There is no doubt that the "mind/body" problem is at the heart -- or rather the "soul" -- of much of our tenacious tendency toward religious supernaturalism and other forms of irrationality and superstition. We do not understand, and cannot understand, how mental states can be physical states (and we are quite right not to think we can understand this). As a consequence, many of us simply assume or conclude that they are *not* physical states -- thereby opening up the metaphysical door to the immaterial and the supernatural, the fabled world of spirits and deities that surpasses all understanding and must be taken on faith. A faith, moreover, that conforms naturally to the pantheistic experience and intuitions we all shared as infants, when omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent beings (our kin and kind) were all about us, aware of and ministering to all of our bodily and mental wants, and all causality was telekinetic magic. Reasoning and scientific knowledge are meant to wean us from that magic world, and for the most part they succeed, but they come a cropper when it comes to the mind/body problem, just as all bets are off in mathematics if it admits a contradiction. For, from a contradiction, everything, and the opposite of everything, follows. Mathematics, fortunately, has managed to immunize itself against contradictions; but science has not managed to square spirit and flesh, so it remains vulnerable to the fancies of the spirit. "Science cannot explain everything!" is the usual taunt of the untutored; and the usual reply of pedantic, imperious scientism is "Just wait!" And for the most part scientism is right: what is not yet known and understood will be known and understood, eventually; and the kinds of questions that cannot be answered turn out, for the most part, to have been ill-formed ones, with arbitrary, usually anthropomorphic assumptions, such as "Somebody made everything, so who made the world?" or even incoherent ones, such as, "That's just a theory: you can't *prove* it" (which conflates the provable truths of mathematics with the probable truths of science). But at the root of the naive scepticism lies something else, something much harder (indeed, I think, impossible) to eradicate. It is the mind/body problem, but what, exactly, is the problem? It is usual to say, as I did, that it is a difficulty we have in seeing how mental states can be physical states. But this language of "states" is too static, too passive. The problem is also an active, dynamic one, having to do not just with states we feel, but with the things we do -- the states, if you like, that we cause, or *will*. In other words, there is no separating the mind/body problem from the free-will problem. Mental states are felt states. But they are not just felt to have qualititative contents -- it is not that some of them feel-like this and others feel-like that, where this and that are just different colours I see, smells I smell, or