Dr Giulia Felappi PhD King's College London, BA and MA Universita San Raffaele Milano

Lecturer in Philosophy, Internationalisation and Study Abroad Officer, Doctoral Programmes Director

Giulia completed her PhD at King’s College London in 2015. Previously, she studied in Italy at the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa and at the University San Raffaele, Milan, while also being a visiting student at the University of Oxford and NYU.

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Thursdays 16:30 - 17:30
Fridays 14:30 - 15:30

In room 1002 at Avenue (Building 65).

Research

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Research interests

Giulia works primarily on the intersection between philosophy of language and metaphysics and the aim of her research is to understand the relationship between three fundamental kinds of entities: objects in the world, thoughts about those objects, and language about objects and thoughts. In particular, she has so far focused on propositional attitude sentences, and on the metaphysics of those things that these sentences seem to bring in, i.e. contents, propositions and facts. She is now mainly working on questions, answers, and interrogative attitudes like enquiring and being puzzled.

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Articles

Felappi, G., & Santambrogio, M. (2019). Lost in translation? Topoi, 38(2), 265-276. DOI: 10.1007/s11245-016-9433-9
Felappi, G. (2019). The face-value theory, know-that, know-wh and know-how. Thought, 8(1), 63-72. DOI: 10.1002/tht3.406
Felappi, G. (Accepted/In press). Wittgensteinian facts as ultimate items of Tractarian ontology? Australasian Philosophical Review, 3(2), 338-342. DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2019.1655847
Felappi, G. (2017). Content, the Possible and the Impossible. Analysis, 77(3), 648-658. DOI: 10.1093/analys/anw073
Felappi, G., & Davies, B. (2017). Publish or perish. Metaphilosophy, 48(5), 745-761. DOI: 10.1111/meta.12269
Felappi, G. (2017). Susan Langer and the woeful world of facts. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 5(2), 37-50. DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v5i2.2812
Felappi, G. (2016). Objects of thought? On the usual way out of Prior’s objection to the relational theory of propositional attitude sentences. Analysis, 76(4), 438–444. DOI: 10.1093/analys/anw064
Felappi, G. (2015). In defence of sententialism. Dialectica, 68(4), 581-603. DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12085
Felappi, G. (2015). Why fuss about these quirks of the vernacular? Propositional attitude sentences in Prior’s nachlass. Synthese, 1-14. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0903-1
Felappi, G. (2014). On product-based accounts of propositional attitudes. Thought, 3(4), 302-313.
Felappi, G. (2011). Book review. Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Chalmers, D.J., Manley, D., Wasserman, R., (Eds.). Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 19, 213-217.

Book Chapter

Felappi, G. (Accepted/In press). Propositional attitude predicates and ‘That’-Clauses. In Lodz Studies in English and General Linguistics

Tutoring for Phil1005 Ethics

PHIL2010 Philosophy of Language

PHIL2014 Logic

PHIL 3049 Puzzles and Paradoxes

Dr Giulia Felappi
g.felappi@soton.ac.uk

65/1002
Department of Philosophy,
Humanities,
University of Southampton,
Avenue Campus,
Highfield Road.
SO21 1BF

Room Number: 65/1002

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