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The University of Southampton
EconomicsPart of Economic, Social and Political Science

1110 Repeating Voting With Complete Information (M. Kwiek)

Paper 1110 Repeated Voting with Complete Information

Author: Maksymilian Kwiek (University of Southampton)


A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required super-majority is not reached, voting is repeated inde…nitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis
provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the seminal median voter theorem known from the simple majority case. If supermajority is required instead, then the power to
select the outcome moves from the median voter to the more extreme voters. Normative analysis indicates that the simple majority is not constrained efficient because it does not re‡ect the strengths of voters’opinion. Even if unanimity is a bad voting rule, voting rules close to
unanimity may be efficient. The more likely it is to have a very many almost indifferent voters and some very opinionated ones, the more stringent supermajority is required for efficiency.

Keywords: supermajority, quali…ed majority, repeated voting,
conclave, War of Attrition.

JEL Classi…cation Codes: D63, D72, D74

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