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The University of Southampton
EconomicsPart of Economic, Social and Political Science

1603 Communication with an Intermediary (Maksymilian Kwiek)


A model of communication with two features is presented: inattentive final receivers who are heterogeneous in their inattention, and the presence of a monopolistic intermediary, whose preferences are not aligned with the preferences of the initial sender. The sender faces a dilemma how to shape her message to maneuver the intermediary into telling the final receivers what she considers important. The sender can engage in self-censoring – potentially beneficial because it prevents the intermediary from misusing the limited attention of the receivers. Less obvious is a policy of interdependence, whereby issues are corre- lated with each other; this policy is potentially beneficial because it forces the intermediary to talk about all issues tied together, including the ones important to the sender.

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