Cancelled - A Kantian Defence of Epistemic Autonomy Seminar

This seminar has now been cancelled

There is surprisingly little discussion of epistemic autonomy in current literature on epistemic normativity. This can probably be accounted for by the fact that the few recent discussions of it describe it as an individualistic account of epistemic responsibility, an account that champions epistemic independence and self-reliance according to which the individual subject is the only legitimate source of belief. If this is epistemic autonomy, then there are many reasons why one may be suspicious of it. One reason in particular has been endorsed in recent discussions. Namely, epistemic autonomy is an unreachable ideal since human knowledge requires epistemic cooperation. On this basis, it has been argued that the very idea of epistemic autonomy is a non-starter. The aim of this paper is to defend epistemic autonomy against this charge and show that it is a promising way of thinking about epistemic normativity.

This seminar will be chaired by Professor Christopher Janaway.

The room for this talk has limited capacity, and seats will be allocated on a first come first serve basis.