Phone:: (023) 8059 6713
Email:: J.Way@soton.ac.uk

Dr Jonathan Way PhD University of California, Santa Barbara

Associate Professor, On research leave

Related links: Personal homepage

Dr Jonathan Way is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton.

Jonathan completed his PhD at the University of California, Santa Barbara in December 2008. He then held a temporary lectureship at the University of Stirling, before joining Southampton in February 2011.

Jonathan is a Co-Investigator on the AHRC-funded Early Career Research Project, Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

For further details and downloadable papers see Jonathan's personal homepage

Research

Publications

Contact

Research interests

Jonathan's research focuses on issues in ethics and epistemology, broadly construed. He is especially interested in issues to do with reasons, rationality, value, and normativity, across both epistemic and practical domains, and is happy to supervise PhD work on any of these topics. Jonathan also has general interests in action theory, normative ethics, and various issues in philosophy of mind and language.

Affiliate research groups

Epistemology, Ethics

Articles

McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2018). What is good reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 153–174. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12299

Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2017). What is reasoning? Mind, 1-31. DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzw068

Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2016). Against the taking condition. Philosophical Issues, 1-22.

McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2016). Fittingness first. Ethics, 126(3), 1-46. DOI: 10.1086/684712

Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2016). Objectivism and perspectivism about the epistemic ought. Ergo, 1-23.

Way, J., & Whiting, D. (2016). Perspectivism and the argument from guidance. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, 1-14. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9775-9

Way, J., & Whiting, D. (2016). Reasons and guidance (or, surprise parties and ice-cream). Analytic Philosophy.

Way, J. (2016). Two arguments for Evidentialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 1-24.

Way, J., & Whiting, D. (2015). If you justifiably believe that you ought to ?, you ought to ? Philosophical Studies, 173, 1873-1895. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0582-2

McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2014). Broome on reasoning. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy, 34(2), 131-140.

Way, J. (2014). Reasons as premises of good reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Way, J. (2013). Intentions, akrasia, and mere permissibility. Organon F, 20(4), 588-611.

Way, J. (2013). Review: Morality and the Emotions. Edited by Carla Bagnoli. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. vi + 304. Price £37.50.). The Philosophical Quarterly, 63(252), 610-612. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.12008

Way, J. (2012). Explaining the instrumental principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3), 487-506. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2011.598174

Way, J. (2012). Rationality, instrumental. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1.

Way, J. (2012). Transmission and the wrong kind of reason. Ethics, 122(3), 489-515. DOI: 10.1086/664749

Way, J. (2011). The symmetry of rational requirements. Philosophical Studies, 155(2), 227-239. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9563-7

Way, J. M. (2010). Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason. Philosophical Studies, 147(2), 213-233. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9277-2

Way, J. (2010). The normativity of rationality. Philosophy Compass, 5(12), 1057-1068. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00357.x

Way, J. (2009). Two accounts of the normativity of rationality. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 1-9.

Way, J. (2007). Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency. Analysis, 67(3). DOI: 10.1093/analys/67.3.223

Review

Way, J. (2017). Weighing Reasons, edited by Errol Lord and Barry Maguire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, xi + 301pp. ISBN: 9780199315192, hb £34.99. European Journal of Philosophy. DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12294

Book

Whiting, D. (Ed.), Way, J. (Ed.), & Mchugh, C. (2018). Normativity: epistemic and practical. Oxford University Press.

Book Chapters

Whiting, D., Mchugh, C., & Way, J. (2018). Introduction. In C. McHugh, J. Way, & D. Whiting (Eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical Oxford University Press.

Way, J. (2016). Creditworthiness and matching principles. In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 7 Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Way, J. (2013). Value and reasons to favour. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8 (pp. 27-49). (Oxford Studies in Metaethics). Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Dr Jonathan Way
Humanities University of Southampton Avenue Campus Highfield Southampton SO17 1BF United Kingdom Email: J.Way@soton.ac.uk Telephone: 023 8059 6713

Room Number:65/1043

Telephone:(023) 8059 6713
Email:J.Way@soton.ac.uk

Dr Jonathan Way's personal home page

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