < .05$. Simple effect tests showed that, consistent with our hypothesis, the effect of procedural fairness (i.e., feeling more relationally devalued when denied rather than given voice) was stronger among positive-reputation participants (Ms = 5.84 vs. 2.33, SDs = 0.74 vs. 1.07, respectively), $F(1, 36) = 36.03$, $p < .001$, than among negative-negative reputation participants (Ms = 4.80 vs. 2.53, SDs = 1.07 vs. 1.14, respectively), $F(1, 36) = 6.17$, $p < .05$.[4] In summary, the relational self-esteem of participants with a positive (relative to a negative) reputation ebbed and flowed more as a function of perceived procedural fairness.

[4]We also conducted a regression analysis, using the perceived fairness (rather than the voice manipulation) score as one independent variable and reputational valence as the other. Fairness perceptions influenced the personal self-esteem of participants with a positive ($\beta = -.53$, $p < .05$) but not negative ($\beta = -.27$, $p < .21$) reputation.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Reputation, others' opinion of the individual, is an integral part of the social self (Tyler, 1999, 2001). Given its self-evaluative implications, people are motivated to maintain and protect a positive reputation in their social interactions (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001; Rucker & Petty, 2003; Rudich, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2007). Information about one's reputation is provided by a representative authority (e.g., supervisor, manager) by means of fairness of treatment. Provision of the opportunity for an input in an organizational decision-making context (i.e., voice) signifies a positive reputation, whereas lack of voice signifies a negative reputation. Such variations in procedural justice are likely to make a stronger mark on group members who are highly concerned about their reputation, thus impacting on their self-esteem. It follows that violations in procedural fairness (i.e., lack of voice) will induce more substantial drops in the self-esteem of individuals with a positive than a negative reputation.

We examined the relation among procedural fairness, reputation, and self-esteem in four studies. Study 1 provided evidence for the assertion that procedures carry reputational implications: Compared to participants who lacked voice, those who received voice reported that the supervisor gave their reputation more serious consideration. This effect was more pronounced when voice-receiving participants were identifiable to other group members. Furthermore, Studies 2 and 3 showed that concern for reputation moderates the influence of procedural fairness on personal self-esteem: Variations in procedural fairness were more strongly associated with the personal self-esteem of individuals high rather than low in concern for reputation. The final study examined whether violations in procedural fairness (i.e., lack of voice) would diminish the feeling of relational devaluation of positive-reputation participants to a greater extent than the feeling of relational devaluation of negative-reputation participants. Indeed, participants with a positive (compared to negative) reputation perceived lack of voice as an unequivocal supervisory sign of relational devaluation.

Although our investigation showed that procedural fairness has reputational implications, a task for future research is to delve more deeply into the exact mechanisms for this influence. For example, are the reputational consequences of lack of voice (i.e., a dip in personal or relational self-esteem) due to the generic ego blow experienced, to a lowered group standing, to a sense of diminished respect, or to fear of exclusion? Is it possible that damaging reputational feedback undermines one's self-esteem by rendering accessible existential concerns (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; Sedikides, Wildschut, & Baden, 2004) or increasing uncertainty (Sedikides et al., in press; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002)?

Future research would also do well to examine emotional and behavioral implications of reputational threat. Emotional implications could include hurt feelings and disappointment (Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, & Evens, 1998). Behavioral implications include cooperation and exit. Does damaging feedback about one's reputation reduce cooperative behavior (perhaps because of hurt feelings or disappointment) and increase the probability of leaving the group (Simon & Stuermer, 2003)? Are lack of cooperation and exit dependent on the degree to which group members are interdependent (Lind, 2001)?

We have focused on the reputational and esteem implications of procedural fairness in the context of an ingroup. What if damaging information about one's reputation (i.e., lack of voice) is provided by an outgroup member? One possibility is that positive-reputation individuals will react even more strongly to such violations of procedural fairness (Stahl, van Prooijen, & Vermunt, 2004). Finally, a promising research direction concerns the role of individual differences. What kind of persons (among those with a positive reputation) are most likely to experience a substantial drop in self-esteem following unfair treatment? We would identify as likely candidates persons high in self-uncertainty (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005), high in neuroticism (John, 1990), or low in trait self-esteem (Sedikides & Gregg, in press).

A potential limitation of the current research is that the use of a voice manipulation is somewhat limiting in that it reduces the confidence of our claim that fairness perceptions accounted singly for the observed effects on self-esteem. Although the results we present in the four footnotes provide evidence that lack of voice indeed influenced fairness perceptions and that these perceptions in turn influenced the effect of reputational concerns on self-esteem, it is noteworthy that lack of voice can also influence other psychological variables, such as feelings of social rejection and sense of control or autonomy (De Cremer & Blader, 2006). For this reason, future research will need to replicate our findings with alternative manipulations of procedural fairness, such as accuracy, bias suppression, or ethicality (Leventhal, 1980).

Relatedly, the voice manipulation can be regarded as a somewhat incomplete induction of fairness/unfairness perceptions. The manipulation zeroed in on a single group member without providing information about the corresponding treatment of other group members. This practice is standard in procedural fairness research; as Kray and Lind (2002) remarked, "with a few notable exceptions, the study of perceived justice has been a 'first-person' undertaking" (p. 906). Although notions of social influence and social comparison have been

impactful in distributive justice research, such as equity theory (Adams, 1965) and relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976), they have been less impactful in procedural fairness research (De Cremer & Van Hiel, 2006). Future research will need to redress this imbalance.

To conclude, an important contribution of our research is that the reported four studies constitute the first systematic investigation into the interrelations among procedural fairness, reputation, and self-esteem. We have shown that fair or unfair treatment by an authority Figure signals to employees their reputation, and this is why such treatment has important implications for personal and relational self-esteem. We hope that future justice researchers will incorporate this notion of reputation when further developing insights into the self-relevant and relational implications of procedural fairness.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Claire Hart for her helpful comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by a fellowship from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, Grant No. 016-005.019) awarded to the first author.

REFERENCES

Aberson, C. L., Healy, M. R., & Romero, V. L. (2000). Ingroup bias and self-esteem: A meta-analysis. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *4*, 157–173.

Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 267–299). New York: Academic.

Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*. New York: Sage.

Anderson, E. (1999). *Code of the streets: Decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner city*. New York: Norton.

Brockner, J., Heuer, L., Siegel, P. A., Wiesenfeld, B., Martin, C., Grover, S., et al. (1998). The moderating effect of self-esteem in reaction to voice: Converging evidence from five studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*, 394–407.

Brockner, J., & Wiesenfeld, B. M. (1996). An integrative framework for explaining reactions to decisions: Interactive effects of outcomes and procedures. *Psychological Bulletin*, *120*, 189–208.

Campbell, K. W., Bonacci, A. M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2004). Psychological entitlement: Interpersonal consequences and validation of a self-report measure. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *83*, 29–45.

Campbell, K. W., & Sedikides, C. (1999). Self-threat magnifies the self-serving bias: A meta-analytic integration. *Review of General Psychology*, *3*, 23–43.

Crocker, L., & Algina, J. (1986). *Introduction to classical and modern test theory*. Forth Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Crosby, F. (1976). A model of egoistic relative deprivation. *Psychological Review*, *83*, 85–112.

De Cremer, D. (2003). Why inconsistent leadership is regarded as procedurally unfair: The importance of social self-esteem concerns. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 535–550.

De Cremer, D. (2004). The influence of accuracy as a function of leader's bias: The role of trustworthiness in the psychology of procedural fairness. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *30*, 293–304.

De Cremer, D., & Alberts, H. (2004). When procedural fairness does not influence how good I feel: The effects of voice and leader selection as a function of belongingness needs. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *34*, 333–344.

De Cremer, D., & Blader, S. (2006). Why do people care about procedural fairness?: The importance of belongingness in responding and attending to procedures. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *36*, 211–228.

De Cremer, D., & Sedikides, C. (2005). Self-uncertainty and responsiveness to procedural fairness. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *41*, 157–173.

De Cremer, D., Snyder, M., & Dewitte, S. (2001). "The less I trust, the less I contribute (or not)?": The effects of trust, accountability and self-monitoring in social dilemmas. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *31*, 93–107.

De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005a). Am I respected or not?: Inclusion and reputation as issues in group membership. *Social Justice Research*, *18*, 121–152.

De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005b). Managing group behavior: The interplay between procedural fairness, self, and cooperation. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 37, pp. 151–218). New York: Academic.

De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2006). When it matters to me that you are treated fairly: Effects of other's fair treatment as a function of other's willingness to help. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *100*, 231–249.

Emler, N., & Hopkins, N. (1990). Reputation, social identity, and the self. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Emler, N., & Reicher, S. (1995). *Adolescence and delinquency*. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, *43*, 522–527.

Ferris, G. R., Blass, F. R., Douglas, C., Kolodinsky, R. W., & Treadway, D. C. (2003). Personal reputation in organizations. In J. Greenberg (Ed.), *Organizational behavior* (pp. 211–246). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Fine, G. A. (1996). Reputational entrepreneurs and the memory of incompetence: Melting supporters, partisan warriors, and images of President Harding. *American Journal of Sociology*, *101*, 1159–1193.

Folger, R. (1977). Distributive and procedural justice: Combined impact of "voice" and improvement of experienced inequity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *35*, 108–119.

Folger, R., & Cropanzano, R. (1998). *Organizational justice and human resource management*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Fombrun, C. J. (1996). *Reputation: Realizing value from the corporate image*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. New York: Holt.

John, O. P. (1990). The "Big Five" factor taxonomy: Dimensions of personality in the natural language and in questionnaires. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 66–100). New York: Guilford.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk. *Econometrica*, *47*, 263–291.

Koper, G., van Knippenberg, D., Bouhuijs, F., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. (1993). Procedural fairness and self-esteem. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *23*, 313–325.

Kray, L. J., & Lind, E. A. (2002). The injustices of others: Social reports and the integration of others' experiences in organizational justice judgments. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *89*, 906–924.

Leary, M. R. (1996). *Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). The nature and function of self-esteem: Sociometer theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 32, pp. 1–62). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Leary, M. R., Cottrell, C. A., & Phillips, M. (2001). Deconfounding the effects of dominance and social acceptance on self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*, 898–909.

Leary, M. R., Springer, C., Negel, L., Ansell, E., & Evens, K. (1998). The causes, phenomenology, and consequences of hurt feelings. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 1225–1237.

Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *68*, 518–530.

Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory?: New approaches to the fairness in social relationships. In K. Gergen, M. Greenberg, & R. Willis (Eds.), *Social exchange theory* (pp. 27–55). New York: Plenum.

Lind, E. A. (2001). Fairness heuristic theory: Fairness judgments as pivotal cognitions in organizational relations. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.), *Advances in organizational fairness* (pp. 56–88). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). *The social psychology of procedural fairness*. New York: Plenum.

McFarland, C., & Ross, M. (1982). Impact of causal attributions on affective reactions to success and failure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *43*, 937–946.

Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ostrom, T. M., & Sedikides, C. (1992). The outgroup homogeneity effect in natural and minimal groups. *Psychological Bulletin*, *112*, 536–552.

Pearsall, J. (Ed.). (1998). *The new Oxford dictionary of English*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem?: A theoretical and empirical review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *130*, 435–468.

Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2003). Effects of accusations on the accuser: The moderating role of accuser culpability. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*, 1259–1271.

Rudich, E. A., Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2007). Self-esteem moderates preferences for accepting versus rejecting interaction partners. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *37*, 955–967.

Sedikides, C. (1992). Changes in the valence of the self as a function of mood. *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, *14*, 271–311.

Sedikides, C. (1995). Central and peripheral self-conceptions are differentially influenced by mood: Tests of the differential sensitivity hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *69*, 759–777.

Sedikides, C., De Cremer, D., Hart, C. M., & Brebels, L. (in press). Procedural fairness responses in the context of self-uncertainty. In R. M. Arkin, K. C. Oleson, & P. J. Carroll (Eds.), *The uncertain self: A handbook of perspectives from social and personality psychology*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2000). On the self-protective nature of inconsistency/negativity management: Using the person memory paradigm to examine self-referent memory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *79*, 906–922.

Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2003). Portraits of the self. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), *Sage handbook of social psychology* (pp. 110–138). London: Sage.

Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (in press). Self-enhancement. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*.

Sedikides, C., & Herbst, K. (2002). How does accountability reduce self-enhancement?: The role of self-focus. *Revue Internationale De Psychologie Sociale*, *15*, 113–128.

Sedikides, C., Herbst, K. C., Hardin, D. P., & Dardis, G. J. (2002). Accountability as a deterrent to self-enhancement: The search for mechanisms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*, 592–605.

Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1997). Self-evaluation: To thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 29, pp. 209–269). New York: Academic Press.

Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., & Baden, D. (2004). Nostalgia: Conceptual issues and existential functions. In J. Greenberg, S. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), *Handbook of experimental existential psychology* (pp. 200–214). New York: Guilford.

Shroth, H. A., & Shah, P. P. (2000). Procedures: Do we really want to know them?: An examination of the effects of procedural fairness on self-esteem. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *85*, 462–471.

Simon, B., & Stuermer, S. (2003). Respect for group members: Intragroup determinants of collective identification and group-serving behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*, 183–193.

Simon, B., & Stuermer, S. (2005). In search of the active ingredient of respect: A closer look at the role of acceptance. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *35*, 809–818.

Stahl, T., van Prooijen, J.-W., & Vermunt, R. (2004). On the psychology of procedural fairness: reactions to procedures of ingroup vs. outgroup authorities. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *34*, 173–189.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *106*, 1039–1061.

Tyler, T. R. (1999). Why people cooperate with organizations: An identity-based perspective. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *21*, 201–246.

Tyler, T. R. (2001). Cooperation in organizations: A social identity perspective. In M. A. Hogg & D. J. Terry (Eds.), *Social identity processes in organizational contexts* (pp. 149–165). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *25*, 115–191.

Tyler, T. R., & Smith, H. J. (1999). Justice, social identity, and group processes. In T. R. Tyler, R. M. Kramer, & O. P. John (Eds.), *The psychology of the social self* (pp. 223–264). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Van den Bos, K. (1999). What are we talking about when we talk about no-voice procedures?: On the psychology of the fair outcome effect. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *35*, 560–577.

Van den Bos, K., & Lind, E. A. (2002). Uncertainty management by means of fairness judgments. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 34, pp. 1–60). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Van Prooijen, J.-W., Van den Bos, K., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2002). Procedural justice and status: Status salience as antecedent of procedural fairness effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*, 1353–1361.

Van Prooijen, J.-W., Van den Bos, K., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2005). Procedural justice and intragroup status: Knowing where we stand in a group enhances reactions to procedures. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *41*, 664–676.

Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*, 1049–1062.