Dr Conor McHugh

Associate Professor, Director of Programmes,Academic Integrity Officer,Joint Honours Liaison Tutor

Related links: Personal homepage

Dr Conor McHugh is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton.

Before taking up his post at Southampton in 2011, Conor was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Institut Jean Nicod in Paris. Before that he was a PhD student and then a non-stipendiary lecturer at Edinburgh University. He comes from Drogheda.

For up-to-date details and downloadable copies of my publications please see my personal homepage.

Advice and Feedback hours

Tuesday 15:00-16:00

Wednesday 11:00-12:00

In room 1141 at Avenue (building 65).

Research

Publications

Teaching

Contact

Research interests

Conor has published on a range of topics in epistemology and philosophy of mind, including self-knowledge, epistemic warrant, mental agency, doxastic control and freedom, the aim of belief, and assertion. He is currently working in particular on epistemic normativity and its relation to the nature of belief.

For up-to-date details and downloadable copies of my publications please see my personal homepage.

Affiliate research groups

Ethics, Epistemology

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Articles

McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2018). What is good reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 153–174. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12299
Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2017). What is reasoning? Mind, 1-31. DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzw068
Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2016). Against the taking condition. Philosophical Issues, 1-22.
McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2016). Fittingness first. Ethics, 126(3), 1-46. DOI: 10.1086/684712
Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2016). Objectivism and perspectivism about the epistemic ought. Ergo, 1-23.
McHugh, C. (2015). Attitudinal control. Synthese, 1-18. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0643-7
McHugh, C. (2015). Engel on doxastic correctness. Synthese, 1-12. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0767-4
McHugh, C. (2015). Review: Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford University Press, 2014, 262pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199660025. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2014). Broome on reasoning. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy, 34(2), 131-140.
McHugh, C. (2014). Exercising doxastic freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1), 1-37. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00531.x
McHugh, C., & Whiting, D. (2014). The normativity of belief. Analysis.
McHugh, C. (2014). VIII - Fitting belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114(2), 167-187. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00369.x
McHugh, C. (2013). Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency. Philosophical Issues, 23(1), 132-157. DOI: 10.1111/phis.12007
McHugh, C. (2013). Normativism and doxastic deliberation. Analytic Philosophy, 54(4), 447-465.
McHugh, C. (2012). Belief and aims. Philosophical Studies, 160, 425-439. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9728-z
McHugh, C. (2012). Control of belief and intention. Thought, 1(4), 337-346. DOI: 10.1002/tht3.53
McHugh, C. (2012). Epistemic deontology and voluntariness. Erkenntnis, 77, 65-94. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9299-6
McHugh, C. (2012). The illusion of exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy. DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12032
McHugh, C. (2012). The truth norm of belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93(1), 8-30. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01413.x
McHugh, C. (2012). What assertion doesn't show. European Journal of Philosophy, 20, 407-429. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00412.x
McHugh, C. (2011). Judging as a non-voluntary action. Philosophical Studies, 152(2), 245-269. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9478-3
McHugh, C. (2011). What do we aim at when we believe? Dialectica, 65(3), 369-392. DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01270.x
McHugh, C. (2010). Self-knowing agents, by Lucy O'Brien. European Journal of Philosophy, 18(1), 153-158. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00395.x
McHugh, C. (2010). Self-knowledge and the KK principle. Synthese, 173(3), 231-257. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9404-9

Books

Whiting, D. (Ed.), Way, J. (Ed.), & Mchugh, C. (2018). Normativity: epistemic and practical. Oxford University Press.
McHugh, C., & Di Nucci, E. (Eds.) (2006). Content, Consciousness and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge Scholars Press.

Book Chapters

Whiting, D., Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2018). Introduction. In C. McHugh, J. Way, & D. Whiting (Eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical Oxford University Press.
McHugh, C. (2014). La Normativité Epistémique, la Vérité et la Connaissance. In J-M. Chevalier, & B. Gaultier (Eds.), Connaître: Questions d'Epistémologie Contemporaine Paris, FR: Ithaque.
McHugh, C. (2012). Reasons and self-knowledge. In A. Coliva (Ed.), The Self and Self-Knowledge Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
McHugh, C., & Di Nucci, E. (2006). Introduction: the state of mind. In C. McHugh, & E. Di Nucci (Eds.), Content, Consciousness and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (pp. 1-34). Cambridge, GB: Cambridge Scholars Press.

Conference

McHugh, C. (2014). Fitting belief. In M. Soteriou (Ed.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: 135th Session (pp. 1-15). London, GB: The Aristotelian Society.

Review

McHugh, C. (2018). The Normativity of Rationality. Mind.

Semester 2

PHIL2021 Epistemology
PHIL3036 Self-Knowledge

Dr Conor McHugh
Student Office, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Southampton, Avenue Campus, Southampton. SO17 1BF United Kingdom

Room Number: 65/1141

Dr Conor McHugh's personal home page

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