It seems that you think we can survive the destruction of our bodies and go where our psychological states go (because of the transporter case), but you also don't think we go where our psychological states go and that we are tied to our bodies (because of the 'body swapping' case).
Is this a consistent position?
To learn more about this topic, you might like to read Chapter 1 of Harold Noonan’s book Personal Identity, or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on personal identity (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/).
At Southampton, the question of personal identity can be studied as part of the second-year Metaphysics module. In recent years, a number of our students have also written their third-year dissertations on personal identity. Other modules that consider aspects of our nature and self-conception include Origins of Existentialism, Philosophy of Mind, Self-Knowledge, and Freedom and Responsibility.
Southampton philosophy lecturers interested in personal identity and related topics include Dr. Elselijn Kingma, Dr. Conor McHugh, and Dr. Lee Walters.