Skip to main navigationSkip to main content
The University of Southampton
EconomicsPart of Economic, Social and Political Science

1419 Efficient Voting with Penalties (Maksymilian Kwiek)

Author: Maksymilian Kwiek (University of Southampton)

Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters’ preferences.
This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism when the
choice is binary and the designer may use non-trasferable punishments
to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer
faces a dilemma – a punishment may induce a more correct choice,
but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted
majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments
applied if preferences are relatively homogenous. Eliciting
types through punishments in order to construct type-specific weights
should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous, or if
voters preferences represent a larger population.

Useful Downloads

Need the software?PDF Reader
Privacy Settings