In reference to cogntive penetrability and impenetrability with
relation to architectue, it appears to me that, in basic
terms,computations such as decision-making are cognitively penerable
(i.e they can be affected by expectations, beliefs etc.) and that
reflexes are cognitively inpenetrable (i.e they cannot be affected by
beliefs etc.) The question I have is in relation to the role of
perceptual processes. The book claimed that these processes are both
computations and reflexes, but that they are, according to Fodor,
cognitively inpenetrable. This was shown with relation to the idea that
if you are sitting on a train and see the train adjacent to you moving,
despite sitting still and knowing that you are not going to move for
quite a while, you still get the illusion and feeling of moving.
However, as shown by 'Devil's advocate box' (page 60) various
situations in which perceptual processes are used can be cognitively
penetrable, as the individual adapts to the situation. This idea can
also be seen in reference to the illusion of the train above as, having
been on a train a lot, I no longer get that illusion of feeling that I
am moving. Ths, could it be that with practise or a high amount of
exposure to a particular situation that a person's perceptual processes
can, eventally, be affected by one's experiences. With this view in
mind couldit therefore be possible that the majority of perceptual
processes are, basically, cognitively penetrable ?
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue Feb 13 2001 - 16:23:49 GMT