Levelling Up- What do we need at the centre
Well, good afternoon everyone. Thank you for joining this webinar organised by the Centre for English Identity and Politics at Southampton University. Turns out to be quite a timely event. Kent, yesterday's announcement and discussion about levelling up whatever you thought about who actually got the money or the criteria, couldn't have done more to to emphasise the extent to which even when we come to trying to close economic and social inequalities, it's a matter of local authorities going. Cap in hand as supplicants to central government, which then decides who gets money and how much and what for. But this isn't a a recent problem. Labour's manifesto before 1997 suggested that there was a going to be a great deal more devolution than actually took place. And it it sometimes seems to me that every opposition leader has a speech that they give usually to a gathering of their own councillors. Or perhaps to the Local Government Association. That announces that they're going to be the first Prime Minister to give away power rather than to hoard it at the centre. So what we're trying to do today is to understand why that happens. One possible explanation is simply the perfidious nature of politicians who make all those sorts of promises that they don't intend to keep, but we want to go rather more deeply into this today and ask some more profound questions. Is the way in which the centre of the government of the United Kingdom. Which is also the Government of England, is the way the centre organised the way it works the way it thinks, proving a fundamental obstacle to the sort of devolution that so many people that think that England wants we've got. Some a fantastic panel today to discuss this. All of them are people who are hugely respected academics who've written in on and around this subject over recent years and studied it closely, but also all of them have in different ways. Being very close to. How government actually works working with government at national level and at local level to help shape and advise on policy. So it's it's a great panel that we've got. Today, just to introduce them briefly and then I'll ask them to speak in turn, Professor Patrick Diamond is at Queen Mary, University of London. Professor Diane Coyle is the Bennett professor of public policy at Cambridge University. Professor Janice Morfitt is from the Bartlett School of Planning at UCL. And Ariana Giovanni is assistant professor at De Montfort. City I won't go into their long CV's. You can look them if you like that their experience will become immediately apparent. Each of our speakers is going to speak for about 8 minutes. Initially, I would encourage anybody who's on the call who would like. A question put to the panel to put it in the Q&A section. And please of course to use the chat function to discuss amongst yourselves as the webinar proceeds. And at the end I will try to bring in as many of the questions that you've posed as possible, but to to start, start things off and to give his initial thoughts. Patrick Diamond Patrick.Well thanks very much, John, and it's it's great to be with you and and thanks for inviting me to contribute to this really important seminar. I think the subject matter has always been important, but it's become more so in the light of recent events. Not least, the government announcements yesterday on the shared prosperity fund, but I think also some of the reports that were published before Christmas, not least the brand Commission looking at the potential future of constitutional reform and also devolution. So it's good to be able to share thoughts with with the panel and and the audience this afternoon. So I'll try to be brief, just to say that I've been asked to talk about English devolution and problems at the centre of government. And of course, one ambiguity. As you pointed out in your introduction. And is are we talking about the centre of UK government or the centre of English government? That's something that we might come back to during the discussion, but the key argument which I want to make at the outset is that for English devolution to work effectively and and to be productive then there has to be a capable. Centre of government. Devolution inevitably involves dialogue and negotiation between the centre and local institutions, whether they're elected mayors, whether they're combined, or. Charities local councils. In summary, local actors need a centre of government which they can do business with in the absence of that, it's very difficult for devolution to really function effectively. The other point I would just make an introduction is also a paradox. In a sense, the paradox of government at the centre in England. Which is that, as I think many people would agree, England has among the most centralised governments in the advanced. Economies and yet in many respects the centre of government is brittle and ineffective and lacks important capacity. So we have a centre that is normally very powerful but actually in key respects is ineffective and lacks the tools to do things effectively. So let's just move on then and discuss briefly. What some of these problems at the centre of government are, and I think some of these problems are much discussed. Long debated and very well known. I think among the most important is the tendency of the centre of government in the UK and England to be exposed to a very strong degree of policy, churn and policy and stability, which of course manifests itself also in institutional instability. I mean there are many examples of this, I think perhaps one of the most important in the. Area of governance relates to the changes that were made after the 2010 election. The Labour governments previously had put in place an architecture around devolution which included the creation of regional development agencies. After 1997, and, of course, RA's were abolished after 2010 and replaced by labs as the successor government institution in regional. Economic policy, so we know that when general elections happen and the party of government changes, that tends to lead to policy churn. But of course we also see this. Meaning within government, so within the Conservative government has been in power in one form or another since 2010. There's also been a strong degree of policy churn in this area. One example would be around industrial strategy. The May government in 2016 attempted to put in place a more ambitious industrial strategy, which has then been in different ways. Weakened and in some respects abandoned by her successors. So you know, Whitehall suffers from a high degree of policy churn. I think this is in part a reflection of hyper politicisation, something we might come back to talk about later. A lack of long term consensus between. In political parties, which adds to this somewhat febrile atmosphere of institutional instability? I think a. Second problem with the centre relates to sinoia isation. Again, those who are familiar with how White will operates will be aware that Whitehall is structured around a series of functionally demarcated departments that defined responsibilities. And this strongly undermines cross government order. Nation I think also from the perspective of devolution it means that local actors and organisations are having to make sense of an array of initiatives for Whitehall departments that often don't seem coherent. And of course, 1 aspect of this is the emergence of a big culture in which local councils in particular are spending enormous amounts of time having to write. Funding bids responding to different parts of the centre. Against a series of initiatives that just don't really appear to add up.I think a.Third problem which I wanted to mention is around the centres tendency to micromanage the delivery of public services and over the last 30 years this is something which has increased in significance and we know that the. Centre of government has tended to intervene more and more. In service delivery. Whether this involves more use of inspections, greater use of targets, more alliance on performance manage. Alongside sanctions for failing providers and so-called failing institutions, yet the evidence does not suggest that centralised micromanagement improves long term performance in public services, not least because often the centre of government has a relatively weak understanding of implementation. This brings me to my 4th point, which is another problem relating to infrastructure and policy implementation itself. Whitehall has never had a strong track record in managing major projects. Relating to infrastructure and the Whitehall culture has also been one in which policy making has tended to be regarded as more important and prestigious than policy implementation itself. The understanding of delivery in the centre of government, with some exceptions, remains weak and although there have been various attempts to try to. Shifts the emphasis back on to delivery in many respects, is still a very long way to go. So I think these problems I've talked about in particular issues around policy churn and solarization. Are very well known. Long established and have been under discussion for in some respects many decades. Going back to the 1960s. But there are also some more recent problems. I just want to very quickly mention. Two, I think one is that the centre of government lacks effective mechanisms for managing central local relations and also for overseeing into governmental relationships. And we know that local councils are often relying on ad hoc personal relationships and contacts in order to establish a relationship with ministers and civil servants at the. Centre, and it's not. It's just not an adequate basis for devolution to function. If councils are having to run on these kinds of personal contacts themselves, often dependent on on party politics, there's no statutory requirement on the centre of government to either console or meet regularly with local authorities on most policy. Issues and of course we know that in England as across the UK, local councils have no formal constitutional status. This is something of course, which the Brown Commission attempts to address. A final problem, which I would just mention quickly, which I think again has become more evident in perhaps the recent or last decade or so, is the lack of capacity at the centre over the last decade or so. Of course, civil service numbers in Whitehall have fallen, and although they've begun to rise again in some departments, there are many parts of government that still appear to be. Underpowered, this is not just the course about numbers of civil servants employed, it's about capacity. It's about the loss of experienced staff. It's about struggles around equipping people with the right skill sets. It's about attracting talent into Whitehall, and I would just add to that that I think the centres capabilities have also been undermined by growing conflicts between ministers and civil servants and the kind of long term breakdown of the public service bargain between. Officials and ministers, which is so important to functional governance at the centre. Obviously there's a lot more to be said about that, but I think the recent departure of some permanent secret. Is an illustration of how that relationship has become much more conflictual, at least in the senior civil service. So in summary, John and I'll. I'll finish here. I would say the senators problem overall is its tendency towards overreach. It tries to do too much without having effective levers and tools, and I think this was underlined. By yesterday shared prosperity fund announcements. In which we see the centre trying to determine and decide local priorities that should be the responsibility of local institutions. That's I think a classic example of trying to do too much, but lacking effective tools to deliver. And I would argue that to solve complex policy problems, whether it's regional economic underperformance, long term. Social disadvantage achieving the challenging targets around. Net zero. This requires the centre of government and sub regional and local tiers of governments to work together much more effectively. I think local councils and local actors have an incentive to try to make the centre of government in England more effective. I have some ideas for how we might begin to do that. Let me perhaps. Bring those in later in the discussion and hand over now to the other contributors, so I'll leave. It there.Trick specially thank you very much and that's a a great start and a long list of issues to deal with and I'll certainly make sure that we come back. In the questions and the discussions to to the practical means of reform that we can address just to remind people on the call, do put in questions or use the chat if you'd like to do that. But I'm gonna move swiftly on to our next speaker, Diane Coyle Diane.Thank you so much. Well Patrick's got us off to a great start with that overview of what the various issues are. My own experience has been partly sitting on various national advisory bodies. I'm an economist, so they have mainly been in economic policy domains. But also longer engagement with Greater Manchester. It's my home city helped put together the Manchester Independent economic Review in 2009. That paved the way for the first of the city deals and have stayed involved doing the independent prosperity review and observing that process as it's unfolded over the years. And it's very hard to judge how successful or not it's been without knowing what the counterfactual would be. And of course there have been headwinds of the aftermath of the financial crisis and the pandemic, but I think there have been some successes, but in other ways it's been disappointing. The city still punching below its weight. In any international comparison of second tier cities. So every bit. Of devolving power within England and and to take Patrick's first point I'm talking about English devolution and and the UK Central Government and Whitehall and Westminster. It'll be interesting to get on to discussion about the nations too, but every bit of the devolution within England has been reluctant. There's been inadequate amounts of money. And it's being compromised and these these small dribbles of competitive bidding just make strategic decisions and investments much, much harder to make people around the country. Now you would think in principle that in some ways strategic decision making, long term decision making would be more possible at a more local level. For a number of reasons, one key reason is having the information that's needed, and there is a granularity of information that you don't get sitting in a central department with official statistics. No matter you know, even if that department is part of it is moved to Darlington, you're still thinking about Cornwall from one central location. And there's a lot of information that isn't captured in statistics that comes from people talking to each other in the kinds of networks that exist locally. So information I think is an important part of the economic case for devolution. Another point is about aligning the different actors, because if you're thinking about strategies such as industrial strategy, you need to get. Number of public sector agencies. The private sector, the third sector, all aligned in different ways. Exchanging the information that's needed and that kind of coordination across networks is again more straightforward at a more local level. I don't think a lot of science about the right level for different kinds of decisions to be be made, but I think it's clear that doing all of that centrally isn't is much less effective. And again, as Patrick touched on, the accountability structures for that are tricky because we have this messy patchwork of overlapping layers of different responsibilities around around England with combined authorities and and neps and and and so on. Whose boundaries don't eat, don't match up and whose. Responsibilities sometimes are intentional with each other. But I think strategic thought strategic investments are more possible locally. They would be possible nationally, but they don't happen nationally. There's constant policy churn. The Institute for Government some years ago did a fantastic piece of work on further education policy post 16 and counted the number of major policy shifts in a. I think it's a 20 year period. Recently with a colleague we looked at industrial strategies or policies and since 1980, since Mrs. Thatcher abolished Nadine the early 80s. There have been at least a dozen major economic strategy or industrial strategy announcements. That's not a strategy, that's a complete misnomer. And when governments are asking private sector companies and individuals to make long term investment decisions, and in fact for individuals with their education and skills. Some of that decision will last with them for the rest of their lifetime. For government to be chopping and changing in a major way every few years, it's actually a real abrogation of of responsibility at the centre. I think it's absolutely shocking. So we know that that churn happens. It happens across different domains. Happens with industrial strategies. It isn't clear why Mrs. Mays's industrial strategy of 2017 got torn up by the success the government from her own party. But we also looked at all of the economic policy. All of the policy documents published by the Boris Johnson administration during that during a 12 month period. And during 12 months which were launched with a a new economic strategy planned for growth. We looked at simply. How much did the different documents refer to each other? How much joining up was there across major policy documents? And the answer shocked me. It's almost none and we have some nice diagrams. Heat maps that show you the amount of the extent to which different concepts or policies are repeated in successive docs. And the terms used and the ideas used in the initial strategy document just aren't picked up in the successes during the next 12 months. So this degree of dysfunction at the centre seems to me to be increasing and not decreasing, and I think it's something worth discussing when we come to that. Why has the centre become so incapable of any kind of long term thing? Is it to do with? A toxic combination of first past the post and centralization itself. Is it feeding on itself? I don't. I don't know what the answer to that is, but I would like to see some serious reflection by politicians in Westminster and by leaders in Whitehall. As to why this has come about, I think it's a really big issue. But these current structures simply make long run economic decisions around the country impossible. And this is particularly true of education skills where people set out their whole lifetime earnings and career paths with the decisions that they take at young ages. Given our structure and also for parts of infrastructure, some parts of infrastructure decision making need to be national, but other parts are definitely subnational better. We need sub nationally and I I think we ought to have some serious reflection about that. And as a final thought or two final thoughts actually. First we don't have any evaluation of policy to speak of. It's a real gap. Patrick referred to the way that there's much more interest in the Centre in policy analysis than an implementation. There's also much more interest in the initial analysis than there is in in the evaluation. Now, of course, if you're changing things every 12 months, there's nothing to evaluate. There won't be in time for anything to have an impact, so that combination of leaving something in place for long enough for it to have an effect and then doing a proper evaluation of it afterwards, is something that we are shockingly lacking in our system. There's no way for the whole system. The government to learn from its own mistakes and successes and feed that back into future decision making. And the second is whether there is some, whether there are some interesting lessons in the national devolution journey of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland that we could think about in discussing what kinds of policies could be the priorities for? For devolution in England, and what can we learn from those experiences about? The right scale and scope of of decision making for devolved devolution within England. So I'm gonna stop there and hand back to. You, John thank you.And thank you very much. And and you've you've added another series of very sharp questions to the ones that Patrick had already put in front of us for us to come back to in discussion. So thank you, I'll move straight on now to to Janice.Right, thanks very much and just to continue this really interesting debate as it's developing, could I just have my first slide up with the my key points on? Thank the. Next one thanks. What I wanted to do is just sort of look back to think about why all this is happening because I think you know what one can see if you look back long enough. A kind of periodisation of the different mechanisms and methods of central local relations and control. If if you. If you're looking at it from a a local. Point of view. Point of view, and I think to pick up on the point that Patrick made is that local government, nor indeed of course the Scottish and Welsh parliaments and and the Northern Ireland Assembly are not part of the Constitution. They're creatures of statute of Parliament and can be abolished at any time. And I think that if we look, but ironically, if we look at the OCD research, more decentralisation of government is actually leading to greater contribution to GDP. So our centralization is actually counting against our economic growth. In in, according to ACD research. So so this issue that the Brown Commission came up with about thinking about. Subnational government has passed, the Constitution is clearly very important in in a number of ways beyond just the democratic elements of it, which of course are fundamental, and if you think about Tony Travis, he's often said that the way in which the centre treats local government is just a substitute for colonialism. And and he kind of argues that the rise of control matched the decrease in in the role of of of the UK Government in relation to its colonies. I think that's debatable, but it's an interesting point, but I think. Looking at another reason why we get this kind of relationship between the centre and and and and the local. Is that permanent? Secretaries are remain responsible to Parliament for the spending in their departments. Now this means that, say for department levelling. The permanent secretary is responsible for all the spending of local government to Parliament even though the decisions making made by local authorities will will be undertaken in a democratic way, and it seems to me this is one point that we rarely discuss. But if we look back, this is, I think a a key. Stumbling block to actually producing any better relationships between the centre and subnational government. And lastly I think. On these key points is that when we look back to 1992 and and the introduction of subsidiarity into the European Treaties, then obviously this was a stepping stone for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but it seemed to have the opposite effect as far as the Cabinet Office was concerned in relation to England. And and I think in a way we can see the increasing intervention of the centre from that period onwards and when we look forward to the second point at which that was. And if you like developed in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, we actually then saw the whole introduction of more controls over expenditure, so the centre doesn't seem to be able to cope with devolution in England. And that's because in a way they regard England as being their main. Interest, and they're not so much bothered about devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. And of course you know we are beginning to see those powers being chipped away and returned to the centre so I can have the next slide, please. So we can just see this kind of periodization. If I had have the next slide. Oh sorry, yes, sorry. So we can see that obviously, since the IMF this year in in 1976, where that really marked the end of the the post war role of local authorities. And and and recreating the state through a loss of capital expenditure, roads, schools, housing and so on. And we've seen subsequently the removal of key roles from local authorities in terms of their housing role, but also thinking about education and thinking about transport. And much of this now is either controlled centrally or controlled through. Other agencies controlled by the centre. And then we think post 97. Obviously we had best value and the new public management, which is really a preparation for outsourcing to meet WTO commitments to create a market in the public sector. But we've never really discussed this, so quite a lot of public policy. It's changed to meet external commitments that the government. Has but we never really have this public debt. Right, and if we think about other Member States or the United States, or we think about other members of the European Union, then these debates are much more in the public domain than they ever have been in in the UK. So I do think there's another issue about the centre keeping these issues kind of under wraps. And not debating them very transparency, transparency. And obviously we had the goes and the RA's as an effort to be a quasi devolved approach, and the lips took over that role. Although initially said they were, they weren't going to do that, but of course now if you look at Wikipedia, there's the government statement on Wikipedia that makes that as a kind of post. Not rationalisation for their for their introduction in implementation rules, and then lastly, of course we've had deals. And we've seen these since 2012 and and what the announcement yesterday was. If you like the latest wave of of these deals and and when we look at them now, we actually have deals covering virtually the whole of the territory of the United Kingdom. And this means that there are there are people in Whitehall signing off. Projects of about £60,000, which is so ridiculous as to you know, to really reemphasize the points that both Patrick and and and Diana have already made. And we need to really think about is this the best use of government time and and as as as as both Patrick and Diana have said, you know, how can the centre really know what's needed locally? And it was interesting yesterday to to read that rather impassioned speech or sorry. I think tweet was it or blog from Andrew Andy St who's obviously just had enough of of this kind of begging bowl and bidding culture, which I think everybody else has seen. But you know, he's now had enough himself can have the next slide, please. But we've still. This still goes on. So if we look at the levelling up White Paper, although we're not talking about United Kingdom today, it does actually refer to the whole of the United Kingdom, and it's very interesting if you listen to the language of the Prime Minister and you listen to Michael Gove, they always talk about the United Kingdom now and not about England. And so the idea in this White Paper is to have the same control frameworks for local authorities across the UK. Now I'm not sure how that's going to work in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but what what we will see. In England we have the office for Local Government being set up, of which we know little or nothing at the moment. So there is a new acronym Off Log that we'll have to get to understand, and really this is going to measure how local authorities are implementing these missions, which are set out in the in the White Paper. But again, which we know. Very little about in practise, although I'm sure people are are trying to understand. More, but I think just to finish on this this kind of rather bleak narrative. I think what we also see, particularly from local government, is that local authorities have always responded to those issues that are around them local need, and whether that's been to provide telephones to provide energy to provide. Restaurants to provide support and poverty and public health. Health they've always stepped into a gap. They've found a gap. When government has been directing them elsewhere, and I think now we can see that local authorities are providing huge amount of affordable housing, which is largely going unnoticed. Nationally, they're they're providing it directly using their own funds to do that. Even though they don't have much money, they're providing energy at in through energy networks, but also through the you know, organising all the warm places that we're having this. Winter and and the leadership of place post pandemic is rather significant and again, not really being picked up. The way in which local authorities are working with other partners from from the private and the third sector to actually try to reinvigorate place and the funding that came yesterday is really just a bit of icing on many of those. Takes which are, which are where where local authorities are actually really working hard to do something to to revitalise their places so local authorities still managed to survive despite all this control and continuing poor relationship. If you like with the centre thank you.Janice, thank you very much and not, not least for ending up on an upbeat note there to to after the the list of problems that we are going to have to try to to solve. I'll go now to to to Arianna to give us another perspective.Thanks very much, John, and thanks very much colleagues for the very kind of very good contribution. The link very much to what I'm I am going to say really. So John asked me to think about looking at central local relations, how localities experience negotiating with the centre. Considering all the issues that have been raised so far. And I think that I'm going to bring I'm going to cover like 3 examples that show the current limits. The first one looks at the way in which devolution deals have been carried out since 2015. The second one relates to mayors, and the third one tries to link this debate to a kind of an international perspective. I think the point that Patrick made at the beginning about the the. Question and problem of institutional churn is very important. One just to give a bit of context because it means the new institutions will constantly appear and disappear at some national level, and this creates a web of networks that actually lack effective what we called in a recent paper that that I wrote with a colleague for PR N it lacks effective vectors and connectors. So the centre. Tries to do too much. It tries to cover a lot at the local level from from a kind of using a top down approach, but having to operate within a web of institution that paradox. Paradoxically, it has created itself. It actually struggles to to manage this complex web of relations in a in a in an effective way, because there are no good Connexions. And so this certainly limits the interaction between the centre and localities and affects negotiations, especially when we look at the way in which devolution has been has developed so. Are so the three examples that I just mentioned? Let's start with the first one. If we look at the way in which devolution deals have been kind of agreed between local government groups of of of of council, in in, in the form of combined authorities and the centre, we see that there is there are kind of the approach is extremely ad hoc. Lock and this means that different localities manage to get different things depending on the way in which they the the centre approaches them, and they approach the centre, but the system is so disconnected that it creates a kind of a a a very complex and and and and disconnected scenario. So the three key examples that we can use to understand these complexities. Are for example, Greater Manchester when they got the devolution deal back in 2015. That was a very specific local context. You had 10 councils that have been working together for a very long period of time. The government had an interest in collaborating and negotiating with them because they wanted Greater Manchester to be kind of the the the good example of how you do devolution. When they were launching the devolution deals back then and so that. Became a kind of the model of how devolution should work and how negotiations should work, but back to the point that was made previously. Obviously it will also it the success of that process of negotiation was also very much related to personal and political Connexions, so the centre was willing to collaborate with the local level in that case, and there were good Connexions. But then on the opposite kind of side, you can look at the example of what was called back then. Sheffield City Region Combined authority when they were negotiating with the centre. To to agree that devolution deal back in 2015. Actually they were told by the centre that they could they they had to kind of approach the negotiations in a very pragmatic way. So back then, there was for example a debate on whether there should be a Sheffield devolution, a Sheffield City region devolution deal or a Yorkshire 11. Why devolution? Deal and and and and and through interviews that I did for the book that I wrote with Craig Perry on the political economy of the Northern Powerhouse. It emerged that local leaders within the Sheffield City Region, for example, were told that they had to negotiate just with the centre and close debates and discussions with the other local authorities. At the Yorkshire wide level, if they wanted to get any sort of devolution, deal. So there was again a very different approach there to negotiations that yes, led to a devolution deal in the end for the Sheffield City region. Combined authority but one that was very problematic because, well, we know what happened and how long it took actually to get it over the line and also something that's actually that that that had a lot of strength attached. If they wanted a devolution deal, they had to cut off the links with the rest of the region, and then there was the West Yorkshire or the Leeds City region. Evolution indeed, that never happened because in in in 2015 because they took a completely different approach from Greater Manchester and Sheffield. Actually, they didn't accept the the conditions imposed by the centre by this, but they say, well this is the devolution deal that we want and it's a very very ambitious one. There were a lot of asks in their initial proposal. And the centre said no, this they probably saw that the local level was trying to exert too much agency in that in that case. So these are just three examples that show that sorry, just to conclude on on the on the West Yorkshire bit. Of course, in the end it did happen, but only what was it? A couple of years ago. But but yeah, I was talking about the example of what. What was the situation in 2015. So these three examples really show like how? The the the kind of the way the experience of negotiating with the centre can vary hugely across different localities and the result of this is a multi speed, uncoordinated process of devolution that actually creates a lot of. Creates new inequalities and at the end doesn't really address the existing ones, so the process is a doc and and not a symmetric because it it seems to respond or follow. Try to follow more the needs of the centre then and and also the political kind of needs of the centre than than than than those of the localities that should benefit from the evolution. And this type of approach to negotiation is all often place blind. Because it's more. Focused on political kind of issues rather than policy and and and and and place based. The second example that kind of shows the how this that we have an A multi speed and uncoordinated process of negotiations is the the one of metro mayors. I'm not gonna cover all the metro mayors, but let's take this is something that I covered in an article for the political culture that I that I published last year. If you look at the different styles of leadership that different metro mayors Have developed over time. They they reflect the problem with negotiating with the centre so. Metro mayors in theory should have provided new forms of political leadership that could have improved the connexion with the centre, but in practise this is not necessarily happening, and metro mayors can make use of vertical and horizontal relations in can in the way in which they use their leadership and and in the way in which they engage with. Central government, but different metro mayors have used this. This type of of relations in different ways and if you took at the two if we if we look at the two extreme examples, Andy Burnham and Ben Houchen, we see that for example, and. Burnham, despite the fact that he is leading the Greater Manchester Combined Authority that have very good links with the centre at the beginning, as the role of the mayor has become more politicised. He has actually adopted a more kind of adversarial sort of relationship and approach to the centre, and we've seen that during the COVID pandemic and and and and the the various kind of. Rouse that he had with with the Prime Minister back then. And in that, in that sphere of vertical and horizontal relations, Andy Burnham is focused more on the horizontal ones, so he's kind of try to harness more relationship at the local level while keeping a kind of a a a a kind of. A more problematic perhaps link with the centre in recent times. He has opened up more, for example in. We've seen this in in, in, in, in in the various kind of the the the most recent rounds of funding with Manchester has been benefited from them, but it it was clear that there was was like a political dimension to it. So being a strong Labour metro mayor meant that the relationship with the centre. They're more problematic for a while, and then on the other side of the spectrum you got Ben Houchen, who of course leads a combined authority that was very important for the levelling up. Brenda and so the negotiations with the centre were much easier for him. It was much easier for him to get access to certain type of resources as compared to some other of of his of his colleagues and other mayors that came from a different that had a different, have a different political persuasion, and also where we are. Creating in areas that were not so central, perhaps to the levelling up agenda and so again this type of approach creates binaries and does not really address the key issue of creating better Connexions between the centre and local. You have types of negotiations between the Centre and metro mayors that are again very much disconnected and and do not address the key. The key issue? A final point, if we take all of this and and we try to put it in a comparative perspective, this shows that. You know to to be effective negotiations between the centre and localities in a truly devolved. System really need to be based on a relationship of equals. This is something that that Janice was touching upon earlier on and this is not the case of course, within within the Westminster module and the British political system so that there is a need to create like a relationship of equals or at least a recognition of the importance of the local and regional level. And some degree of trust on behalf of the centre towards the local and sub and sub subnational level. The fact that there is a a written constitution, of course is a big issue here and and and is what it is. What allows the centre to take the kind of top down approach? And this is clearly reflected in in the type of negotiations that we see between the centre and and the local level. I had a couple of points. On how this all links on to the Westminster model, but I think I'm running out of time John, and am I not so I might bring them back in the discussion. I can't hear you John, sorry.Imagine I've just asked you a question about how this links to the Westminster, so you can segue into our Q&A section.OK, so I guess this all brings back to the way in which reform of of of the subnational level works within the the Westminster model, because previous and current approach to reform have been. Kind of a sort of an exercise of what Professor James Mitchell called Constitutional Plumbing, so attempts at trying to graft reform onto the existing W Westminster model, but without actually trying to fix the structure in the 1st place. So you got a lot of sticking. Plasters on a very kind of old plumbing structure and the more. You keep putting. Plaster the more that becomes unstable and yes he continues to work but not is not is not particularly efficient. And so if we look at at the kind of effect of this in the long term of this kind of short term fixes and and sticking plaster, that means the system has become more unstable, not least, and even more so in the context of the current kind of interaction of crisis from Brexit, Brexit to COVID, and the current cost of living. Uh, crisis. And the idea that the Westminster model creates a strong centre. I think this links to what's Patrick was saying earlier on. But Patrick correct me if I'm wrong. Is also showing that showing that the centre is trying to do too much is trying to exert too much power and it's and it's trying to show that it is trying to. Show its strength, but actually this continuous attempt at trying to dominate from the top down the the the subnational level is actually it. It actually kinds of betrays some form of weakness on the part of the centre. Or the centres inability to act as a kind of a strategic steward or place and coordinate the kind of complex, challenging and delivering of a a kind of clear policy strategy for complex policy agenda such as devolution and levelling up in a sustainable way. So in other words, in my view this approach. Foregrounds failings of that kind of paternalistic approach whereby central government treats local government bodies as if they were children, were wrongly assuming that vital official know the needs and individual of individual local areas better than local. Leaders and so there is this means if we look at how to address this issue, I think this means that there is a need to redesign central local relations in a way that is based on on a new kind of hierarchy that frees up the centre from kind of the the approach to operational control. And reorientated towards the communication and collaboration around concrete challenges. So in other words, the centre that engages includes a more consistent relationship, communications and shared responsibility with all the levels of subnational governance. A centre that does not sit above localities, but works collaboratively with with them in insurance. So that's that's.Great thank you. Thank you very much and thanks to all our panellists that's been absolute Tour de force between you. I mean, not a comprehensive list, but just things I've jotted down. We have problems. Our political, political culture and our party politics culture. We have issues about the constitutional structures of local government at the centre. We've got issues of capacity and competence at the centre, the culture of Whitehall, its structure and its accountability. And then we have all of the consequences of those things for. Which we've just ended up on on the way that requires people to behave at local level. I'm just gonna start throw in one question and and to the panel. If you don't. If you wanna pass on it, do pass on it if, but if you'd like to comment, do and just wave your hands and I'll take you. Can we just start by trying to separate out artificially in our minds the extent to which we have a problem of the culture of party politics and the way party politics works and the culture and structure of Whitehall itself? If we if we as. A thought experiment imagined a benign 2 year period. Of time ahead where central government politicians said look, we want to devolve power across England, but we're going to leave it to you. The civil service to design structures that work. How much devolution would we actually get? Or is the problem really that politicians and whites will civil servants reinforce each other in their desire essentially to to keep control and micromanage from the centre? Does anybody want to have? A shot at at that. No, nobody wants Janice. You're muted, Janice.Sorry it's a bit more fundamental than than this I think, and I think it's it goes back to thinking about the Constitution, and I think no matter what you do in the short term, which I you know for thinking about a period of political administration five years or whatever, it can always be undone. By the next administration and whilst all of our sub national institutions, democratic institutions are creatures of Parliament. Then there is always a sense that in Whitehall they can always be changed. I mean, I suspect people in Whitehall didn't think necessarily the devolved administrations would develop as they did, and it this might be another, you know, short term this. Kind of approach. So I do think that we really got to bite the bullet and think about something much more fundamental. To make this work. And I I don't. I think anything else is is going to be short term and isn't necessarily going to be the kind of reform that we all acknowledge is required. I think it to to really change this relationship.Yeah Diane, you thank you Diane. You talked about the incoherence under the Johnson administration, but the obvious question that came into my mind was even even if you had some particular ministers at that time, why was it Whitehall couldn't produce a series of documents that at least cross cross referenced to each other coherently that? Wouldn't appear to have been something would have undermined the Boris Boris Johnson administration.Well, I was going to respond to your question. That's saying by saying you couldn't just fix one of them either. Westminster politics or Whitehall? Because even if you imagined a a benign, competent white hall that was able to do that, joining up, which evidently does not happen across departmental lines, I think for reasons of ministerial accountability, perhaps. But even if you had that, you wouldn't solve the. Information problem and you cannot. You cannot fix everything around the whole of the country without that input of local information and the power to respond to.OK, can I follow that one up then with one of the questions that's come in, which is, I think possibly a reference to the Brown report for the Labour Party. But other discussions which there should be some sort of body that represents England's subnational government at the centre of the language of nations and regions, and the idea that. Labour could somehow be the that England can be represented through its regions. Is needed. Do people feel that that's a. A good way forward, Ariana.Yeah, I think that's an excellent question and I think that again, if we look at this issue in comparative perspective, we we see that it is a fundamental problem that that characterises how central local relations work in in the UK, and in particular in England. If you look at countries where there is. Well, of course if there is a federal fully fledged federal system, there is a a system of official forums that. Almost like create or force that connexion between the central subnational levels, but even in more kind of hybrid or regionalized systems like Spain or Italy for example, and having a representation for localities and regions at the centre is essential to improve those relationship, and this is something. For example, the the apps I Local Government Commission report that was published last year recommended the creation of some kind of official forums. And of course there is an open debate as to how you do it and whether it should be regional representation or local level representation, but having some kind of official forums where. There there where there can be a productive dialogue between subnational government governance institutions and central government is essential to improve, improve things, and in countries like Italy for example, you got like. Permanent commissions committees that actually represent local government. There there is one that represent local government. There is one represent mayors and there is one that represents regions. They are not, you know they're all in place and they, and the fact that they're all in place means that they must, that they're that there has to be some form of communication. And even though the centre ultimately maintain the the ability to make decisions if they want to, having a written constitutions and these official forums means that the centre. Can not impose things on the local level in the way in which it does in the UK. So in my view, yes there would be a good a a good things to to to do and to achieve going forward. But of course there is a problem of institutional design. How do you do it and what levels you represent? That's an open. Discussion on that.It's just just to pick up that point and to join it to. Janice's earlier comment. Can that work without local government having some sort of constitutional? Reality rather than simply being the centre. Deciding to consult in a particular way.Of course, there's another fundamental question. There must be some kind of official recognition of the role that local government and other subnational governance institution play, I think, because otherwise the the centre still has it. It's still too much kind of at the wings of the government of the day to decide whether they want to have a positive relationship and engage with these forums. Or not, whether if if these forums are kind of entrenched in a written constitution, they have to they. They don't have a choice, you.Yeah I do. I do remember in the early years of the Labour government going to the meetings of the nominated regional assemblies that were sort of an early attempt to establish some sort of forum for local government. I have to say I'm not sure they had a great deal of purchase on any of the policies that the central government carried out. Could I go to Patrick? Pick up one point and one question. There's a question in from Jeff Glover. I think about electoral reform. Patrick, you you were talking both about two things. I think one was the lack of bipartisanship in the approach to central local relations and the second was the fact that. There has to be a dialogue between central and local in a way that doesn't exist at the moment. I mean does is. Electoral reform the a key or one of the keys to changing both the way the centre operates and understanding that the government has to work with Andy Burnham and Andy St and. There always will be. People of different parties, so is that the key to changing political culture or does? It come from somewhere else.Yeah, it's a great question. I think inevitably it's a combination of trying to shift the culture as well as trying to alter the hardwiring of how the state functions. And I think you have to try to do both of those. Those in a sense, I mean, electoral reform is an institutional reform, but its promise is arguably greatest in terms of its capacity to change the political culture in terms of trying to engender a more pluralist approach. The idea of political parties talking to one another having to have dialogue having to negotiate over electoral programmes and manifestos, I think. All of these attributes, which of course would depend on the type of electoral reform that you did. I mean, as a. You know very well John. It would depend a lot on the type of of of electoral system that you ended up adopting, but but that point notwithstanding, can you shift the culture? But my point is that that's necessary, but not sufficient, because it comes down to the hardwiring of how the state operates and. A lot of this reflects issues of what academics call path dependency. You know, hardwiring that has accrued over many decades, habits of thought, ways of acting. And selection of appropriate governance tools which often reflects, as I say, you know, long standing notions of how the state should operate, particularly in terms of how civil servants and ministers think about how to implement policies. So I think you'd have to address both of those, and I think back to your earlier question. You could have a a more benign administration. You could have ministers that think much more imaginatively about English devolution, but if they're operating in a system that still has this hard wiring in. Then I think it's unlikely that success will be will be long lived, so I I think we do have to address the fundamental questions. One thing I just add very quickly John is that on the fundamental issues, I think it also does come down to relationships between ministers and civil servants. I mean Janice touched on this very important point about permanent secretaries and accountability. Public spending, I think it also reflects how ministers and civil servants work together. The reciprocal bargain that underpins their relationship and the way in which that reciprocal bargain in itself, I think, contributes towards. An impetus or a tendency towards centralisation? I think there are there are other things I could say about that, but I think it's another reflection of this fundamental hardwiring in terms of how the the state operates.Yeah, thank you. I think that that leads us to a question that Kevin Lloyd's put in. It's it's essentially is can you. Can you change the way in which the accountability that Janice. Mentioned actually work, so there's lesser focus I. I think he's suggesting on holding to people account after the event and and and a different way of overseeing whether public funds have been used effectively, which takes some of the pressure off this the the. The the current drive that makes permanent secretaries directly accountable for every penny that's spent, whether that's spent locally or nationally, is it. Is it conceivable we could bring in a different system of of accountability for public funds? Janice so Diane, do you have thoughts on? That Diane.I'll kick us. Off, not by answering your question directly, John, but by saying that the accountability that we have is a bit of a. Fuss at The moment. I mean the Treasury has departmental negotiation sets budgets. These are cascaded down and to local government as well. But without evaluation, we don't know whether we're getting value for money or not. At the moment I'm working on a project with Dave Richards and Sam Warner at Manchester and Martin Smith at Sheffield looking at public spending control from the. And that that accountability just isn't followed through. So if you're looking at a A spending line such as special educational needs in schools or prisons, which we are doing, it's it's not possible to account for the money anyway. So the idea that the kind of accountability structures we have are working well is is a myth.Thank you, can I follow that up? If you looked at this in closely, to what extent is what we're really talking about the problem that there is no national government of England in the sense of a governmental structure that focuses on England, which has the effect that the Treasury micromanages departments quite separately from each other, and. And less comprehensive spending reviews have changed. There's really little cross departmental discussion in a comprehensive spending review. It's a bilateral negotiation with the Treasury, so is some of this just aside for for the for the overbearing micromanagement of treasury of the of the Treasury within the system of government.I think that's part of it, but I'm also arguing that the micromanagement isn't it's micro, but it's not managing.OK yeah, no. So there's an there. The Treasury has an illusion that it is controlling public money by the way it operates, but it isn't.It isn't so without being able to monitor across private and public prisons or different types of schools, what the budget lines are and evaluating whether they're effective in delivering good special educational needs or the outcomes you want from criminal justice. It's not, it's not delivering, it's not doing any.Thank you, Janice. Did you want to? Come up, follow up on that.Yes, I think there's another issue. For example, in France they actually have a subsidiarity Commission where they determine which function of the state is best conducted by which level of the state. And when. We think about how new legislation Or new services are implemented in England, then it's rather hazard in my experience as to where they get located. Nobody really thinks of that, and there's no real discussion. About that, so that that's one thing that might might be helpful. The second thing is that, for example, in Scotland, then Scotland has a single civil service, and they've abolished the departmental ties. If you like within Scotland, and it said that that operates more effectively, so I I just wonder, you know if. If these things they need a much more fundamental look and and as as as Diane has said, you know this, this kind of issue about. The micromanaging of of budgets. I mean, we've known for some time, probably since at. Least the early. 90s that that hasn't worked but nothing. Nothing is going to change because I think it's something that permanent secretaries are gonna hang on to, you know, for forever, just because that is in a sense their whole raison d'etre for everything. That they do. And I think that that is an issue that never gets questioned really.OK, thank you. Could I follow the question to Arianna about local capacity so that we've had you know the the the the capacity of the centre to do this doesn't come out very well from what we've heard in the last hour, but there has clearly been a massive stripping out of capacity in local government. Over the past ten years, in particular, and. Is there a problem? And now in doing devolution successfully at a time when the capacity of local government to take on additional responsibilities, whether in the area set out in the levelling up, White Paper or the OR the Brown report or others it is is quite demanding, and if so, how? How in practise do you overcome that problem and and will the centre tend to use the the very fact that it's weakened localities as a reason not to do devolution?I think that's the point, isn't it that this is is exactly what happened. The centre keeps saying, well, the local level doesn't have enough capacity to do devolution well, so we impose it from the top down in the way we want it to do, and we do it. In a piece. Meal way, but there has been certainly a reduced capacity at the local level, but we need to. You know who's who's responsible for that? Because it is like the the the kind of austerity of course has played a a huge role in this process of reducing the capacity of the local level. But this is something that was initiated by the centre itself, so I guess it goes back to the issue of having a centre that is not effective. In kind of kind of putting forwards initiatives that actually end up weakening, they will struck the other structures of governance that operate around. So there is an issue of capacity at the local level, but it's also true that despite all the challenges of the past decade, the local level has also demonstrated a huge level of resilience as well. So I'm not saying that all places would be able like not all places. To to to to. To put it simply, not all places. The Greater Manchester. Not all places can can take a huge package of devolution and make it work straight away because they don't have the same history of institutional cooperation across councils and things like that. There are places that would struggle more to kind of put into practise and develop a good process of a good devolution. Still, but this doesn't mean that the that these places too shouldn't be given the opportunity to do it. So in a piece of work that we did when I was at IPPR NA while. Back with Marcus. We actually argue that the way forward, the way to balance this kind of question about whether well we want devolution, but the local level might not be able to deliver properly on that is to embrace the principle of subsidiarity going back to what Janice was saying earlier. Brown and making sure that the centre is prepared to let go of power, but also trust the local level and allows different areas to take on devolution deals at their own pace in the way in which, in the way that works for them. So without imposing a module or a structure or for for a specific devolution deal on areas. But actually having local areas to say, well, we may. We may start from a maybe a small devolution deal that help us to build institutions. Capacity and collaboration across councils and then in a number of years we will get to a more ambitious one, so some areas might want to operate in that way. Other areas might be able and and and capable to take on a more ambitious deal straight away and work that way, so that would be a really asymmetric kind of approach to do. Devolution deals in England. As opposed to the adhoc one that we have now, where is it? Is the centre that decides who can get devolution deals and on what terms and conditions?Thank you, the Brown report seems to suggest. Best that rather than just relocating government departments to Darlington. Or or or. Or whatever that Whitehall civil servants should be moved out progressively, but in quite large numbers to strengthen local capacity. I just wondered is is that a? Is that actually a realistic strategy? Or is it better for to allow local levels to recruit? I mean I can see with the small people it's really how it makes it. Easier to handle, but. Whether the owners shouldn't be on local areas and and regions to recruit the people that they want with the skill sets that they need. I said some.I don't I. Don't think it's a capacity problem so much as a resources problem, and if local authorities have the resources they can hire good people and there are lots of excellent officers in local authorities around England. I I would actually like to see more central civil servants spend part of their career outside of outside of Whitehall. But one could do that through promotion criteria. You know you're much more likely to make it per SEC if you've had. 7 or 10 years not in sitting in a central department.Yeah indeed indeed. Thank you John Townsend. But a an interesting one which is. Is that one of the things you could share about the the shared prosperity fund? Is that it hasn't had to follow European Union rules and he asked whether there are Brexit benefits that could help us do differently do things differently. If the state is free from EU rules to do devolution better, that's quite an interesting one, which I haven't. I haven't heard. Posed recently, but I think it's an interesting one. So Diane, you're shaking your head, so I'm gonna. Bring you in first.Oh no, I there was always much more flexibility under state aid than was pretend. Ended State aid was it's an excuse for not spending, so the rules themselves were not the constraint on that. The kind that the kind of investment in particular skills or industries.Right, OK, any other thoughts Janice yeah.Yeah, well I'm I was going to say actually I thought that this ad hoc package that we had yesterday was a mopping up of the end of the EU money and that these are projects to be done. You know, by using that money that we still have until the end of 25, is it 2025? So I rather took the different view and I think you know to. Come back to the. The crux of the question. Actually sub national government had huge amount of protection under the EU Treaties. Where it was in enshrined and it had to be done and and you know we would would have had much more devolution in England had we stayed in the EU then coming out. So actually it's had the reverse effect. It's actually weakened. Devolution and promoted the opportunities for the centre to take more control of this this micro control. Then actually, if we'd stayed in the. For you so I, I think I'd rather think the other way around.I'm just seeing I'm about to what Janice has said. If that's OK, John, I think you won't be surprised. To know that there's a. Degree of scepticism on the panel about whether Brexit has led to such benefits. I I do think that when one looks across the board, the general pattern since Brexit, since the process began in 2016. You know, has been one or further. Centralisation in in many different areas of public policy and I think. I think you know the the the difficulty here is that Britain's departure from the European Union has meant that the the fundamental principle of the new governance around subsidiarity has been weakened in all sorts of areas. And you know, I think I think that has lots of important implications that we'll have to address. Because, as I say, since Brexit, I think the surreptitious recentralisation both in England but also from Scotland. In Northern Ireland, is is a really serious governance problem that we will have to grapple with in the future.Yeah, thank you.Can I just can I just put points on this because I think it's an interesting point. I agree. I agree with what has been said so far and in principle let's say that in theory if we look at the take that control slogan that could have been promising.Alright please yeah.But the problem is that yeah, we've taken back control, but we've given more. We there is now more. So at the centre and and no, it has not been kind of passed down to localities and then. Is the limit, so there was an opportunity, but it has not been. If there was an opportunity that has not been taken on board.Great, well thank you very much. I'm going to start drawing us towards a close now so I'm going to go around the panel and ask people to make any final reflections.I think 1.Of the things that's really striking, here is a lot of overlap and commonality of analysis, but also the the challenge of making a whole series of changes in a reasonably coordinated and effective and effective way, but also a very strong message that. Governments are simply not going to be able to deliver the objectives they have for public policy if they continue to govern in this way, and nor are governments going to be able to make the best use of public money. So I'm going to go through each of the panellists and ask them to to to say. A few words. I'll go in reverse. In reverse order, if I may. But I also and I did give some notice of this about an hour ago. I'd like each person. On the panel, just to say. Having having said you can't just change one thing and make it all work, but nonetheless, if there was one thing you wanted to change in the way in which the centre operates, what would it? What would it be? So closing thoughts from each of you and and and your one area of change Ariana.I think I'll I'll say really embrace the principle of subsidiarity in a way that is not politically driven and just something that you write on political manifestos. But in a way they're really kind of. Opens up to localities. Trusts local government and gives different areas the possibility to have a devolution deal at their own pace so that this becomes a policy that can benefit all people and places and not just a few selected ones.Thank you Janice.I would endorse that, of course, but I think something we haven't mentioned today, but I think maybe reform of the House of Lords to become a a second Chamber of nations and places in some way. And if we can't get reform of the Constitution, this would be the next best thing, I think, to to achieve the change.Thank you, Diane.I'm very troubled by the lack of long termism at a time when we're going through major technological transformations. Net 0. Transformation, and the decisions that get taken now will affect people's living standards in this country for a very long time to come. So I would like to see devolution by function I I guess, and perhaps education to start with and we've fragmented our education system a different types of schooling. Let's try it a different way and and and devolve at least post 16 education.Thank you, thank you Patrick.And just one final reflection. And then I'll try to answer your question John, just my my final reflection about your question on local capacity is that it is undoubtedly the case that in the last decade local capacity has been significantly weakened. But as others have said. That there is a lot of very talented people working in local authorities and combined authorities across England, and I think I would also add. What is very striking about really effective local authorities in England and also combined authorities is that they have a very intelligent approach to how to use power, which I think the centre of government could really learn. Wrong if you look at and I think Janice was reflecting on this in terms of the response to COVID, but the way in which local authorities seem to be able to work intelligently with a wide variety of partners. Whether it's elsewhere in the public sector, whether it's the private sector, where it's civil, whether it's civil society or the voluntary and community sector, I think that's something that the Centre and Whitehall could actually really learn from in terms of a. Much a much more mutual policy learning process and finally to your point about reform. My proposal, which is perhaps a little niche, but I think it's really important, is to think about having a joint profession, particularly a joint policy profession that would unite central government and local government so that there's much more transfusion in roles between people working at the centre and working at the local. Level, and I think that also includes building up analytical capacity. I think what Diane was saying earlier about evaluation is really important both at the centre and the local level we still lack. I think the means to properly evaluate and learn from policy initiatives. So if we could strengthen that within the wider frame of creating more of a harmonised policy profession across both local government devolved areas and central government nationally, I think that would go some way, at least to dealing with some of the capacity issues that have been flagged up during this discussion.Thank you, there's some really good and very practical ideas there. I think it's been a fantastic webinar. Thank you to all of the panel. All of the contributions will be worth rereading and rewatching. We'll post the the video in a week or so's time. The next webinar for the centre is.