The Politics of Brexitland

The Politics of Brexitland

Welcome to everybody who's joined us. I'm John Denham and I'm the director of the Center for English Identity and Politics at Southampton University. This webinar today is going to discuss this book Brexit land and we have the two authors of Brexit land with us today. Rob Ford, who's the professor of political science at Manchester University and his previous writing, includes revolt on the right about the. Rise of Ukip. And also Maria Soboleski, who's also a professor of political science at Manchester and her previous publications include the political integration of ethnic minorities in Britain. We're also joined by two politicians, Danny Krueger is the Conservative MP for devices. He has previously been amongst other things, speechwriter to David Cameron and political secretary to Boris Johnson, and founded the crime prevention charity. Only Connect. Stephen Kinnock has I'm pleased to say stepped in at late notice to take the place of Shabana mood who is unwell. Steven is the MP for Aberavon, which of course is in Wales not. In England but. Wales was also Brexit land and prevent. Perhaps it provides a different perspective. Perhaps most important, Stevenson has spoken and written about. Bridging the communitarian and cosmopolitan divide. So to set the scene, Rob and Maria, or Maria and Rob will share their analysis of the forces that have shaped what they call Brexit land. And also how these have interacted with politics to produce the events of recent years. I'll then ask Danny and Steven to respond. I hope that in the discussion we can not only understand the forces at. But also ask whether the divisions of recent years are now hard baked into our politics or whether there are ways, whether from left or right of bridging them just before we start, then uhm, most people are now sick of doing stuff on zoom, but just to go through the normal things, this is the webinar format so I can't bring participants in.But if you want to raise Questions, please do that under the Cure Day button and I'll try and draw on those questions for the discussion. There's also the usual chat function if you want to have a parallel discussion online. While the center, while the webinars taking place good, so let's get underway over to you first, Maria Thank you so.Much first of all, for having us and welcome to all who have taken another zoom meeting and attending today.So thank you very much and once more figures decided to say Brexit land is a story about identity, ethnic diversity and how these have. Shaped our politics. And we have called it Brexit land because there is an American book that describes the 1960s, a rise of an American divisive American, President Nixon. Of course, rather than Trump, and he has this amazing striking, powerful quote which we think.Applies today to British politics.As much as it did to the 1960s, politics in America, he says, I have written of the rise of two American identities, two groups of Americans staring at each other from behind the common divide, each equally convinced of its own righteousness. Each equally convinced that the all other group was divine, defined by its evil.And we think that.Discussions in British politics.Now about those issues of diversity about the issues of immigration and Europe.So have kind of that quality of divide over righteousness over moral right and moral wrong.And this is what makes those divides so powerful and those arguments so heated.So of course some visual examples are of of kind of most famous recent heated debates, and that kind of reflection of those moral arguments.Of course crush the saboteurs.Anyone who wants to overrule or even fiddle with the result of a referendum.Is called a saboteur.And and on the other side of the equation, the response of the supposedly liberal left is very well pictured here at the extreme, by the kind of welcome that Manchester our own city has offered the party conference the Tory party conference.Following the referendum, as you can see here in this picture, hang the Tories.Not only is it just aggressive words, but also actually there are some refugees of Tories hanging off of that bridge.So there is a lot of heat and a lot of disregard for the.The site arguments and their possible merits here and what we think has happened is that these two divides have been given a name and a flag to fly over themselves, and these groups are leave and remain of course, and this is what the referendum has done for those.Divides and for those politics.Of division, as you can see from this graph, the first two sets of columns are party party groups, so these are people who think they identify very much with the party that they have voted for partisans.This used to be our traditional political division, right?People who wear Tories and people.Who are labor?They may have not liked each other, etc. But these, as you can see, are not actually huge groups. About 20% of people who have voted for conservative would say that they feel like we refer to we if we talk about conservatives and they if we talk about other parties.And and we also see about 20% of people who have voted Conservative in 2015 felt that criticism of the party felt like a personal insult, right?And yes, this was slightly higher for labour, but again not a lot.So a minority of these voters felt a very strong attachment to the political parties.However, when you went into looking at how angry they were about the other side of a different referendum and how passionate they were about the other, the own side of the referendum, you can see the latter sets of columns, so they leave partisans really fair.Leave us are we?And the Remainers were the day, and they felt like it was a personal insult to them.If somebody criticised the league site and the same on the remain side, so these are very powerful.A much more powerful political identities than what we saw before with the political parties and Fast forward three years in 2019, we still saw that these identities were running high on emotion and here we have a.We have asked some.Voters, whether they felt the their own group, was intolerant or reasonable, and again about the opposite side and what we see here is that the levers perception, so that's the first set of columns here.Leave voters are all the levers said.Yes, leaders are.Very reasonable and not at all intolerant.And of course the Remainers were the other way around, so leavers felt Remainers were very intolerant and not at all reasonable.And again, in the second two sets of columns you see the exact inverse of this.On the remain side, so the Remainers.I really feel felt very little about leavers and the other way around so you can see that those two divides really are staring at each other with disdain over this division to leave, but a lot of our book is about where does it come from so we can see the referendum has given it all this heat.Partly because it created those names.And this sense of group identity for those people.But where do those people come from?Uhm, so we have divided really this book into three parts.The first one explains the long term demographic change that has created distinct groups in the electorate and these groups then take on a very different value system.Long term political change then.Contributes to this becoming a very potent political issue.Political issue that kind of explodes on our of our political agenda.But we also make a very strong point here, using the example of Scotland that none of this really was inevitable, and I think, especially when we talk about very long term causes of something, it is very easy to kind of think.Oh, it's because it was always meant to be, but we say with this same demographic.Change and with the same political change taking place.Actually we saw a very different result in Scotland, so we'll talk about what hope that might give us for trying to bridge these very powerful identity divides on this side.Of the border as well.So firstly, the demographic change, the first and one of the most important demographic changes that have taken place since the Second World War was a huge rise in education and this is at all levels, so all levels of education have been expanded, but one of the most.Powerful one is the fact that more people now go to university than ever before in history, and the fact that there are now fewer people who leave school with no qualification than people who go to university.Is extremely critical for our politics.Because education does change the kinds of political values that people hold dear, and so people who have experienced that education that university education do have different conception of what is right and wrong and what is good and bad.And then people who have left school without.Any qualification, however, what is it that they are differing on particularly well?They are differing on their concept of what is the place of diversity and the people who have gone to university often value diversity.I think that's a really good thing.Whereas people who are school leavers still don't agree with this point of view and.Of course this.Brings us to the second major demographic change after the Second World War, which was a huge rise of ethnic diversity and we have always.Britain always has had a presence of non white.Ethnic minorities because of its colonial history.But really after the Second World War, the rise in the numbers who were resident permanently in Britain.And of course since then.Uhm, native born ethnic minorities.Uhm, has gone.It has become a much, much different kind of kettle of fish, so we're talking about huge increases of ethnic diversity.And here we also show that there is a relationship between where these minorities concentrate.So there is a relationship between where there already was.Some ethnic diversity and those places are becoming even more diverse.Uhm, so how do these two demographic changes translate into our new voters?And here we present three ideal types of voters that have arisen as a result of this demographic change, the first group is identity conservatives.So these are these.Uhm, people who used to be the majority of our British electorate, so they are white people who have left school with no qualification in the 1950s.They were the vast majority of people who voted in this country and they have strong ethnocentric tendencies.And by this I mean again that they don't really value diversity they value.The security that comes from knowing that you are surrounded by people like you, but of course now they are.Are falling in terms of their their kind of numerical dominance in the society?Against that group as the second ideal type is the one that is growing.These are identity liberals.These are white people who have gone to university and therefore their social and political values have changed.They've become what we call conviction liberals.They value diversity.They have very strong anti prejudice norms.They want to actively oppose racism and.Other forms of intolerance that they perceive, and here we have another source of identity, liberals which is not to do with convictions about diversity.But it is to do with the necessities of everyday life.Ethnic minorities are impacted in terms of their everyday experiences by how welcoming the society is towards them and how prejudice people might be against them. And so they are in this kind of unstable temporary necessity coalition.              With conviction identity liberal. And what is happening to those attitudes that divide those two big groups of voters identity?Liberals and conservatives, either they have become more politically polarized.And here on the graph that doesn't include the 2016 new divisions of leave and remain, and we already showed that the.The party polarization on these issues has been going on since the late.1990s, so we see an increase of proportion of conservative voters that think the equal opportunities for ethnic minorities have gone too far, and the kind of the gap between conservatives and labour is growing, even though in that period actually the proportion of Labour voters who think.They have gone too far also temporarily increases, but since 2006 that proportion is also decreasing precipitously, so we can see an enormous gap in those attitudes and politics, and we know that has mapped on onto those new leave and remain identities as well.Right and I will now take over this story and bring it onto.So that's the demographic story I'm going to bring it onto the political story and then a little bit about the lessons we might take from Scotland.So here I'm going to skate over a number of long term political changes that we discuss at length in the book, all of which essentially Dr the same outcome.Which is an opening of the political market to new parties and new divisions.So after the 1997 election, and indeed after the 1994 election and Tony Blair's Labour leader, there was a convergence in both parties on traditional economic divides.The familiar New Labour story.There was also another convergence in that period about the parties, which is less discussed, which is there was a convergence in the kind of people who became MPs from both parties.So the share of Labour Party MP's who came from the kinds of white identity conservative backgrounds that we're talking about declined very sharply from actually the late 1980s onwards.Back in the 70s and the 80s there was a large contingent of MP's, for example, who had mining backgrounds in their new.Links by now.There are more MPs who who literally came to politics straight from being university lecturers than there are MPs who have any kind of background in any kind of manual laboring profession.So the nature of the Labour parliamentary party changed as well.The kinds of people people saw in politics change.Along with both.With those changes, the nature of campaigning changed and the.         There of expenditure that parties were spending in safe seats held by the opposite party decline, which meant that campaigns elect general election campaigns as a conversation between two competing parties ceased to be the local experience for ever larger shares of the electorate ever larger swathes of the country.But basically it wasn't a conversation.             It was a monologue they would hear from their incumbent MP, maybe.          Although even incumbent party spending declined in those seats, but they wouldn't hear very much at all from their opponent.         Probably in reaction to many of these changes, the share of voters who report no attachments to any political party at all has steadily risen.      There are other reasons for that as well, but this has contributed to it and after 2003 we have consistently been in a situation where more voters report no party attachment at all then report.             A strong attachment to any of the main parties, whereas for the 50 years before that at least the parts where we.             Data consistently, the majority of the electorate hasn't since been locked in to a tribal party.   The electoral market was becoming more open and many of these changes apply more strongly to identity conservatives.      They're more likely to live in the kind of safe seats where campaigning has declined.             They're more likely to have seen their group groups.        Representation, decline and they are more likely to be disaffected by the economic convergence of the main part of the convergence on economic ideology.   Now into this story steps the issue of immigration, which in the early 2000s rose up the agenda in a way that is historically unprecedented.          There have been spikes of concern over immigration all the way through post war British history, but the context that we had from 2003 to 2016 where immigration was an.                Ever present issue at the top of the political agenda for a very substantial part of the electorate is historically unprecedented. There was never before such a long period in which large shares of the electorate, again dominated by density conservative voters, consistently said, even during the depths of the financial crisis, that the issue they were most worried about, that they most wanted to see addressed by politics was immigration.             Then in the second-half of that period, that story of salience kicks off in about 2002 2003.      The story of party change kicks off later, and the reason it kicks off later is that partly is a legacy of political history which we talk about length in the book.      Look Powell, Thatcher, etc. The Conservatives had a very strongly established reputation with the electorate for immigration control. They that is the reputation then collapsed in roughly 2 years after the coalition began in 2010, and the reason for its collapse is very clear. The Conservative government, the Conservative Party.            In 2010, had pledged to bring immigration down net immigration down to the 10s of. Thousands that was an impossible pledge to deliver within the framework of a Britain that was in the EU and committed to some immigration into, for example, workplaces and into universities that was in its economic interests.          None of the policies pursued after 2010 could possibly, in any reasonable state of the world.    Have reduced immigration to the 10s of thousands and those involved with crafting those policies must have known this as a result.       What happened is that the the target was repeatedly.                Met every time there were new NR statistics.      They would once again show that the target had failed to be met, but rather than abandon the target, Cameron and Theresa May his home secretary repeatedly insisted the target was still the goal and that they would try again next time, and they would meet it again, knowing that the policy framework they had couldn't possibly deliver that.           And you know voters.    Notice this kind of thing so pretty quickly. Voters decided the Conservative Party were no longer a party that was serious about immigration control, and that very substantial chunk of the electorate that cared a lot consistently about immigration started to cast around for an alternative.   And that's what we see with this other. Line here other actually mainly means UKIP and we see a rise in UKIP support from round about the same point as the Conservatives reputation for immigration control collapses.                The other trend we see during this period, which was the trend that that Nigel Farage both contributed to and benefited from is for the first time.          British voters started to see.       Immigration control and EU membership. As two sides of the same coin, it is really important to remember that in the 1975 referendum there was a 0 correlation between voters views about immigration and their views about EEC membership. No relationship at all that continued to be the case for many years thereafter.             Then from 2004 onwards, that relationship steadily increased to the point where in the EU referendum year of 2016 you could more.               Unless it was more or less a one to one relationship, you could more or less guess what voters views of EU membership were going to be from their immigration attitudes, and vice versa.    And that was in part because for several years the government had failed to deliver on immigration control, and one widely discussed reason for that failure was freedom of movement.                Policies that were an essential and non-negotiable.          Feature of EU membership.        So that is a path dependent political narrative. You will have noticed that I've emphasized several political decision points in that the Conservatives decided to offer a 10s of thousands net migration pledge in 2010. They need not have done that. The Labour Party decided in 2004.     To not impose transitional controls on new EU Member States, they need not have done that.           The Conservatives decided to persist with the policy even when it was clear it couldn't be delivered.                They need not have done that.   And all of this then brings us to Scotland because it's something we really want to emphasize very heavily in our book.        You know, with political sociologists, we believe that that structural changes matter.               But we're also political scientists, and we believe political agency matters.             We don't think that politicians are powerless passengers in this process.    They are agents with the power to shape this.                Process and This is why Scotland is a really important case to consider, because in Scotland we see the same story of demographic change.    We see the same levels of ethnocentrism in the older white school Leaver electorate, but we. See a very.          Different narrative about identity and diversity mobilizing.            So a very different pattern of political.               Division, so here's just some evidence for the point that yes, indeed.       Ethnocentrism is as much it's as widespread in Scotland as it is in England.        The share of Scottish voters who say being born in Scotland is important to Scottish identity is.                In fact higher.    Than the share of English voters who feel likewise the share emphasizing ancestry is similar in both.  Countries the share of voters concerned about immigration is slightly lower in Scotland than it is in England, but there's still widespread.            The share expressing ethnocentrism in the sense of discomfort with a close relative marrying somebody Muslim is somewhat lower in Scotland than in England, but there are substantial numbers of people in both country expressing this view. So in both countries you have a large.     Wiser electorate with ethnic identities and views.          What you have then is 2 very different constitutional campaigns that focus on mobilizing voters in two very different ways in the Scottish Independence campaign.     What we see is mobilization of both sides of the identity politics divide, so the core identity conservative electorate.        Of Whitelow qualification basis was slightly more pro.               Independence than the identity Liberal electorate of graduates and ethnic minorities after the referendum campaign, the share of voters in favor of independence in both groups grew at the same rate.   This was essentially a big tent campaign that managed to bring both sides together, whereas in the EU referendum what you get is.       It's a, it's a roughly 20 percentage.           Point lies and the EU referendum.            What you get is mobilization entirely on one side.         The share of voters in the ethnocentric group who wants to leave the EU increased very sharply the share of voters in the identity Liberal Group who wants to leave the EU rose?          Not at all.     So on the one hand, a unifying campaign, on the other hand, a polarizing campaign.          Very different campaigns and therefore very different political aftermaths. And, you know, we can get into the details of why those campaigns were different and how they work differently in in Q&A. Perhaps the point we just want to emphasize is that what this shows is that the decisions that politicians make.  In these kinds of campaigns have real and lasting consequences, and that of course applies to the situation we are in now and the decisions that are made going forward.              So right now we are in a situation where we have two British identities, two groups of Britons borrowing from Palestine who are staring at each other from behind the common divide, each equally convinced of its each of its own right.      Business each equally convinced that the other side was defined by its evil.           That is the starting point we have to work with where we go from here is up to people such as Stephen and Danny in terms of negotiating the path.      Forward so rather than getting into the dilemmas that they face, I think I might just hand over to them to offer their thoughts on how to manage this kind of situation politically.             And there's just a quick. Plug for the book.      Thank you very much indeed, both of you.            That's excellent and I think that is a it.     The presentation so good that is not a reason not to read the book.  There's a reason to read the book and look at the the article in more detail.     I'm going to turn now to.              Danny and then to Steven to give us their reflections and what they've heard.        Perhaps if they want to, whether this feels like the world they've been living in for the last 10 years, and whatever else they want to say about the challenges ahead, Danny, can I?       Come to you first please.                Thank you John and very good to be with.             You all.                  Absolutely fascinating presentation and and and builds on on previous work by by you guys on the phenom. None of the uh, of this sort of.    Right of centre populism that has sort of defined our times and in a sense I'm a beneficiary of as well as the new MP elected on the, you know the Brexit wave in 2019 and I I recognize your description very very well. Interesting point about the convergence of type of MP's though I recognize that.       As well, and I think there's something peculiar about the way that.      Uh, so many of us, you know, come from you know, privileged backgrounds across left and right.                And yet you know now we are in a position where the divide even within that sort of quite.    Frankly, similar sort of social demographic has it got very very vicious and, uh, you know it was.            It was particularly bitter and I think, but I think politics was strangely more benign.              In the old days when you had great diversity among politicians, and I mean I, I sat in watching the House of Commons in the in the end of the last Parliament. And you know Steven was.                Sitting in in in there dealing with it.          All you know we we we really really got to the bottom of the barrel.                I think in terms of conduct and style and tone.    At that time, and in a sense, the 2019 election, I think was cathartic and obviously very dismaying to.            To our opponents, but I you know, I, I feel that the sort of conduct and tone of politics has marginally improved, even though the divisions remain, and obviously we've got much, you know, very, very profound ones.               Now, over the conduct of government, but I I, I hope that we are restoring something of the civility of politics at the moment.           But we.                 But but all of that is totally superficial to these.   Much more profound demographic and cultural and electoral changes that have been described and that need to be addressed.   So let me quickly say where I I, I agree.   And where I think we're moving forward, I mean.                The story of kind of euro skepticism in this country has tried very much with my party over the years.                Obviously we know about the long history of pro European conservatism and the role of zonal leaders right up to Margaret Thatcher in terms of deepening the the, the European Community and the in the EU.              But the but what appeared to be a slow diminishment of national sovereignty, and also a cultural estrangement between the UK and the EU, as as the EU itself.   Uh became unmoored from its own origins and Christian democracy and became more of an and you know, particularly anti American, but also some more kind of anti nation, anti national political force and assumed the pretensions to statehood in its own right.               Uh so so conservative trying with euroskepticism on the grounds that it it it.            It was a.                                It was essentially an anti national.             And that is obviously fed much it fed into the sort of political earthquakes we've seen, but there's another dimension to which conservatives, I feel have have been.         The at odds with this tide and if only now and not completely I.  Have to stay. Getting with the programmers that we're catching up with where our voters are and and this is the the the adoption of economic mobility that we've been primarily responsible for the last 40 years.            But that was enthusiastically embraced by the Blair and Brown government as well.    Which from the the 1970s late 1970s onwards basically assumed that capital and labor were a set were essentially mobile forces that could meet each other in a frictionless way through the interplay of of the free market. And so people, you know, errors D industrialized.      A unwanted labor would get on its bike and move to where the jobs were, and conversely capital would flow into the places where.    Land and labor were cheap and it was assumed that there would be a natural rebalancing of the economy in the same way that industrialization itself had happened 100 years earlier.     Labor and capital finding each other quite naturally, with a bit of prompting from from the state, but primarily independently.  Of course it didn't work like that.   Labor was, you know, we found that place.           As a sticky people don't get on their bike and move, even if they're compelling economic reasons to do so.     Actually, they've got social and cultural associations and infinities which keep them to the places that they're from.            And my party has been very bad at.         Honoring that impulse.               Uh, which is an honorable 1.       In my.                   View and we had the idea that we should.            You know, government should be spatially neutral.   I think as the phrase, uh, you know, shouldn't be thinking it shouldn't be picking winners among places and shouldn't be trying to intervene in any kind of regional sense through any kind of industrial strategy that is now changing and we're recognizing the absolute centrality of.           Place and people identification with the part of the country that they're from, and not assuming that social mobility necessarily means labor, mobility, or geographic mobility.  That should be possible to do better than your parents did in the place that you're from, and that is that.       That should be our mission.         As much as anything.      So these two principles of loss of nation and economic mobility have combined in the as we've been hearing in this great upheaval.        And of course it found its most extreme expression as it were, or its most pointed expression in arguments over ethnic diversity and immigration.      Uh, because you know the apparent disrespect for the nation among our rulers and this doctrine of economic mobility.          People can move where they like, including from abroad into this country, uh?    Words are deeply offensive to the uh.          To to the public mind.    And I recognize and respect that sensitive acts of umbrage.                And and that is what we need to respond to.       So if that's why free movement was such a touchstone issue, I think throughout the Brexit debates.      So what do we do?          I mean, this is where you know. I think there is real common cause to be made and interested to hear Stevens view on this. I mean I, I always I said this in my maiden speech. A year ago or so, you know, I interpreted Brexit as a as a as a response to the call for of home people want to.                Feel like they have a say in and some control over the place that is theirs and we need to honor that and work with it.  And I think it's a fairly straightforward commitment that we need to make as as a political class.  To strengthening the associations that give the individual their sense of home in their sense of.         Safety, belonging and and freedom and and those associations are quite simply the family, the community and the nation and. But those those might have uncomfortable undertones for what we've what.           What Robin Rear described as our conviction.                Liberals they hear the distant cry of.        Unpleasant politics in in those, but they should. They shouldn't. And or rather we should ensure that they're wrong about that.            And you know there is nothing wrong with families, communities and nations, and we need to strengthen those associations.              And I think going back to the point about ethnic diversity and the role that is played in our politics, there is the common ground.      You know these principles.           Or one in which large numbers of people, meth minorities, immigrant communities totally resonate with and on a political basis.        We should.         Frankly Tories should be getting gaining vote.     In those communities, on the grounds of our appeal to family, community, and nation in a way that you know we don't enough, we do a bit, and Brett the Brexit campaign did, of course.             So I think there is a route to the unity that lies through social conservatism and that is I think our challenge and I my party has a great deal to do and frankly to repent of in its in its responsibility.           For our upheavals and for the fact that you know so many people have been left behind and so many places have been left behind.    And we need to fix up as well.    I hope we are under this government.     And and I hope that for their part, those on the left will recognize that the the call of family, community, and nation are good ones.  And if we can find common cause there, we can bring our country together.                Thanks, John.     Danny, thank you that that's.      Excellent and that and several issues there that we will follow up.         I'm I'm sure in the discussion, but straight over to Steven.             Well, thank you very much gentlemen and thanks so much to Maria and and Robin and Danny for setting the stage in such a compelling way and so much of of what's in the Brexit land book just resonates so strongly with me.              This is obviously my opportunity to.         I love my book, which is spirit of Britain, purpose of Labor, which which is about building a whole nation.            Politics to reunite our divided country. And I wrote this book along with a colleague of mine in 2018 and.    I think certainly some of the terminology that that that that Robin Maria use is different to mine, but I think the the thrust of what we're saying is exactly the same in in our book.              We, in essence said that the the old political divides of of of class and if you like political ideology were being replaced with.     A divides around values which were driven, in particular by education, place and age, and we called the two tries.     It's the cosmopolitans and the communitarians, and I think there's some overlap there with the sort of conviction liberals and the identity conservatives that Robin Maria talk about and, and I mean the the the premise at the.            Heart of the book.           Is it's very unhealthy for a democracy to be divided along these lines? Because you can end up giving rise to political parties that can create the sort of ethno nationalism which can be extremely divisive and damaging and can actually lead to.             I think fundamentally threats to democracy, which is the.          Kind of thing.     That I think we've tragically seen in the United States.     We also see it in places like Russia, and you know, you see the kind of rise of authoritarian nationalism all around the world, so.            The premise of. Of Spirit of Britain.           Purpose of Labor is that we we're we're actually in a dangerous place.              If we we don't get this right, we can end up with these divides.   Feeding something very very toxic for our politics.       Uhm, the question therefore is you know, I think we we have common cause MPs like Danny and myself, we we we understand that threat and we want to resolve it. They where where.         I think we probably differ to some extent is on how to get.   There, and that's where we need to have that healthy political debate around that I.    I think you know, my thinking is shaped very much by being the MP for Aberavon.             And doing that, you know the way that MP's do, straddling between two very very different. Parts of our.       Lives and and you know the community that I represent in abrahamz is 1,000,000 miles away from the West Coast.   It's a.                     Bubble and it is a fundamentally communitarian constituency, and I think that whatever your background is, an MP personally coming into politics, you are massively shaped by the constituency that you represent and the communities that you represent there, and there's absolutely no doubt that the people in my constituency have felt that for decades.  Their concerns were being ignored. Their anxieties were being glossed over and that they voted in my constituency, voted 56% for Brexit in 2016.   So you know, we we as a Labour Party, we ignore those communitarian voices at our peril.                And I think the the.         The the the.       Key for us is to understand where those divides are between the communitarians and the cosmopolitans, and to recognize.            Is that our party had swung too far in One Direction? Certainly by I think about 2005.  We had course the very well known speech that Tony Blair gave to lead party conference in which he said, you know, we shouldn't question globalization.        Questioning globalization is like questioning whether the autumn follows.             But in fact you know the role of government is to harness globalization and to make globalization work for working people, but to also understand the deep concerns and anxieties, social, cultural and economic that are caused by globalization. Just as Danny said in terms of that unfair.                Tattered movement of capital and labor and what that the impact that has on communitarian communities. So you know, we, we've got to recognize that the the impact as well as I think Rob mentioned of the 2004 decision to go ahead with with.        A free movement of labour in in the United Kingdom, way ahead of any other member.  State of the European Union apart from Sweden.         I think that did that and and these things have a knock on effect, so you know, just as Danny said, the Conservative Party's got certain truths it needs to live to recognize and acknowledge. We do too.             So you know why does the Labour Party need to do far more to reconnect with its communitarian heartlands?        Uhm, I think it's not only our moral duty, these are the people that the Labour Party was founded to represent.          These are the people who are most exposed to the winds of change and to the.  The impacts of globalization and that is what a Labour government is there to do to harness the the, to to to be almost a protective shield in the in terms of the winds of change and the other is it's the only way we're going to win an election. I mean the as we wrote in 2018.              See if Labour thinks it can count on on winning back.       The Conservative remain vote in a future general election.    Forget about it. It's not going to happen and and we saw that happen in 2019. And and you know it it our our. Our position on Brexit and on the referendum on it.        Is it's no.                                Secret though I I didn't. I didn't support the the second referendum policy.           I did support a very.                What I would call smart and balanced Brexit, where we retained a maximum access to the market, which is the the the the single biggest export market for our country.       And I I I've come on to that in a second, that's I think where we've got to find this way of marrying together pragmatist.            And about how the world actually works in terms of of the economy and prosperity with the need to absolutely anchor with our policies in in place and nation.                And doing what is right for our communities.      So I think where that takes us to is a kind of a question about what are the overall messages and the narrative that that the Labour Party needs to adopt and push forward.      And then I've got a few ideas around some.  Of the big.           Kind of shifts that we we need to be.       Making I think.  We need to be a party which is much more. Optimistic about the way that our country can go forward regardless of what's happened with Brexit, we have to show that we absolutely believe in our country's ability to compete and prosper, but we need to marry that optimism together with realism about the way that the world actually.              Works and what it takes to prosper, and that I think is very much about showing that your sovereignty as a country is actually enhanced by close cooperation with others.        And I think that that's a debate and.        An argument that we can.                Here a second big part I think is about patriotic internationalism.               I profoundly welcome the fact that Keir Starmer is appearing and giving speeches with the Union Jack behind him.    I'd I'd like to see the Welsh Dragon and the George Cross and the Scottish Saltire there as well, but the the fact is.     That we have to demonstrate that we are a party.         That is absolutely a con. Optimal with.     Leading the country that we want to lead and loving the country that we want to lead.     And you know, I think that that's a lot of that is about symbolism.              A lot about that is about the policies that you put in place to follow that up, but it's also about internationalism.         It is about demonstrating that you know the isolationism.   That I'm afraid we have seen.     In recent years is not actually patriotic.              It's not actually the best for the country, and that is, I think about this.    There's been this tension between identity and prosperity.              It's almost being presented as a binary choice.    You can either believe in Britain and your British identity, or you and and be prepared to take a hit in terms of our.               Or you kind of go down the road of being a globalist and and selling our country down the river.     And of course, that is a deeply a facile and counterproductive binary choice that doesn't exist in the real world.                The real world is.              About of course, standing up for our interests as a country, but demonstrating that we believe we have to do that.               By pooling sovereignty and cooperating with other countries.            I think there are some other.      Very briefly, John Big kind of seismic shifts.     We need to make.           We need to show that.  Common bonds are just as important as.                Diversity we shouldn't be just putting people into boxes of.          If you like disadvantaged groups we should be talking about the whole nation and and recognizing that everybody who's facing the challenges that we face today deserves the support and attention of the Labour Party. We don't prioritize one group over another.        Social responsibilities are as important as rights.             A big commitment to security and law and order.              Social mobility should not be synonymous with geographical mobility.  Why is it that people have to leave the town they were?   Bought, born and.            Brought up in in order to get a good job and to make something better for themselves and their family.               Let's have much more of that anchored in in place, and an active state working with business.                Got to show that.             We don't we.     We are all about bringing business and government together and that we're pro business party.             That managing immigration is a is a good thing because there's nothing labor or Social Democratic about an immigration system which can potentially lead to a race to the bottom, and unscrupulous employers exploiting the workforce and then very much about this this patriotic internationalism about showing that we are. We know we have to.     Build bridges we're not an alliance breaker.         We are an alliance maker and that is in the patriotic interest of the country and the communities that we represent.  So hopefully that gives a few just pointers as to what.        I think the Labour Party needs.  To do to address some of.            The extremely important issues that we're discussing today.           Thanks John.      OK, thank you very much indeed. And thanks to all the speakers and let's get into a discussion just to remind people if you've got questions, I'll try and keep an eye on the chat, but if you could put them under Q&A that then I just look in one place for find.        Issues I want.     To raise can I can I pick up a couple of issues? Is that really touched on both by Steven and Danny and put them back to Rob and Maria?  Both actually talked about nation.            Uh, in quite strong terms and you'll see in your own presentation talked about what had happened in Scotland and Mike Gapes has asked a question about the role that a common Scottish identity and perhaps anti English feelings played in explaining what's happened in Scott.                And in in your presentation.    One might have got the sense that ideas of nation and sovereignty were very much secondary issues in your analysis. To these this sense of conservative.        Ah, liberal identity issues is, is that really what you're saying or do you recognize that the idea of nation both in England, Wales and Scotland and individually plays its own dynamic role in explaining what's happened?     No, I mean, if that's the impression we gave then, then then it's a a misleading one. Definitely as as is hopefully clear in in the book we native ethnocentric voters who are kind of our identity conservative group are people who care very much about their central social identities and have very clear ideas about where the boundaries of those social identities.         Like and far and away the most important social identity for most ethnic Smith century basis.        Most of the time is some conception of now.      That's true in Scotland.             That's true in England.   That's true.         Most other places too.   So absolutely a sense of nation is a very, very central part of this story, and indeed the very different conceptions of nation, that identity, conservative and identity liberal voters tend to have is a central element of the tensions.         You get between them in terms of the specific Scotland story.  In answer to Mike.           This point there is a role of both a strong common Scottish identity and an undertone of anti English sentiment.        In the Scottish story which we lay out at length, one of the ways in which the Scottish story becomes a unifying big tent story rather than a polarizing US against them.          Story as that the Brexit referendum was in some respects.      Is that the SNP managed to craft a narrative where they could be all things to all men.             So for voters who represent Westminster or tourism or the English, there was a there was a strand of we will free you from all that we will free you from rule by these outs. Side is for Scottish voters who wanted to identify with a progressive open inclusive cosmopolitan in Stevens language, Scotland.              There was also a strand of Scotland unlike England, 'cause that comparison is made a great deal is progressive is outward looking, is pro EU etc.  So in a sense they were able to have their cake. And eat it by essentially offering a different kind of identity and a different kind of appeal to both sides.         But in both cases nation was central.       To that, and as you all know, John and this is very well laid out in a recent book by Elsa Henderson and Richard Wyn Jones in England. We get similar kinds of internal divisions within the senses of Englishness and English patriotism.               There is a strand that is quite narrow and ethnocentric.             There is a strand that is quite broad.        And inclusive what's different in England is that unlike the Scottish, we've always had the ever present English contrast.   Group the English strands have been blurred a lot more.    The English had not thought so much about how being in Mrs.    Difference of being British and how different senses of being English relate to each other.     So in a sense, that is a conversation that we are at the beginnings of having. I think in English politics and just as we saw in Scotland, I would argue that there is a lot of.    Scope for politicians to shape where that conversation goes from here.  But I also think a lot of discussions of nation is a very symbolic, and I think this this matters hugely because when we think.      About the symbols of our kind of constitutive nations, they do carry very different input in terms of what kind of symbolically they are interpreted to mean, and I think quite uniquely the English one is associated by quite a few people with the kind of anti diversity.     A much more narrower conceptions of. Uh of nationhood.           Then the British or the Scottish or the Welsh nationhood.         So I think one of the problems that we are facing is that as the other constitutive nations are happily associating with their kind of subnational identities like being Scottish or being Welsh, the English.             Are hesitant to do it if they do belong to this identity liberal group because of those connotations, and so instead they of course go for the British.               Identity instead, which is thought to be less ethnic and less kind of place based and more civic and liberal.    The problem then becomes with this that it is self perpetuating, so we see.           The ethnic minorities.          Born in England are much less likely to say that they are English. They are British and we see those.                Kinds of divisions.            When white people feel much more comfortable to say. Oh, I am English than ethnic minority people, then we have a problem with creating a wide, broad, welcoming and open identity for all.            OK, thank you very much.     I'm going to just put one.              Question that builds on that a bit as a political challenge.                Leighton Andrews question is partly to Rob and Maria, but it's does your data go far enough to tell us how identity liberals now view the legitimacy of the post Brexit UK state.         But I, I guess, a different way of putting that is also.       Now we are where we are.          Is it possible to construct a real sense of national identity that can unite whether we're talking about Britain?       Whether we talk about Wales or Inc?      Or does if you like one side have to suck it up and say, well, we lost, we've got to stick with where we are and I I wouldn't mind putting that question first to Stephen and Danny if I can.    It is is is actually.               A shared national identity in what's being called Brexit land possible or do those polarizing factors?  That Maria and Rob have talked about.  Are they still built in that that it's just a matter of one side is going to have to win with their view of the nation over the other?                Steve and Pat.   Yeah, so it's a great question. I mean I, I think it touches a little bit on what I I was.        I suppose I was trying to say about optimistic realism, which is that I think that that's got to be the foundation stone on which to build our post Brexit, United Kingdom, I believe, passionately in the Union.      And I think that our country would be hugely diminished if it were to break.  I think in order to achieve that.  That commitment to the Union we've got to.       Bringing together this sense of identity with the sense of priority and not make the mistake that the the Remain campaign made in 2016 of making remain really all about a kind of loss of prosperity that would ensue because so much cuts so much deeper in terms of people.              Identity and their emotional.      Of connections too to the the issue that's on the ballot paper, so I I think that we've got to what we need to demonstrate is that.            Separatism is potentially very damaging to prosperity, and it may well make you feel for a brief moment.     Almost the sugar rush of that kind of right with one boundary or three.          But I my personal view is that the where we are with Brexit and the kind of Brexit that we've got is actually going to end up making people feel in the end.      That they have. Less control than they had when we were in the European Union and and if things do develop in that way, then I think there's a real case to be made for.                The United Kingdom.     To say.                  Look, you we need more devolution.      We need more pride in place.                We need to give you that sense of control within the United Kingdom.    But we also need the United Kingdom to hold together because there's nothing patriotic about wrecking your own economy and marrying the patriotic.                Argument with the prosperity argument, I think that's the kind of the magic formula that can that can take us into this new post.           Brexit reality.     Well, I mean your question John was was about. I think it was.     It was about come, you know, can our country hold together or come back together again?    Can we tell a story that is a unifying national story?  Yeah, it's the one.            National story having to beat the other national story.    So I think when you say that I think of the Elizabethan settlement in the 16th century, which was, you know, one side did win.              You know the Protestant one, and Elizabeth insisted that the country was not going back to Catholicism and you know, sedition and treason were were not tolerated.   But what she did insist on was that it was OK to be a Catholic, or at least an Anglo Catholic, and she punished extreme protestantisme just. As harshly as she punished extreme Catholicism, and she really insisted that you know, there was a unified.   English church and that it was and and uh and and there was a middle way to be pursued and what we need, I think, is that Elizabethan idea of a generous and and gentle settlement that recognizes the, you know, profound frankly theological differences that we have. And yet says that we can, we can.       We can all share.              This is our common home and in terms of the constitutional arrangements.  To enable that, I do.        Think we need? We are at a moment where.       We need to, uh, to.         To to rearrange and to review our constitutional settlement in the light of Brexit and the in the light of of of particular Scottish nationalism and separatism.      I mean, I, I I broadly agree with Stevens Point that prosperity is ultimately the card to play. But as we all know, as as Robin Maria's book demonstrates.               You know the arguments for, for for Brexit, disregarded the economic arguments that were being made at the time, the the people either didn't believe it when the when the experts say you're going to be poorer when the elites said you're going to be poorer, or they say.                But we don't care.           There's something more important going on for us and and so I think fundamentally the argument will have to be a one around identity belonging attachment.            I just believe that we can have and need to recover an idea of a, you know, a looser Union that enables all the constituent nations.  Of of the of the UK to have a strong sense of identity, and John Newell and leading voice on this, I think there's a story to be told about England in the context of the of the 21st century.              The union.          Uh, that will I hope if we get that settlement right, and you know, I'm not yet sure what what I think that should be.   I think we need to have a proper conversation with the public. There's no point politicians dictating that.             But I think we need to address the English question as a part of the answer to the future of the Union. And personally I just.      Think you know?              We need to let Brexit settle and we need to recover from COVID before may making major constitutional leaps in any of our countries.                Thank you let let's take that idea of the generous settlement and raise another issue.       Uhm, which is partly one perhaps for analytical answer and one for political answer.  Marcus Roberts has raised a question.    About the language of the two tribes is saying, for example, there are significant numbers of leavers who are socially liberal on many issues, but are concerned about immigration and there would be people who would have been remainers but nonetheless would accepted some common concerns and really, isn't it perhaps the case that the number of people who are.              Adamantly against living in a diverse society, is now relatively small, as is the number of people who really want open borders.            And, you know, complete migration.       So is is there actually a bigger potential center ground on these two issues in terms of people's current attitudes, than perhaps comes across if we look at how these things have played out in Brexit?               So it's partly back to Robin Maria I think say where we are.           How is the bigger? How big is the potential middle ground? Here and then to Steven and Danny about, well, the question I asked them is slightly different.             Are we in a position where your party, Steven, indeed minors?   It still is has now become so captured by one fairly extreme wing of its activist base that it can't address the middle ground.            And Danny, could I challenge you in the same area?  Is the activist base of the Conservative Party now so aligned with one review that despite the efforts of people like.     Yourself, you can't speak to the middle ground, so can I go back to the authors first and then to the two politicians?       I think that is an excellent question and and we do take some pains in the book to say that these are ideal types and so they don't cover the entirety of our kind of electorate.  But also we are pointing out that it is a little bit of a misunderstanding to talk about social liberalism. Or social conservatives. And This is why we use this word identity, conservative and identity liberalism, because really, even though there is some correlation between people who are uncomfortable with.            Our city and also are very traditionalist in terms of family and and other kind of lifestyle choices.      It's not a perfect correlation and what has disrupted our politics was not questioned about social conservatism.           What was on the table was not questions about family women. Girls sex, gender.       None of this was on the table.    What was on the table? What we call ethnocentrism, which is this kind of self identity.        T as a as a group, as a nation, as a wider community and how broadly that is defined right?                And so This is why immigration and diversity are particularly important because it's so important to how we draw those lines around who we think are us and who we think are them.             Who is English, who isn't who's British who?     Isn't are we?      Part of Europe, aren't we?           So, so This is why.            Even though there's.      Lots of issues in politics around authoritarianism and social conservatism.         We don't actually talk about them almost at all.  They are slightly divided by here.         And if I can pick up 1 strand of what John mentioned in terms of some other research that I've been involved with isn't in Brexit land.  So on the issue of immigration, which is John, Stephen will both now I've worked on for a number of years I've been involved with with John Curtis and others in some deliberative democracy exercises where we brought together, leave and remain voters to debate.      Post Brexit policies in a number of areas, but immigration was a particular.           And what you indeed do find is that there is a kind of broad framework for consensus that gets lost in some of the more polarized debates.  So on the one hand, everybody favors a system that is subject to government selection and government control.            They want the levers of immigration policy to be in the hands of the central state.      That's at basic.   Premise for most people and most people favor some level of selection in terms of selection by qualifications, selection by resources and so on.              But within that settlement, people across the divide are actually relatively liberal and have a relatively high level of consensus about where the thresholds should be, and they set the thresholds in quite a liberal way.            And we we.        I mean, I certainly was was quite surprised at both at the degree of consensus and the the sort of speed.  And good.                Temper in which this consensus would emerge in conversation. So I do think that does illustrate that the fact that these quite deep, sometimes quite profound, differences in views about attachments to nation attachments to group exists, doesn't necessarily mean that the barriers to policy, even on hot button issues, are in.           Supercable there there just needs to be some sensitivity to the central concerns of both sides.            The central concern with control on the identity conservative side, the central control is concerned with liberalism and openness on the liberal side, and that's work of course, and that's hard work.      But it's not impossible work.       The only other thing I would say just.               As an addendum to your point about activists, that is something that we see in in other data that we've gathered on activists at a mass level is that they do tend to the poles of these distribution.               So in terms of finding that consensus that respects both sides, they can actually often be a little bit of a of a problem on that front.                Thank you before everybody else asks on the chat is is that published that recent work with John Curtis or is it?           OK, well some of it is some of it isn't.       I can I can send you some links to the bits that are.           Yeah, if you if you had the chance to put anything in the chat before 2:30 that would be great. Otherwise, we can circulate it afterwards and and it.    It reminds me of a in a different context of paper UK in a changing Europe, but I've last year actually showing a remarkable gap between the values of the voters of both the main parties.     And the people are actually members and MP's for them which is another part of the problem but.   Steve and Danny.             It sounds like there's a biggest potential center ground or common ground here than we imagine, but are either of your two parties able to persuade your Members to move into that ground?          Or are you going to argue that you are moving into that ground at the moment with your current leaderships?           Uhm well.            I don't know.     I mean, I I I think it's helpful what Robert said.              'cause I think there is actually quite a high degree of potential common cause and the.                Issues which divide us bitterly do not necessarily preclude alignment around other questions and and the ability to move forward once.     Once these issues are settled and and you know one hopes with Brexit behind us, that's one source of contention gone, but it'll take a while for that to happen, no doubt. I mean the point I was making about.   Social conservatism earlier?        I mean I.                               Maria is right that you know that wasn't on the ticket on the in the in the referendum and in these and in our recent dissensions and and and you know it.         It's obviously the case that Brexit and the Leave vote wasn't driven by concerns around social conservatives.   I mean, it's in.                Traditional understanding around you know family formation and so on, and you know not least most obviously in the fact that Boris Johnson and Michael Gove are both social liberals by and large, but I think it's the precisely the fact that that wasn't what we were arguing about means that that and I and I interpret social conservatism be much more broadly.      And just being sort of traditionalist around family formation, it's really about this idea of at home is what matters most.           And people are primarily motivated by a desire for security and prosperity of their in their homes, and that extends beyond family into community and also intonation as well.    And if people feel that their homes are safe.    And the and and have the opportunity for prosperity.     Then they are.   Then they're they're less resentful and more disposed to to tolerance and diversity.     So I think the middle ground is 1.                It's a very traditional one.             It sits around and you know before the modern times.    This is basically what politicians fought over who can. Strengthen the security and the prosperity of people in their homes and but we seem to have forgotten the language around, particularly family.           Uh, and and we've we scratch our heads a bit about how to strengthen communities, but for me that is our policy.     That should be our politics.          I don't think we should have some cozy consensus to, but by the way, you know when I'm on panels with Steven or or John Crowder.                So on quite a lot with 'cause we agree on so much.           I don't think we should be basically agreeing on this on the way forward other than say this is the terrain.       In which we should be having our political arguments we left and right to be fighting over.      Uh, I wrote a little essay 10 years ago called on Fraternity, and I was busy trying to say, you know, you have the equality junkies on the left and the liberty drunk is on the right.        We basically both are contesting over who owns fraternity.      This area of our relationship and community and connection, and that's what I think we should be.         That's not what I think our political battles.          Should be and that's where.       The way to find a common ground. Thank you Stephen.        Yeah, I, I mean I.               I think the short answer to your question in terms of whether the Labour Party membership.              Uhm, has has got itself into the right places is whether or not we're serious about winning general elections.   Do we want to be a party of government?            And of course hugely encouraged by the result of the leadership.         Election in 2014 and A and A and a clear indication that our our membership has as recognized that we cannot afford as a party to have yet another glorious or inglorious defeat.                Depending on your point of.       View you know, I mean, people will often talk about the the great labor.                Victories 456697 and when you look at the the the percentage of our vote from the working class in those, you know, Clement Attlee won 60% of the working class vote in 1966.      Wilson 168% and Blair in 97158% of the working class.    Vote but since.  2001 we've had this slow decoupling, a kind of divorce from our between the Labour Party and our communitarian heartlands. And fundamentally, you know that came.          To a head in in.  In 2010, when we lost and and it's just got worse since then and getting into situations you know where we piling up.                30,000 vote majorities in Hackney that vote but losing in Blyth Valley. Well, that is not a whole nation party. That is not a political party that is going to win general elections. We cannot win unless we bring together our coalition of cosmopolitan and communitarian voters. So the fundamental message.         So the party membership has to be if. You want to win general election.             These are some of the shifts that have to be made and then to say look there is no difference between communitarian values and labor values, reciprocity, security, good work.       For quality family life, a community where your High Street hasn't been completely devastated by the impact of the Internet and out of town shopping centers, and. And all the rest. That and security in terms of the country, national security being absolutely vital.    Make sure that. You don't vote, don't side with the Russian intelligence services over our own intelligence services.    When Russia has launched a chemical chemical weapons attack on British territory, you know it's it's not rocket science so.  I think fundamentally the message has to be communitarian.       Values are labour values.    There is a way of putting this into this framing of work, family, community and country patriotic internationalism, which demonstrates that the Labour Party understands and appreciate and will stand up for the people who that we were fundamentally created to represent.  As a party, and I think if we can do that, we've got a very good chance of winning in 2024.      Thank you well. I'd like to.            Pick up now a theme that's come up in.  The Q&A which is perhaps? I think actually as politicians you are well equipped as it happens to to make a contribution.                This in Robin Maria too, but is outside the way.  I framed the discussion so far and that's about political change in Civic Society outside of formal politics.               So Josh Westerling from the Joe Cox Foundation.              It's asking how should civil society.  Organisations like them navigate the politics of Brexit land, sort of on the ground, as well as coalitions at national level.            And Steven Heat refers to Putnam and Garrett Research saying the key to overcoming division is the moral Dr of individuals to do the overcoming of division.           Does that apply here?    Here and and sue Maddock.  In addition to point yet very often at the moment, is women who in communities are actually challenging.        What's going on and building things that are are different and and challenging.   The economics that leads to resentment.      So, so to what extent?   I suppose the question would be in if you don't feel you. An answer is in any great length, but what is then?     Should we be looking outside the framing of formal politics to places where where social and political change can overcome these divisions? Any takers on that?         Steve Danny Roberts Danny                Thanks, well I think that is vital and this is where I struggled here.              2 to persuade my colleagues in the Conservative Party of of the enormous potential, not just for us. OK then I.            Think it is real, but for the country of these new models of.     Uh, Rob talk about deliberative democracy.         I mean, you know there there are ways to engage the public, or rather to.  Uh, as it were to be engaged by the public might be a better way of putting it to discuss options and including around budgets and all sorts of you know vital questions around planning and so on that deliver what I think.        Fundamentally, we all.   Want which is agency and a sense of control over the places.       That are ours and, uh, you know belonging is not just.               You know, Aristotle said, you know slavery is is good because you're connected.           Well, you need to need to be connected in a way that that actually gives you a sense of power in the relationship.          So it's not enough just to be rooted in the soil of your place.         You have to have some ability to affect what happens there.    And I don't think our current models of representative democracy are delivering that for people.         So I think we should be far more innovative in the way we have political conversations and do political decision making.              And I know my colleagues worry about that.        That will basically empower.       The ***** fringe    Possibly of the right wing as well as.        Of the left.          Just as the arguments around localism everyone talks about Derek Hatton and you know, let's not go back to the days when crazy local government     Politicians could could ruin a place.           Well, I think we've got to get over that on localism, but I also.      Think beyond.   Just devolution to local government. We need to be bolder about what would happen if you actually put communities in the driving seat and we want it. One evidence that it's OK and safe.          Is community organizing, which David Cameron introduced are in the first flush of the big society in 2010, 2011, and there's they've fund.           The government has been funding community organizing for the last 10 years, and that means basically putting in funding people to to to work in local communities to engage people, businesses. Community groups, civil society and basically say what do we want to do together?     And and and then and which includes.    How do we challenge power to do the right thing?         And it hasn't been some terrible sort of Marxist takeover. Even though community organizing has its roots in sort of quite Marxist theory, in in in EU. S in the last century.       Actually, it's been.           It's been mostly, you know, churches and other religious groups, largely.          Organizing in really good ways to deliver local change.    So I think we've got evidence that it's OK and we should be doing a lot more of that, and I think we'll find as I've been saying, that people will respond in a way that is, you know, very much speaks to the, to the, to the emotions, and the agendas that we've been discussing here.             Thank you Stephen.        You muted.        I I, I agree that we need to find ways of opening up our democracy. I I have to say I have very deep reservations about first past the post as an electoral system and I think that it's actually contributed to much of the polarization that we've been talking about today and I I think that. You know, that's one way of looking at opening up our political debates and and potentially making them more.        If you like more transparent and and clear in terms of.    Where parties are coming from. The the other big point, I think around participative and deliberative democracy is, is what we do about the future of our Constitution.      I think it's a really, you know, interesting debate to be had with the public about, for example, the future of the House of Lords.      Which in my view should be abolished and replaced with a democratically elected Senate. But that's the kind of discussion that we should be having in the context of a constitutional Convention, which I think can actually so much of this is about taking the heat out of identity politics and directing that energy into something more constructive, which isn't about.               You know this.   These divides that are mentioned in the Nixonland quote, which is so.     Powerful, but making it much more about enabling people to disagree without being disagreeable because you're not going to the core of somebody's identity and having righteous indignation about this idiotic person, how can they possibly think what they're thinking? You're actually bringing people together and giving them an opportunity to debate and and and tragically.    I think because of first past the post.       Large swathes of the country have had political debates just going past.            Them because all the.    Resource as Rob and Maria showed has been put into target seats and so you've ended up with large parts of the country not really having those local political debates in the so-called safe seats, which is such a a terrible phrase, so there's a lot that we can do.         Both in terms of a top down change.  But also the bottom.      Up, but the two have to come together. I think it's quite difficult to make something happen which is going to create the critical mass and the and the and the leveling up to coin a phrase of our democratic debate. If it isn't happening both from the top down as well as the top up at the bottom.               Rob Maria, I don't even want to add anything there, but I suppose one of the questions to you as political scientists is.       Is is this politics outside the formal political parties and doing things differently? A realistic part of the response to the challenge we're facing?          So I definitely don't think that this response should replace the political parties, and in fact I have done research on UM.       Actually, the electoral integrity around communities of Muslim origin in Britain and what we have found time and time again, that inevitably these communities were predominantly resident in safe seats and basically the political parties by not going into those areas created this political vacuum.              And of course, political vacuum then invites all sorts of unsavory abuses of power and other actors stepping into that space. And that has really led to issues in those areas and I think very similarly with civil Civic Society organizations.    They can only do so much, specially that we are talking.  About, uh, very kind of unorganized organizations, right?       So they don't have a national coverage, even if they are national, they don't necessarily have the resources to target all places that might be in need. And finally, to add to this triangle of parties and civic organizations.    That are important but can't really fix it. I would say local government.    I mean sadly the Conservative Party again is proposing.               To reduce that in size again, and I do think increasingly giving more money and more freedom to local government.   Uh, which it's?   You know, the best place really to know their local areas and where the need might be and what they might need.    Uh, maybe we should be going in the opposite direction.               We should create more opportunities for local government and giving them more money.     Yeah, but if I could just add on that point, I do think in the debate about devolution. I'm very since that is the need for constitutional changes of various kinds.    One thing that that has been systematically neglected for decades in the British debate is is fiscal devolution, devolution of tax raising powers, devolution of spending powers we have.    Some of the I believe we're one of the most fiscally centralized nation states on Earth, particularly England, of course.             And while various you know, we've seen the city region deals and so on, and those are a good start.       They're very, very fiscally weak organisations, and if we're talking about bringing people in, if we're talking about re engaging them with a political process showing them this is a political process in which real things are at stake, in which the ability to.   Resource things the ability to raise new revenue are actually on the table. It's really, really important in that process I think and and that really shouldn't be neglected.  And I think it's really a very important point to make.      Also, because there is a very strong institutional resistance to. That from the Treasury you know they are one of the most powerful fiscal centralizing forces, probably in any nation state. And so it's really important to put that front and center of any reform agenda, I think. Thank you, I'm just going to now raise one more question.            It hasn't been raised on the chapters because it's one that interests me and that's my chairs privilege. And then I'm going to ask people a chance, give our panelists a chance to make some final remarks.  And it.                   It's actually about one part of the picture you describe.             What you describe as the necessity liberals.         Essentially, ethnic minorities who.            Uh, because racism and structural disadvantage impinges on them directly.    Have you found common cause with the identity liberals?               But I'm just wondering, is is that something you see going into the future?            I mean, when you have pretty Patel very critical of Black lives matters.         You have kimep agonac, UM, very critical of parts of the equality diversity agenda as it's been framed past by the liberal left.         And I think it's I'm right in saying that amongst Hindus and Sikhs at least now they get more support from the Conservatives than than the Labour Party does.     Is it actually quite possible that over the coming years the necessity Liberals will split quite significantly into groups that align themselves more with a conservative? You on the the social values, the ethnocentrism that they share and those that remain with their current labor.      Labor voting because that that would complicate the picture as it's as it's being presented I think, says Rob.    So yeah, that's that's my kind of main, uh, area of research.          And I must say that I have always believed that for a proper ethnic equality in this country, we need also equality of political choice.  And I think to this day we don't have that because Labour Party has still, uh, dominated. I notice to the extent that they can't really engage with the Conservative Party, and even though the Conservative Party made huge inroads, both in terms of representation of minorities. I mean in 2010, I think before 2010 election they had two MP.        Is of visibly minority ethnic origin, and now they almost caught up on labor, right?       So we are seeing enormous advances here, and they have improved their vote share amongst the Sikh and Hindu communities.              But they still don't.                They haven't overtaken labor in those communities and I think part of the.           Problem with the concern.                Is that despite their absolutely genuine and amazing efforts on this front, they are a party that split in the middle and they're doing things that will always be read as threatening to a lot of those communities.     So you cannot, with one hand have the most diverse cabinet in history and with the other hand.               Deport people. Uhm, who are you?     You know, who can't prove that they are entitled to stay because the government has been their documentation and people are not like that.        People already have this worry that the Conservatives will not stand up for their interests and this will now they will never be persuaded otherwise.  I mean when you look at Ashcroft Re?                He said he shows that even people of minority origin who can't possibly have experienced Enoch Powell still remember enough.        Powell's words, they still have those symbolic memories of the Conservatives being the nasty party, so more fundamental rethinking. Out about how to address those necessity concerns of minorities will be needed, and without this, I don't think there will be any progress.             So even though I believe that ultimately, hopefully we'll have that.             Uh, equality of choice and then yes, many minorities might switch their vote.      We don't have it now and I think we are further away than we.           Should be on this.            If I could just add one one comment on this about the the the the asymmetry of trust and distrust. Which is, I think, the Conservatives biggest barrier to progress in this front. Once you distrust an agent once you distrust.     Political party or any kind of actor you are prone to see actions in a potentially negative light and prone to remember them and prone to pass them on. And I think, for example, the Windrush case is a great example of this, because on the one hand.           You had the first ever ethnic minority Home Secretary appointed to to to to clear it up.               On the other hand, you had a crisis in which people who clearly had full citizen rights were being treated, treated badly by the state and by a Conservative government.     And the problem is when you have a distrustful community, they will remember the second bit. The bad behavior, but they won't remember the first bits so well.      Cycle information bias basically yeah.     And yeah, so in a sense you have to.  You have to do better than than just well enough in order to overcome that distrust and normalize the process.  You have to eliminate gradually the distrust.        I decide it's worth mentioning that for many minority communities, the labor liberal left is sometimes going very almost like too far on on race and ethnicity as well, and we saw for example in America that some minority communities have actually supported Trump because they were.          They felt that Black Lives Matter has gone too far as well, so I think both parties will have to walk a tricky line on those issues.           Fine, thank you. I'm just gonna go to each speaker in turn.             I'm no need to pick up on that point, particularly if you want to just one minute each to make a, uh, last remark, if you could to 7 hours, I want to keep us the time.             So I'm going to go to Steve and then Danny, then finally to wobble Maria Steven.                What well, thank you very much for such a fascinating discussion.             I mean, it's very difficult to sum it all up.         One one of the things that struck me is, you know, the danger of trying to to neatly pigeonhole people and groups, and I think we all agree. British society is much more messy than than what what we've been talking about today with different kind of definitions. But you have to have those definitions in that language in order to have a.                Basis for for a dialogue. But in spite of the the the messiness I'm actually hopeful for the future for two main reasons.               One is that I do think that the Brexit vote was a kind of cathartic moment.             And coming out of that now and of course, it wasn't just one vote.  On one day, the whole negotiation process was just dragged on for so long was so painful and so divisive.          But you know, we are now out of the single market and the customs union.                And the reality? Of what we've done is going to be clear for all to see, and I think that.      That will lead to.                A kind of confluence.     Of patriotism, yes, but with realism.        And I think that will lead to an erosion of the lever remainer divide, and that as we get this kind of dose of realism coming in.  To the levers and a dose of Remainers realizing we do. We are on.          Our own, we've got to stand up and be optimistic that those two will, I think.       Fuse and will lead to getting politics back to something that would might more resemble normality, which I.    Think is is.                Also good news for the Labour Party because we we're not interested in the culture wars, we've got to avoid those cultures.  And then of course, the COVID crisis.       We haven't talked much about that today, but I think that's.                Going to trigger a kind.  Of spirit of 45 put.           I got it.                  I gotta stop you going on to the COVID crisis.                Steven, 'cause I want to keep most of time.          So that's another seminar, no doubt at Danny.    Last remark.                Shawnee, thanks well I I mean so thanks echo very very very helpful for me and thanks for the chats as well.                I've been looking at unloads for me to take away.              Just a quick two practical points.               I mean I would echo robs point about fiscal devolution.   I think that is absolutely vital and I think we've got.           We've got a grasp at nickel as part of the rethink that our our country needs. I think we do need something along the lines of what Stephen talks about the Constitutional Convention, whether we call it that, and whether we do it as a single event.                Or or even a assortiment process, or but we need to do this, we just do it in a way that is properly engaging and it can't all just be.    Done through election manifestos, I would just end with a single point, which I think are you know, a chance for us all is to find unity both in our vision of the future, which is what this Constitution convention be about, but also kind of a a sort of rapprochement with our past, a reconciliation with our history, and I think you know.   My party side that means coming to terms with with where our our history has been appalling, but but generally we I think we need to unite around the fact that we have a great history and and we are we have a role.                Drive that you know we are a great country because of where we've come from and all the different confidence that that has arrived at that and and that's particular terms for the left and the modern left in particular.                Didn't used to be Hugh. Gaitskell talks about 1000 years.               Of history, you know.     The labor movement was a traditionalist one in many ways, and I think we it needs to recover that.      And it's it's it's part of our need to get over their objection to to Britishness into British history and and our party needs to come to terms with its with with with the role of Britain in the world which hasn't always been good.         And I think through that conversation and actually this culture war that we're in is almost the conversation we kind of need to be having.    We're probably doing the wrong way. But I think we're having good conversations to talk about our history properly thinking about constitutional convention.           Will be helpful. Thank you Rob Maria.    UM, yeah.           I mean, Stephen mentioned earlier that he's a rational optimist.          We we actually talk in the introduction about how we're similarly rational optimists, in that we believe that these forces we talk about powerful, but we are not passengers in this process, we have agency.      We have the power to shape them in new and positive directions, which we.       We talk about a lot at the end of the book as well, and this conversation I think is an example of that process in.              Probably the most positive element of the Brexit process, and the disruptions that followed it from my perspective at least, is that it has brought into the center of political conversation a whole range of issues and concerns that were clearly out there.                Latent in the electorate, but didn't have a productive outlet.        At the center of the political conversation, so I guess I would like to.    And with the thought that this is actually a great opportunity where we are right now or at the end of the formal departure process and at the beginning of the process of figuring where we want to go now that we've left the departure lounge, and I think it is a really great opportunity with all of these issues on the table and with people in both parties thinking hard about. How to make something positive from them going forward and and I I would very much encourage them to continue doing so. Thank you and thank you too Maria.        Can I just say been a fantastic discussion?       I'm very grateful to all of our panelists.   It's ended up.    In the position where we're actually talking about a remaking of the nation and the national story and the way we do our politics, we always like the Center for English identity and politics to end up concluding that, broadly, that is something that's very important that it's useful to get there from this particular starting point.               If you've enjoyed it, do come to other webinars in the future.  Our next ones on the 15th.          It's actually also got a Brexit theme, but we're going to look at how Brexit played out in the Anglican church in its politics and the theology and the role of faith in nation which Danny helpfully touched on about half an hour ago.         So thank you very much indeed, and I hope you've enjoyed the event.                Thank you.